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Editorial

'The date is September 25, 1993. 'The morning sun specia{[y smi[es
through the windows of the VidhanSoudha to hera[d thefirst Convocation
of the 9{fltiona[LawSchoo[ of Inaia 1.1niversity - the only raw 1.1niversity
in India.
'The gathering is impressive - judges, pofiticians, senior [awyers,
parents, facuCty and students.
'The ex;.citement is showing. 'There is
nosta(gia aU around - for a dream come true.
Loof(jng bact ...five years ago, thefirst batch ofstudents had wa[ks-d
in to a new e~eriment. Cha[[enges were formidab{e - as it was a quest
towards ex;.cef[ence. 'But despite the 'ifs' and the 'buts' and the initia[
stumb{ing, with doubts raised on us refentfess[y ... We fina[[y made it!
'Where do we go from here? - Of course to' the future - as ex;.cef[enceis
a continuous process.'Bul- we now go with confidence. 'This confidence is
based on conviction and the reafity - of the fact that we have everything
to succeed - a very rear potentia[ for ex;.cef[ence. It is time to be more
ambitious and to spread our wings and be a[[ set to reach higher sf(jes.
'The sper[ is broks-n as the Presiden t of India arrives. 'The en tourage
comes in red by the 1?f-gistrar hording a mace fo[[owed by the Visitor of
t].£LSNl - the Chief Justice of India, the 'Director, the Chief Minister,
the members of various counci[s, the senior facu[ty - a[{ dressed in
bright, riCh co[oured gowns.
I t is now time for the most awaited
moment of the day. 'The invocation song from the Vedas is sung
reverentia[[y .. 'There is an unusua[ air of serenity and so[emnity a{[
around. Y1.fter the 'Director's report, the Visitor dedares the Convocation
open. Y1.sound of app[ause fo[[ows as meda[s and degrees are given.
'Then the President deavers the first Convocation address. 'These bright
young graduates, WhO have just graduated, view raw as an instrument
for socia[ change and human were being. Y1.nattitude incu[cated in them
through the five [ong years of hard worf(at t].£LSI1.1. Proud[y hoUing
their degrees, they now step ou t into the sun[ight towards their respec tive
goa[s.
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'Thisjournal contains the first Convocation aaaress of the Presitfent
of Inaial 1Jr. Shan/(szr 1Jaya{ Sharma. 13 esitfesl this issue offers a
multiplicity of views on issues £ik!- human rightsl rule of {awl regal
systeml regal profession ana regal eaucation. It contains synopsis of
some of the aissertations of our maitfen M.phi{. scholars. We hope you
enjoy this issue which is aeaicatea to ourfirst Convocation ana we move
onl as we have a (ong way to go ...
Jt5na '.Bajpai

ADDRESS BY DR. SHANKER DAYAL SHARMA
PRESIDENT
AT THE FIRST CONVOCATION
SCHOOL

OF INDIA
OF THE NATIONAL

OF INDIA UNIVERSITY,
Saturday,

25 September

LAW

BANGALORE
1993

3 Asvina 1915 (Saka)

It gives me great pleasure to associate myself with the First Convocation of
the National Law School of India University. I thank the authorities in the
University for their kind invitation to me to be with you on this important
occasion.
The National Law School of India University (NLSIU) has been developed in
terms of the various branches of its curriculum, building offaculty strengths, the
innovative approaches towards effective teaching with its emphasis on maximum
teacher-student interaction, practical exposure to legal mechanisms, and the
value-based inter disciplinary approach towards learning, understanding and
application of law. I would like to congratulate the authorities of the University
and all others for their effort in putting this unique institution on a soundfooting
in such a short period of time.
This Convocation marks the entrance of the first batch of graduates from the
National Law School of India University into the legal fraternity in our country.
I have pleasure in extending to them my greetings and felicitations. The students
of the first generation in this institution have special importance. The progress
and performance of each student will, in a way, reflect the efficacy and social
value of the instruction imparted in the NLSIU.
is the motto of this University and this brings
Friends, "fJ1if Tl!:i'frr -if~:"
to mind the imn~ensely profound heritage of thought concerning Law that belongs
to us. Philosophies, doctrines, concepts and perceptions of great refinement
enrich the corpus of legal thinking in our country. Ideas bearing a perennial
relevance have been expressed with remarkable precision from the earliest times.
(Dharma is a word that has entered the lexicon of the English language.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary gives the following meaning: 'dharma': n.
[Skt.fr. dharayati he holds;] akin to Lfirmusfirm:
custom or law regarded as
duty: the basic principles of cosmic or individual existence: Nature: conformity
to one's duty and nature. The Concise Oxford Dictionary has it as : Right
behaviour, virtue; the Law [Skt = a decree, custom}). The Rg. Veda refers to the
existence of 'Sanat Dharmani' or ancient ordinances. Considering the antiquity
of the Rg. Veda itself as humankind's earliest literature, one may only conjecture
as to the even greater antiquity of these ordinances which even the thinkers in the
period of the Rg. Veda considered ancient. The concept of 'Dharma' has
therefore been with usfor time immemorial. What does Dharma mean? The word
is clearly de rivedfrom the root 'Dh.r'-:-which denotes: 'upholding', 'supporting "
'nourishing' and 'sustaining '. "~mr
qrf: "- that which upholds is Dharma.
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In the Karna Parva of the Mahabharata,

f..mfr~ifm

mT~
<1IT

~

Fm:.~*

tr

V~:/

"111

mr f.r~:

Verse-58
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in Chapter 69 says:

I

(Dharma is for the stability of society, the maintenance of social order and the
general well-being
and progress of humankind.
Whatever conduces to the
fulfilment of these objects is Dharma; that is definite.)
The Brhadaranyakopanisad
supreme status:

"tr #q

0?1~

identified

err ~4Jir4~\if('f

~Wt+lf~~(m

~/

Qifur <f~ -mrr /

r:r:ci

drf ~

tr

cR~

its

ifi

3I.,M14f-CfM74f·tf~/It"tfd

JT~

err ~

"111

Dharma with Truth, and declared

"111:

1PI err ~

ffi'lr ~

em: d t+I frtI r4"

trrli CfC.dlr4dC.l-#~7Pi

srcrfrr/"

["There is nothing higher titan dharma.
Even a very weak man hopes to
prevai lover a ve ry strong man 011 the strengt h of dha rma, just as (he prevails over
a wrong-doer) with the help oJ the King. So what is called Dharma is really Truth.
Therefore people say about a man who declares the truth that he is declaring
dharma and about one ll'ho declares dharma they say he speaks the truth. These
two (dharma and truth) are this"]
A similar thought is expressed in the Ayodhya-kanda
in Verse-lO, Sarga-109:

of the Valmiki Ramayana,

tr,

"tfr4~CfI1-mi

~T~rcFt WfTrf'rl{

I

~
trr<T ffiq;-: ~:

1/"

(From the ancient times the constitutional
system depends 011 the foundation of
Truth and social sympathy. Truth is thefundal/lental
basis of the State; indeed the
whole universe reSts on Truth.)
The Rig. Veda stotes that the Law and Truth are eternalsublimation:
"w:"ii

tr trrli m~emr.. rrrmh~l"
- Rig Veda X-l90-1

The Niti Vakyamrit
'JTPl

tmTef

m~

The Yajnavalkya

'f1f:/"

Smriti states:

"~frf: 'f1[frf:~:

===f'f17ir:

begins with the statement:

'RWf ~ rY4~/r~'1:
CfimT

~fffmf ~//"

I

born of sacrifice

and
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(The Sruti. the Smriti, the approved usages, that which is agreeable
most self or good conscience, and has sprungfrom due deliberation.
as the foundation
of DJiarma.)
Chanakya has stated: ""71fur "ITTW .:'rC/wnakya
Morality sustain the world."
The Vaisesikasutra

04/<94f«l~:1

<roh~:

J>.i4tf/tffo,<;,:

"Ff"71f

RrR

Sutram 234) "Law and

defines Dharma: as "that from which results true happiness":

"3TmoT ~

The Bhagwad

to one's inner
are ordained

~

~:II"

Gita refers to:
J>.i"l[: I/"

Focussing on aspects of Dharma in the Artlwsastra.
Kautilya has indicated
it "as the basis for securing and preserving poll'er over the earth."
II

rrFlT:

1'~

T'T'ft

MT'<i4/M'f/4/4:
'

~"I:m(»lf~Ir111
",J""""

"

TIle essential aspect of our ancient thought concerning Law was the clear
recognition of the supremacy of Dltarma and the clear articulation of the status
of'Dha I"/naI, somewltat in terms of the modern concept of the Rule of Law, i.e. of
all being sustained and regulated by it.
The Mahabharata
has expressed
Verse-3 (1), Chapter-90 says:

"~<rrRT

this with great clarity.

In the Shanti Parva

I"

'IT'Tf! '1 ~T~

of the King is the maintenance

that is. "the proper function
enjoying tile luxuries of life").

of the law. not

It then reiterates:
"~

U>itTWT-s,'ff

f1Tf:

J>.igrr{"

fl[ff:

/I"

-Shanti Parva, Verse-20.

Ch. 90

(Law only is supreme. so t lie king wlto regulates
discharges II is functions appropriately.)

society

In Verse-9 of Chapter-5 in tile Ashrama
Dhritrashtra
states to Yudhistllira:
"~

TI\i'lf

VTCFi

"71fur

in fulfi lment of the law

Vasika Parva of the Mahabharata,

W~
TIItTf{~~I
~R"l[ /'W'f/tf/'fO()1TrTII"

(the State only to be preserved

by Dharma-under

the Rule of Law.)

These perceptions oftlte Rule of Law were echoed by ancient thinkers in the
West. Aristotle stated that "the true relation between Law and government
is

xii
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secured by making the law sovereign and the government is servant. " Plato
reiterated this in the "The Laws", and Cicero said: "There exists a supreme and
permanent law, to which all human order, if it is to have any truth or validity,
must conform. "
The comment of Sir Edward Coke on the House of Lords' Amendment
Petition of Rights in 1628 comes to mind: "Magna Carta is such a fellow
will have no sovereign!"
Later, many thinkers
including
further developed this view-point.

Augustine.

Austin,

Fortesque

to the
that he

and others

The .Rule of Law in our ancient thought was strictly co-related with the
purpose of securing social well being. Kautilya in his Arthasastra has said:
"1J~
ot/rHllJ4'

W: ~

tJ;Ci

n-ri

TI'JI":

'rJ

1J~~

n-#

n-rr1[J

ftJ<i n-r17{JI"

- Kautilya.

Arthasastra,

1-9-39.

(In the happiness "Ofhis populace is the king's happiness. in their welfare. his
own. His good is not that which pleases him, but that which pleases his people.)
The Markandeya

Purana expresses

"~ffir.fifrJm lot r4Jj,
"RR! ~ ~mf.r ~
~tf"4~

~!!~

1fT &TTf!IT~

fJ

MW{

of Dharma

as:

I

fcr;;r;frqfqll

frrmicti7f.:r ~

'rJ1

'IT<MJ 'rJ II

~~~

wnff

4~IH~)~~mf.r~~
r~/qH~

en.J"

the purpose

/I;,'oJ/lolotiylro(~

-;;r;fl

4(t-4(S(1I

(Ch. 188. Verse 12-17)
(That all persons may be happy, may express each other's happiness, that there
may be welfare of all, all being free from fear and disease; cherish goodfeelings
and sense of brotherhood,
unity and friendship)
It is this stress on the identification
of Dharma with Truth and social-wellbeing, Duty and Service that impelled Yudhisthira to express his own ambition,
as Dharmaraja,
in the words:
"rr red

Cfl~

Cflrz:rcrr ~: W ~

<:r-r<i

rr

m rr T's:{~1

1JTfUr;rf

3/1 orotI ~I otH. /I

"

(I seek no kingdoms nor heavenly pleasure or personal salvation, since to relieve
humanity from its manifold pains and distresses is the supreme objective of .
mankind).
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It is in this context that the phrase 1ilrf ~
'Victory of Dharma' could be
understood, as employed by the Malayan Emperor, Ashoka, in his rock edict at
Kalsi which proclaimed
his achievement
in terms of the moral and ethical
imperatives
of Dharma, and exemplified
the ancient dictum: ""lRIt fl1furnt ~:"
(where there is Law, there is Victory).
The ancient juristic thinkers who laid down the detailed laws of procedure in
judicial
matters:
Brahaspati,
Yagnavalkya,
Narada and a galaxy of other
brilliant minds made contributions in this connection. Narada declared the four
stages in relation to a case in terms of the connection of the case to the whole
system of the law, the bearing of the specific remedies .and the essence of
adjudication.
He speaks of different kinds of proof, of the laws of evidence,
examination
of witnesses, restraints that may be placed on defendants (These
correspond with such modern processes as attachment or arrest before judgment
and temporary injunction), Narada also classified the decrees a court may make,
he make-up of a judicial mind, the psychology of a plaintiff, et al. Narada refers
to the four types of answers that a defendant may put after a plaintiff has
submitted his claim or charge. These included a denial, a confession, a special
plea or a plea of previous judgment (the last corresponding
to the concept of
Precedent in modern jurisprudence).

I

The Katyavan Smriti represents a high point of ancient Indian jurisprudence.
Among other matters it refers to thefour stages of legal proceedings: The plaint (rff
141Jf),

tile reply (~)

the stage of deliberation

as to burden ofproof(-.:piq:;fffir), and

of the
of adducing
of proof CITn'fTTR)' He refers to the method of consideration
evidence by the court and the declaration of the judgment and order. The Law of
Evidence similarly was developed, attention being paid to the quality and character
of documents and witnesses for determining the evidentiary value. The specialized
nature of the work involved in makinga cogent presentation of the case, including
assemblage
of precedents, interpretation
of law and rules, and utilization of
various available devices to secure justice, makes it clear that such matters were
handled by experts who had made the study of law their special profession.
I have recalled aspects of this great heritage that belongs to all of us, not with
a view to our looking backfor the sake of glory, but towards drawing lessons and
guidance with a view to Ihe future. It is noteworthy that the wisdom of the
ancients, the doctrines and concepts of jurisprudence,
the system of laws, the
rules and procedural features,
could succeed only so long as the essential
purpose of Dharma and Ihe determination to uphold Dharma was maintained in
the country. Not just law or doctrine or philosophy but a climate of public opinion
and resolution to uphold law, is necessary if the benefits of the Rule of Law are
to accrue to Society. That is why the statement "Dharma Rakshati Rakshitah"
which occurs in the fifteenth verse of the eighth Chapter of the Manu Smriti, and
which is the motto of your University, is so meaningful and relevant; "Dharmo
Rakshati Rakshitah":
"who shelters and defends the law, the law defends and
shelters. "

National
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Distortions
and deJiciencies
in public outlook, beliefs, and way of life
accounted Jor the decay and demolition oj our ancient systems oJjurisprudence.
A pragmatic political thinker sllch as Kautilya,
and material advantage had declared:
"3Ur~C/drt1c{'1rf1J

<f: ~

tr

with his accent on expediency

~rr:I"

(In his Cltanakya Shastra: "He who sees all beings as one may be deemed
learned"). A cardinal principle, regarding the strength oJihe State being derived
from a sense of oneness amongst its people, was thus recognized and stated by
th(l[ expert practitioner
in the art oj governance.
But what had happened in our
country? The sense oJoneness had been ruined and, contrary to Dharma and the
laws, its place was taken by all manner of difJerentiation
of the people in
moribund, weakening divisions
of castes and sub-castes, complicated
social
prejudices,
unjust subordination,
greedy exploitation,
inhuman regimens. The
sum oj all these was the obscuring oj the pristine purity and strength oj basic
dictates of our ancient culture and our eventual reduction into bondage.
Following centuries of decli ne and eclipse of indigenous lega I structures and
traditions, a stage had been reached in our country which is lVell reflected by a
comment by Lord Macaulay during the Second Reading of the Charter Rill, later
enacted as the Charter Act, 1833. Macaulay had said: : "1 believe that no country
ever stood so much in need of a code oj lalV as India, and 1believe also that there
never was a country in which the want miglJt so easily be supplied."
With British rule came British laws and jurisprudence
and the association
with the Anglo-Saxon constitutional tradition stemming Jrom the Magna Carta oj
1215 and Roman concepts, axiollls, and doctrines. To our goodJortune,
some of
these reiterated certain principles innate to our own tradition. OJthe essence of
this stream oj thinking was the concept oj Equality before the Law. Sir Ivor
Jennings has referred to this as follows: "Equality before the law means that
among equals law should be equal and should be equally administered,
that like
should be treated alike."
The Magna Carta provided the leading ideas for constitutional
governance.
It ensured security of the person and decreed that no man may be deprived of his
established privi leges without a ltmjul judgment or otherwise than according to
law.
Lord Bryce drew comparisons
between the adoption of many branches of
English law as the law inJorce in India, and the manner in which Roman Law had
become the law oj countries within the Roman empire.
W.S. Holdsworth later comlllented: "We may expect to see that the needs oj
India may produce modifications
in English rules of law which, with the help oj
technical reasoning oJthe common law, will produce new development of common
law principles." Indeedfor over a hundred years it is precisely this that happened.
In tlle modern period our great national

leaders, most of whom were trained
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in law, naturally strove to build in India a polity sustained by law in which the
rights of the human beings. the role of the State and the imperatives of India's
special socio-cultural alld economic characteristics
could properly be addressed.
The importance of our struggle for freedom may be better appreciated
in the
historical perspective of the struggle for human rights. In 1895, the Swaraj Bill
referred to various rights of the individual among which were specially: Right to
Freedom of Sp-eech and Expression, Right t(l Equality and the Right to Vote.
Following the Montague - Chelmsford Report, The Indian National Congress
demanded that the Government of India Act should embody provisions relating to
hUlI!an rights. Later, in 1927, The Congress aT its Madras Session resolved that the
ConstiTuTion of India musT contain a declaraTion of fundamentalhullian
rights,
The Motilal Nehru Committee in 1928 expressed the continued importance
attached by the Indian people to fundamental rights. At the Session of the Indian
National Congress aT Karachi on March 29, 1931, The famous resoluTion on
fundamental
rights was adopted -having been moved hy the FaTher of the Nation,
Mahatma Gandhi. This resoluTion was III oved so ThaTThe masses might appreciate
the goals of freedom. IT was also STated thaT any ConstiTution ThaT might be
adopted should include provisions for fundamental
rights. The fundamental
rights were listed and included The following:
1-

(i)

Freedom

of association

and combinaTion;

(ii) Freedom of speech and press;
(iii) Freedom of conscience and the free profession
religion, subject to public order and morality;

and practice

of

(iv) No ~isability to attach to any person oj religion, caste or creed in
regard to Jlublic employment, office of power or honour and the
exercise of any trade or calling;
(v)

Equal rights and obligations
account of sex;

of all citizens.

No civic

(vi) Equal rights to all citizens of access to and use of public
public wells and all other places of public resort;
neutrality

bar on
roads,

2-

Religious

on the part of the State.

3-

A living wage for industhal workers, limited hours of labour, healthy
conditions of work, protection against the economic consequences
of
old age, sickness and unemplo,yment.

4-

Labour

5-

Protection of women workers,
leave during maternity period.

6-

Prohibition
factories.

to be freed from serfdom or condiTions bordering

against

employment

and specially
of children

adequate

on serfdom.
provisions

of school-going

for

age in

xvi

National
7-

Adult suffrage.

8-

Free Primary
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education.

In moving the resolution on fundamental
rights, Mahatma Gandhi also
referred to the right to protection of the culture, language and scripts of the
minority, abolition of all disabilities
attaching to women in regard to public
employment, office of power or honour, human rights in an industrial society and
avoidance of sectarian prejudice
by the State.
(Later, in 1944-45, the Tej Bahadur Sapru Committee reiterated the commitment
of Congress and the people of India for enshrinement
of human rights in our
Constitution. )
The spontaneity and wide public acceptance with which such thinking concerning
human rights was appreciated and adopted by the leading political figures of our
country and by the masses, was a powerfulfactor
in ensuring that the Constitution
when it came into being, based itself on an emphatic articulation
of essential
human rights, and the Rule of Law.
Indeed the Constitution of India gave expression to certain concepts which
have been part and parcel of our great national heritage oftllOught and wisdom
that belongs not just to people of India but to all humanity. It is not surprising
therefore that Professor Barker in his treatise on the "Principles of Political and
Social Theory" reproduced the Preamble of our Consititution in his book saying
that it seemed to him "to state in brief and pithy form the argument of much of this
book; and it may according ly serve as a keynote. I am all the more moved to quote
it as I am proud that the people of India should begin their independent life by
subscribing
to the principles of a political tradition which we in the West call
Western but which is now something more than Western."
The Preamble to the Constitution encapsulates the ideals and aspirations of
the people. The solemn words of the declaration in the Preamble in our Constitution
record the resolve of the people to constitute India into a Secular Democratic
Republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, Liberty and Equality; and to
promote amongst them all Fraternity.
The fundamental
rights guaranteed
in
Part-II I of the Constitution confer certain justiciable socio-economic
rig hts and
the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution
lay down the socio-economic
goals which the .State must strive to attain. As
Glanville Austine has observed in his book "The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone
of a Nation",:
"The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document.
The goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing
the conditions necessary for its achievement.
Yet despite the permeation of the
entire Constitution by the aim of national renascence, the core of the commitment
to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the Fundamental Rights and in
the Directive Principles of State Policy. These are the conscience of the Constitution. "
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The Constitution places the pursuit of a Welfare State before the country. It
has struck a balance between the rights and privileges of the citizen and the
power of the State to impose restraints on the exercise and enjoyment of those
rights in the interest of good Government and welfare of the State as a whole. It
provides for corrective justice. The Constitution-makers led by Dr. Babasaheb
Ambedkar who was Chairman of the Drafting Committee, had thus viewed, and
rightly so, law as an instrument for social change.
Law is not a static body of rules but rather a living creature, continually
forged and shaped to serve the needs of a community that itself is constantly
changing. Adaptability, therefore, is truly a condition sine-qua-non of the continued
existence of a legal system. Law synthesizes change and stability. The relation
between Law and social change is reciprocal. As Justice Holmes has said: "The
life of Law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time .... have .... ·good deal more to do ..... in determining the rules by which man
should be governed ...
That is why Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru while speaking on the Draft Constitution
on November 8, 1948 had said: "The Constitution if it is out of touch with the
people's life, aims and aspirations becomes rather empty; .... a Constitution
should .... be flexible ...
Later in May 1951 he had said: "A Constitution to be living must be growing;
must be adaptable; must be flexible;
must be changeable .... Therefore, it is
desirable and a good thing for people to realise that this very fine Constitution
that we have fashioned after years of labour is good in so far as it goes but as
society changes, as conditions change we amend it in the proper way. It is not like
the unalterable law of Medes and Persians that it cannot be changed, although
the world around may change .••
This approach corresponds perfe<;tlywith the incisive and telling comment of
Thomas Jefferson that: "Each generation has a right to determine the law under
which it lives; the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Law must therefore be a 'variable constant. ' Law does not exist in a vacuum.
It must remain ahead of socio-economic and political needs. The horizons of law
are expanding with the growth of modern approaches in a variety of spheres.
There are many stimuli of change when the objective is the building of a Welfare
State. There is. therefore a constant requirement of the spirit of enquiry and
reform, with a view to maintaining integrity between the law and real social
needs.
The great law teacher, Dean Roscoe Pound had stated the philosophy of
Functional Jurisprudence which views law as an instrument of social change. W.
Friedmann in his "Law in a Changing Society" has quoted Roscoe Pound as
follows: "the sociological method consists in study of a legal systemfunctionally,
as a social instrument, as a part of social control, and study of its institutions,
doctrines and precepts with respect to the social ends to be served. It presupposes
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that law is a specialized agency of social control ... While jurists have been at
these tasks, a new social order has been building which makes new demands and
presses upon the legal order with a multitude of unsatisfied desires. Once more
we must build rather than merely improve; we must create rather than merely
order and syStematise and logically reconcile details ... legal history is the record
of a continually wider recognising and satisfying of human wants or claims or
desires through social control; a more embracing and more effective securing of
social interests; a continually more complete and effective elimination of waste
and precluding friction in human enjoyment of the goods of existence - in short,
a continually more efficacious social engineering. "
There is also the neo-realistic theory propounded by Lewellyn and Jerome
Frank which treats with the propensity towards 'emotional hunch' - related to the
instinctive preferences arisingfrom personal backg round and experience. Subjective
considerations come into play and affect the way issues are perceived. The path
of Justice has to be kept clear of such hindrances. It has always to be borne in
mind that Law really subsists on the basis of objective appreciation of Truth and
Social Good.
All this places a tremendous demand on legal practitioners. There has to be
a clear recognition of the connection between Law, Truth and Welfare. These are
inseparable. These are not simply ideals or goals of altruistic endeavour. Within
the larger concept of Dharma as outlined earlier, Law, Truth and human Wellbeing form a composite of practical value to society and to every individual.
The new entrants into the legal profession will find that Law is a hard task
master. Meticulous application of mind is necessary towards gathering truth
from the ma$s of data before one, sifting the grain from the chaff as it were,
mastering relevant case law and organising a cogent, comprehensive, truthful,
persuasive, and polished presentation of the case. Glossing over inconvenient
facts or tutoring witnesses will not do. It helps in establishing oneself when one
gains a reputation for upright adherence to the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth.
An unshakable commitment to Truth; the needs of Justice, and to Duty is not
just altruistic. Such an approach is representative of practical wisdom ~
1fT7f-."
Indeed a reputationfor truthfulness will help the practitioner of law in his
legal profession as well as in other dimensions of his entire life. The word of such
a person always carries more weight with judges. Sharpness o/mind and width
and strength of intellect have their own utility, but right behaviour and a
reputation for fidelity with truth have perhaps an even greater value. A sense of
Service must rule .and regulate the total approach of the advocate. Only then
would he properly perform his rightful and appropriate duty under the aegis of
Dharma. Always it would be important for the practitioner of law to bear in mind
the ancient dictum from the Mahabharat:
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(Verse-6 Chapter-31) "The person desiring to milch the law cannot derive the
real benefit of law."
I am reminded of the opinion expressed by Sir Grimwood Mears, Chief
Justice of Allahabad High Court about Pt. Motital Nehru. According to Mears,
Motilal Nehru's position and distinction as a lawyer was due to "a profusion of
gifts; knowledge came easily to him, and as an advocate he had art of presenting
his case in its most attractive form. Every fact fell into its proper place in the
narration of the story and was emphasized in just the right degree. He had an
exquisite public speaking voice and a charm of manner which made it a pleasure
to listen to him. "
These are some of the characteristics that young advocate could cultivate
with advantage, to establish himself or herself in the complex and challenging
domain of Law.
Friends, I would like to mention with emphasis that the linkage between
axioms of law and values and resolves that individuals hold in their hearts and
minds, comprise a crucial internal element in an organised society. It is this
element which reflects how abstract ideas determine the actual lives of the
people. Members of the legalfraternity therefore have a position offar-reaching
. significance in the task of national reconstruction and the building of a better
future for all. Judges and lawyers have a key role in properly and expeditiously
responding to sqcial needs and converting political will into legal form and
tissue, of interpreting laws appropriately and in the human interest, as was said
of Solon: "Whose sturdy shield protected every party. And gave to none an unfair
victory. "
I feel certain that the specialised environment that has been created in the
National Law School of India University, and the instruction received here has
equipped you to win laurels for your Alma Mater by the service that you render
to the people attuned to our time-hono'ured concepts of Dharma and the Truth.
Let me conclude with some words from the 'Shikshaw.ali' in the Taitraiya
Upanishad, which has for ages strengthened our centres of education and
contains invaluable advice to students passing out from an institute of learning:
Sat yam Vada : Dharmam Chara;
Swadhyayanmaa Pramadaha:
Satyaa Na Pramaditavyam: Dharmaa Na Pramaditavyam:
Kusalaa Na Pramaditavyam: Bhutyai Na Pramaditavyam:
Swadhyaya Pravachanaabhyaam Na Pramaditavyam:
Aevamupasitavyam

Aevamuchaitadupaasyam"
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(Forever speak the truth, follow the Dharma,
Strive constantly towards true learning and progress,
Forever on the righteous way to welfare,
Teach the world as diligently as you learn:
Behave this way every day, Life-long, conducting yourself thus be creative and
ascendant.)
I would like to thank you once again for your kind invitation to be with you
at this function. I have expressed afew of the thoughts that were in my mind and
which, based on my experiences, Ifelt may be useful to the young people here as
they set out in their own lives, and to members of the Bench and of the Bar. Each
should do what appeals to his or her own reason and good conscience and do so
fearlessly, with faith in oneself and the Nation, and so serve to build anew India,
a better world.
JAI HIND
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FROM INTERNATIONALISM

TO GLOBALISA TION:

IMPLICA TIONS OF DUNKEL DRAFT
Dr. A. Jayagovind*

Socialism and internationalism - the key concepts of yesteryears - have been
replaced by liberalisation and globalisation. This development is welcome in the
sense that we should constantly review even our deeply-held beliefs in the light
of changing circumstances. But it is equally necessary that in that process we do
not throwaway the baby with bath water. Dunkel Draft Text, with which the
Government of India is confronted at present represents such a decisive shift both
internally (i.e. from socialism to liberalisation) and internationally (i.e. from
internationalism to globalisation); and it is the thrust of this paper that in our
anxiety to move into the "brave new world", we should not lose sight of our vital
national interests.
Socialism, shorn of its doctrinaire connotation, stands for the exercise of
deliberate control over economic activities in the wider interest ofthe community.
This is how it has been understood outside the erstwhile Community bloc. Our
Constitutional mandate, as laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c), succinctly
expresses this idea. It is submitted that in this wider sense (in contradistinction
to its doctrinaire meaning), the governments all over the world, cutting across
ideological barriers, have been socialist since Second World War. Ramsay Mac
Donald, the Prime Minister of Britain in the early thirties, echoed this idea when
he declared "we are all now Socialists".
Andrew Shonfield in his seminal work "Modern Capitalism: The Changing
Balance of Public and Private Power" 1 has graphically described how capitalism
has transformed itself from laissez - faire to unequivocal commitment to full
employment since the early thirties of this century. It is this transformation which.
converted capitalism "from catalysmic failure of great prosperity of the post-War
Western World."2 He lists some of the distinctive features of this transformed
capitalism as follows:

*

2
3

a)

VaStlYincreased influence of the Public authorities on the management
of economic system;

b)

The use of public funds for public welfare on a rising scale;

c)

Taming of violence of market place by large companies through skillful
economic planning. Large range national plans.3

Associate Professor, National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Chani:ini: Balance of Public and Private Power
(1968).
Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 66-67.
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Andrew Shonfield on his part prefers to call this new ideology as "capitalism"
albeit with the epithet "Modern".4 But what he has stated above as the distinctive
features of Modern Capitalism could be equally applied to Indian national
ideology as well. Given our socio-economic backwardness, we have probably
attempted more comprehensive national planning than what is normally obtained
in a typical Western country. But the difference is one of degree (as could be
witnessed between France and the U.S.A. as explained by Andrew Shonfield) and
not of kind. Thus we can well use the expression "socialism" in the place of
"Modern Capitalism".
Frederich Hayek, while conceding that planning (i.e. systematic governmental
intervention in national economy) operates both in capitalist and socialist states,
seeks to distinguish one from the other as follows: whereas socialist planning
restricts individual rights and initiatives, regulations of a capitalist government
seek to enbance tbem and essentially rely upon tbem.s Tbis proposition can be
well applied to a communist state, but in relation to a country like India, tbis will
be misleading. Indian State, while ass'uring its commitment to basic human rigbts
including right to property, has maintained that its mission is to make these rights
meaningful to vast majority of population. One may question the particular
strategy adopted by the Government, but as in communist countries, there was
never any deliberate effort to suppress individual initiative. Even a measure like
nationalisation of major banks was avowedly for directing the credit to small
scale industries sector and other weaker sections of society. It bas been generally
acknowledged that wbatever migbt be the deleterious impact of this measure, it
did contribute to tbe growth of small-scale industries; and to this extent, it could
be considered as the affirmation of individual rights and initiatives.
Internationalism, the basis of international economic organisation established
at tbe end of Second World War, was the extension oftbe same idea of cooperation
between sovereign states with a view to achieving this national objective of full
employment coupled with economic stability. Tbe "Bretton Woods System"6
based on the troika namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDB) and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), essentially represented this idea of internationalism.
The system, while safeguarding tbe sovereign right of a state to follow an
autonomous pattern of development, provided for inter-state cooperation in the
area of commercial relations. In brief, the system sought to infuse the benefits of
international commerce into national economic pursuits. To appreciate the significance
of this concept, it is necessary to view it in proper historical perspective.

4

Ibid at 7.

5

Frederich Hayek, Road to Serfdom (t967).
Though GATT was not concluded at Bretton Woods Conference, the expression "Bretton
Woods System" is popularly used to refer to post-war International Economic organisation in
general.
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Economy

The Bretton Woods System, as established in 1945, was the reversal of the
earlier ideal of international economic integration. The International Economic
Order, as developed in 19th century and continued upto 1914, was based upon
laissez-faire ideas.of free market and gold standard. The unwritten rules of gold
standard such as free convertibility of national currencies into gold and free
movement of gold across national frontiers ensured free international payments
system since the government, inflow and outflow of gold, consequent upon
surplus and deficit in balance of payments, automatically led to inflation and
deflation; and thereby national economy tended to correct itself.
The outbreak of First World War sounded the death-knell of the above
economy, and thereafter economy became the integral part of economic management.
When the Allied Nations gathered at Bretton Woods in 1945 to deliberate on the
future economic order, the aim was not to procreate the old liberal order based on
economic organisation in consonance with "social market economy" . 'Fhe problem
before that international gathering was aptly summed up by Richard N. Cooper as
follows:
The central problem of international economic cooperation is how to
keep the manifold benefits of expansive international economic
intercourse free of crippling restrictions while at the same time.
preserving a maximum degree of freedom for each nation to pursue
its legitimate economic objective.?
In brief, the problem was how to curtail the proclivity of government to restrict
international transactions of economic externalities broughtabout by the international
markets, and this process may go against government's commitment to maintain a
welfare state. A completely unhindered international free trade is possible, provided
there is a tight international planning which would effectively coordinate national
economic policies in global interest and the adequate financial assistance to deficit .
countries (which may be characterised as super nationalism). But given the reality
of international relations, this was not possible, and therefore, Bretton Woods
Conference settled for a rather loose regime of international cooPeration (which we
have characterised here as internationalism), among sovereign states.
Internationalism, as envisaged by Bretton Woods system, signified interstate cooperation in inter-national commercial sphere. While each state retains its
economic sovereignty in the sense of right to pursue an autonomous pattern of
economic management and development including the right to initiate appropriate
measures to maintain internal and external stability, it also believes that international
commerce would facilitate the realisation of national economic sovereignty and
requirements of free trade, the former would prevail over the later. Both the IMF
7

R.N. Cooper, The Economics ofInterdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community.
8 (1968).
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and the GATT permit the imposition of restrictions on international trade to
safeguard balance of payments position. This point may be illustrated by reference
to the following propositions:
(a) Under the Fund Agreement, it is left to the determination of each
member whether to make its currency convertible or not. In terms of
Articles of Agreement, a state while joining the IMF may choose
whether to opt for Article VIII status (Le. the obligation to make its
currency convertible) or for Article XIV status (Le. to continue with
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions).
(b) Even a member-state which has made its currency convertible can
impose exchange restrictions, if it faces balance of payments problem.
The IMF however has the authority to ensure that this right is not abused
by the concerned member state.
(c) A member is entitled to use all economic measures including the change
in exchange rate policy to tackle persistent balance of payments problem
(Le. "fundamental disequilibrium" in Fund's terminology). Keynes,
who as British delegate played a leading role in the establishment of
IMF, considered this as an important innovation introduced by the IMF
in contrast to the earlier gold standard. Ashe put it in the course of
British House of Lords debate on the Agreement,
In fact the plan introduces an epoch-making innovation in an international
instrument, for instead of maintaining the principle that the internal
value of a national currency should conform to a prescribed, de jure
external value, it provides that the external value should be altered
if necessary so as to conform to whatever de facto internal value
results from domestic policies which themselves shall be immune
from the Fund.8
(d) A member facing balance of payments problem, is entitled to receive
temporary financial assistance from the Fund. Further, a member running
surplus in balance of payments continuously is required to table corrective
measures to reduce the surplus, to this extent balance of payments
adjustment is considered as a matter of international concern.
(e) Under the GATT, a member's sovereign right to use tariff as an effective
instrument of economic policy is recognised. It may reduce tariff on
incoming goods on reciprocal basis with its trading partners and the
tariff rounds including the recent Uruguay Round were essentially
intended for this purpose.

8

131, House of Lords Debate, 845 (23 May, 1944). The provision referred herein was incorporated
into the Fund Agreement.
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(f)

Though quantitative
restrictions
are normally prohibited,
entitled to use them under the supervision of the GATT
balance of payments crisis.

a state is
to meet a

(g)

Restrictions associated with intellectual property rights are considered
as legitimate exceptions to GATT regime. These rights are treated
separately under Paris Convention and it is left to the sovereign right of
a state whether to subscribe to this convention, and even this convention
laid down a few broad principles for inter-state cooperation in matters
relating to intellectual property rights; and the organisation of intellectual
property regime within a country is mostly left to the determination
of
the concerned government.

All the above characteristics conform to the concept of international cooperation
between sovereign states. Even with regard to conditionalities
associated with
the IMP's financiai assistance, there was no definite authority in the original Fund
Agreement. In fact, the expressions used in the Fund Agreement such as sale,
purchase and repurchase
to refer to the Fund's financial assistance
and the
repayment
thereof seem to support Keyne's point of view that the Fund's
management
took the view from the very beginning that it can impose conditions
on the use of Funds resources so as to make such use temporary. In course of time,
this decision paved the way for stand-by arrangements.
With the sharpening of
North-South divide, conditionalities
embodied therein have assumed ideological
overtones and become extremely controversial.

Liberalisation
The election of Ronald Regan as the President of the U.S.A. in 1980 was as
much a milestone in international relations as the election of Franklin Roosevelt
in 1932. The ideologies they represented had tremendous impact nationally as
well as internationally.
With the disintegration
of communist bloc in Eastern
~urope, the new trend, represented by President Reagan, is interpreted as the
affirmation
of the final triumph of market-ideology
over all other ideologies.
Liberalisation
has become' the new catch-word and it signifies the process of
working out market-ideology in concrete situations. Under most of the circumstances,
it has meant the rolling the state back from economic activities.
The process of liberalisation,
when extended to international
sphere, has
come to known as -globalisation. It aims at converting the world into one market
wherein, tbeoretically
speaking, both capital and labour should ,move freely. The
role of governments
would be tbat of municipal bodies providing only local
services. In practice, however, globalisation as is understood at present seeks to
facilitate the movements of only capital. The movement of labour is supposed to
fall within the domain of immigration laws to be determined by respective states.
This indicates
corporations
which seem to be orchestrating
the moves in this
regard. In terms of international relations, globalisation seeks to overturn internationalism
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which upholds the authority of state over market. It is submitted that the proposed
Dunkel Draft Text (DDT) seeks to usher in the process of liberalisation and
globalisation.,
DDT is the most ambitious international instrument ever conceived. Quite a
large number of provisions of this complex documents aim at elaborating the
existing provisions of the GATT relating to trade in goods. These provisions are
generally welcome since they would tighten the existing regime. But it breaks
new ground in relation of agriculture, investment measures, services and intellectual
property rights. The thrust is to roll back the state in all these areas so as to
facilitate the free play of market forces nationally as well as internationally.

Agriculture
Agriculture was kept outside the purview of the GATT as states all over the
world tend to protect their agriculture. The DDT seeks to throw open the entire
agriculture sector to market forces. It may be noted that it was the issue relating
to liberalisation of trade in agricultural commodities which created deadlock in
Uruguay Round between the U.S.A. and European bloc.
DDT seeks to realise its objective by two broad policy measures: (a) tariffication
and (b) reduction of governmental support provided to agriculture operations.
Tariffication means that a state should rely only on tariffs to safeguard its
interests in a particular sector and it should completely give up the use of
quantitative restrictions and other restrictive measures for this purpose. DDT
requires member states to rely on tariffication in their agricultural sectors. For
this purpose, to start with, all members are required to convert their existing
restrictive measures into their tariff equivalents as per the method elaborated in
Annex. 32 of the Chapter on Agriculture. These tariffs should be reduced starting
from 1993 upto 1999 as prescribed in DDT. Even when there are no significant
imports of agriculture commodities, minimum access opportunities shall be
established as specified in Annex.2, Part B.
As far as governmental support to agriculture is concerned, DDT seeks to
reduce by 20% government subsidies to promote export and also domestic
support to agriculture in general (defined as "aggregate measure of support" in
DDT). Article 9 (of the, Text on Agriculture) lists six types of export subsidies
which have to be phased out over a period of time as elaborated in the relevant
provisions ofDDT. The fist includes subsidies contingent upon export performance,
payments to reduce the costs of transportation and marketing, etc. Other export
subsidies if any, not specifically mentioned in Article 9, should not be used in
such a way as to circumvent the eradication commitments undertaken by a
member. Even export credits, export credit guarantees and insurance programmes
provided by a member, should be in conformity with international standards. It
may be noted that the GATT also prohibits subsidies (to industrial exports) in a
general way; but DDT measures are very precise and thorough-going in this
regard.
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Article 6 (of Text on Agriculture) lays down that domestic support to
agriculture shall not exceed 5% of total value of production (10% for developing
countries like India) in the case of product-specific support These domestic
support measures would include all measures which have trade distortion effect
or effects on production. Any measure which has the effects of providing pricesupport to producers definitely comes within the purview of the prohibition. All
these measures, in so far as they exceed 5% limit (or 10% limit for developing
countries), they shall be reduced over a period as specified in Annex.2 of Text on
Agriculture. Only permissible domestic support measures are government service
programmes such as research facilities, advisory services relating to pest control
and other useful information, etc.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex.2 come down upon public stock-holding for food
security purposes (i.e. public distribution system in Indian context). DDT requires
that purchases and sales by governments in this connection shall be made at "no
less than current domestic market price for the product and quality in question".
It is clear from the above that DDT drastically curtails state's authority over
agriculture starting from production upto international marketing. Even public
distribution system is not spared because of fear of market distortion. As the
things stand now, the toughest opposition to the above provision comes from
European community and Japan which view them as conspiracy hatched by
American farm lobby. If accepted in the present form, these provisions will have
serious impact on India as well, since our governments provide various support
measures to agriculture by way of bench-mark price fixation, subsidized irrigation
and power supplies, etc., which are forbidden by DDT. Many people claim that
these measures will not add upto 10% of the value of total production as fixed by
DDT at present. But even then, it should be a matter of serious concern to us that
our agricultural policy should be dictated by a foreign body in the name of
globalisation.
Removal of agricultural subsidies would push up commodity prices in developed
countries and this would adversely hit developing countries which, taken as a
group, are net importers of food grains. Some farmer lobbies in India, such as the
one led by Sharad Joshi support DDT on the assumption that India can gain by
exporting agricultural commodities. But once India is integrated into world
commodity market, the prices of food. grains within India are bound to go up in
consonance with world commodity prices. The Government being hamstrung by
various provisions of DDT as described above may find it very hard to ensure
food security to weaker sections of the society.
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
These are intended to remove investment measures that distort or restrict
international
trade. DDT treats these measures as extensions of a member's
obligations under Articles III (i.e. obligation to accord national treatment to
imported goods) and XI (i.e. obligation not to impose quantitative restrictions on

8

National

Law School Journal

[1994

goods coming into the country) of the GATT. The illustrative list of measures
prohibited hereunder reads as follows:
(a) the requirement that an enterprise shall purchase or use only products
of domestic origin or from domestic source;
(b) the requirement than an enterprise's purchase or use of imported
products shall be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of
local products it exports;
(c) the requirement that an enterprise shall export certain percentage of its
local production or upto certain value.
All members are expected to report to the GATT, the TRIMs, which they have
been imposing, within ninety days of entry into force of this decision and
eliminate them within a period of next two years. A developing country like India
can deviate from this obligation temporarily as provided in Article XVIII of the
GATT.
The provisions relating to TRIMs drastically affects a state's authority to
regulate investments, foreign as well as local, within its territory. In the aftermath
of liberalization in India, many foreign enterprises such as Pepsi and Coke are
allowed to operate in low priority consumer items with the hope that the part of
the local production will be exported. One of the serious allegation against TNCs
are that they indulge in transfer pricing, i.e. they tend to import their requirements
from their sister units located in foreign countries at administrated prices with a
view of defeating the local competition. Th~ prohibitions relating to TRIMs
leave the governments helpless in combating such situations. The Government of
India has built up its industrial capacity over a period of time by assiduously
supporting domestic concerns. It is one thing that our industries should stand up
to foreign competition; but it is a totally different thing if the Government is
helpless to counteract the machinations of foreign enterprises. Therefore, we
should be extremely wary of these provisions.
Services

DDT seeks to treat services on par with goods and thereby extend the
provisions of a GATT to cover services as well. The expression "service" is
defined for this purpose as any service except services supplied in the exercise of
governmental functions. And trade in service is defined as the supply of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Party into the territory of any other Party;
(b) in the territory of one Party to the service consumer of any other Party;
(c) through the presence of service providing entities of one Party in the
territory of any other Party;

(d) by natural persons of one Party in the territory of any other Party.
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includes

the

establishment of foreign enterprises in areas su~h as banking, insurance, telecommunications,
etc., (which are specifically provided in the schedules to the Text on Services) in
the national territory. It must be pointed out, however, that a state is not under
an automatic obligation to provide free access to foreign companies offering
services, but under Article XIX of the Text on Services, member states are
expected to negotiate with each other in multilateral forum to reduce barriers to
the movement of services cutting across national frontiers. The problem which a
country like India,.which has a fairly well-developed
service with trade in go<?ds,
can face is that a developed country can force a country like India to allow free
entry for its service enterprise in return for entry of Indian goods into its territory.
Under Article XVII of the Text on Services, a State must provide national
treatment to services and services providers of any other member state. Payments
in foreign exchange to foreign service providers shall not be restricted except in
the case of serious balance of payments crisis. Any such restriction shall be in
conformity with the Fund Agreement and shall be progressively phased with the
improvement
in balance of payments situation.
Article XVI of the Text on services describes the implications of undertaking
a commitment in service sector. These implications would include, inter alia, that
the concerned state shall not impose any limitation on the total number of persons
employed, on the participation of foreign capital and on the kind of legal regime
the concerned enterprise has to adopt. In other words, the permission
to a
particular service seems to preclude th~ state from prescribing any limit on its
activities in the interest of foreign exchange.
According to Article XXI, a state which has undertaken commitment
in
regard to particular service cannot go back on it, unless it makes a compensatory
adjustment with the party concerned. This would be applicable even when a state
decides to give monopoly rights to a particular unit in an area wherein it has
undertaken commitment.
The Annex to the Text on Services categorically
states that this Agreement
shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to employment,
nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship or residency rights. Thus
labour per se is excluded from the scope of the agreement.
On the whole, the provisions seem to weigh heavily in favour of TNCs from
developed countries. The main objection from developing countries'
point of
view is that they are forced to grant several concessions without any reciprocal
advantage. Despite the exhortation in the Agreement that the developing countries
should be encouraged to develop their capabilities in the service sector, DDT
does precious little in this regard. Only definitive obligation upon the developed
countries, as provided in Article IV, is to establish contact points to supply
information regarding markets, availability of service technology, etc. This is far
from the developing countries'
expectation regarding some definitive commitments
on transfer of technology.
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Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
The provisions relating to TRIPs have become the most controversial of all
the provisions of DDT. This is mainly for two reasons;
(a) These provisions force countries like India to accept undertakings in an
area to which they have bee~ opposed all along. Since DDT requires to
be accepted as a whole, any opposition to TRIPs push the country out
of international trade regime.
(b) DDT goes much farther than what has been so far provided on conventions
on intellectual property such as Paris Convention.
The Text on TRIPs covers copyrights, trade-marks and patents. In all these
areas, TRIPs impose obligations additional to those imposed by international
conventions so far. As far as patents are concerned, Article 27 of the Text
provides that patents shall be available for any inventions, whether produce or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. In other words, a member
cannot exclude a particular area from patentability, unless it is in conformity with
Article 27 (3) providing for exceptions to patentability. Both product and process
patents have to be conceded in all the areas covered by DDT. This provision goes
much farther than Paris Convention on Intellectual Property Rights which allowed
the State to determine the area of Patentability.
Only exceptions to patentability under Article 27 (3) are:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans
or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-parties
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system.
As a result, Indian policy not to ~llow patents in agriculture and horticulture
and to allow. only process patents in food and pharmaceuticals will be affected.
The implication of the second part of (b) above is not clear. The recent statement
of the Government of India that it proposes to enact a legislation guaranteeing
plant breeder's.right show the uncertainty inherent in that formulation.
Under Article 33 of the Text, Patent protection shall not be less than for a
period of twenty years from the date of filing. This also contravenes Indian policy
to prescribe different periods ranging from 7 to 14 years for different kinds of
products.
The authority of the Government of India to invoke the sanction of compulsory
licensing under Indian Patent Act, 1970, would be considerably diluted under
DDT. Under section 84 of Indian Patent Act, if the reasonable requirements of
public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the
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patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price, the
concerned patent may be compulsorily licensed by the Government. The reasonable
requirements of public would include the supply to foreign markets as well.
Article 31 of Dunkel Text on TRIMs on the other hand, does not make the nonworking of patent per se a ground for governmental intervention. The government
can hereunder intervene only if patent holder fails to license it on "reasonable
commercial terms within a reasonable period of time". A patent holder may well
use the standard of "reasonableness" to stall the governmental moves. Any such
use should be predominantly for domestic market. In all cases of governmental
intervention, patent holder should be paid adequate remuneration, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.
Drug and Pharmaceuticals industry which would be immediately affected by
DDT has been rigorously campaigning against DDT. By and large, the academic
and general public opinion in India strongly oppose the consequent dilution of
State's authority over intellectual property rights.
Quo Vadis?
"It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive natural liberty in their
economic activities. The world is not so governed from above that private and
social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice
they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that
enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor.is true that
self-interest is generally enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to
promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these.
Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are
always less clear-sighted than when they act separately",9 wrote John Maynard
Keynes, reputed to be the saviour of capitalism from the brink of disaster. But
surprisingly what Keynes, and following him others as well, had decisively
rejected years ago is being resurrected in the name of globalisation. States are
asked to dismantle their protective and regulato"ry mechanisms in the hope that
multinational corporations would usher in an era of prosperity all over the world.
Uruguay Round clearly demonstrates to liS that what we have in West today is not
~arket economy in Adam Smith's sense, but the state is prepared to expose its
weak economic spots to the blow of market forces. As a bloc, they fiercely protect
their inefficient textile industry in blatant violation of GATT rules. Even under
DDT, they have reluctantly agreed to remove restrictions in this area over a
period of ten years, the longest period for similar methods thereunder.
It is nobody's case that socialism and internationalism have proved to be
unalloyed success. The antidote of liberalization requires to be administered
hereunder to reduce the rigidity developed into the system. But to quote Keynes
from the very same essay, "we cannot settle on abstract grounds, but handle on
9
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its merits in detail, what Burke termed one of the finest problems in legislation,
namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the
public wisdom, and what it ought to direct by the public wisdom, and what it
ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion" .10 In
other words, liberalisation should proceed on the basis of pragmatic considerations.
In Indian context, what was good in the fifties and sixties need not hold good in
the nineties and we should have courage to review our economic strategy in the
light of changing circumstances and take appropriate measures.
Globalisation should be based on the same pragmatic considerations. It is true
that our sheltered economy should be exposed to external competition. But in the
name of competition, the local industrial base should not be totally swept off. As
was pointed out above, the huge TNCs can always count upon the backing of their
government, and as against them, if our local industries complain about the
absence of "level playing field", the issue should be seriously looked into.
Finally, it should be remembered that the big foreign companies are not
global in the sense of world-wide share holding and they are global only in the
sense of their area of op·eration. As a result, it is not logical to expect them to be
as much concerned with the fate of host country as with their home country. The
governments eager to open up their economy to multinationals should be selective
in their policies.
It seems that DDT has already become afait accompli and India probably will
have no choice but to accept it. But it should still be possible for India to
manoeuvre within the space available and safeguard its national interests.

10
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NINETEENTHCENTURY GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE HISTORICAL
SCHOOL OF LAW AND LEGAL POSITIVISM
Gerhard Dilcher*

Since the Middle Ages, German jurisprudence has stood in the shadow of the
legal accomplishments of other European nations. The Italians founded medieval
legal science with the School of Bologna, which rediscovered the Corpus luris
Ci vilis in the twelfth century and completed its methodology. In the fifteenth and'
sixteenth centuries the French competed successfully with Italians and surpassed
them with the development of a modem, humanistic methodology, the Mos
Gallicus. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Dutch broadened traditional
jurisprudence to a natural and international law - the name Hugo Grotius stands for
this - and to a modem, but historically founded "elegant" jurisprudence. Since the
seventeenth century there have been a number of great German jurists, for example
Samuel Pufendorf, and in the eighteenth century Germans such as Christian Wolff
took part in the development of a rational law of reason, which formed the basis of
later codifications of private law. Germanjurisprudence did not reach an internationally
leading position, however, until the first half of the nineteenth century with the
founding of the Historical School, which is inseparably bound to the name of its
founder, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Savigny's works have been internationally
noted, received and translated. Attention and influences 'were not limited to
Savigny's work: the entire German legal science received throughout the nineteenth
century until the First World War international consideration and took up a leading
position in legal developments throughout Europe. Lines of influence can be traced
in the German speaking countries Austria and Switzerland, in Italy, France,
England and Scandinavia. The German Historical School of Law supplanted to a
large extent the influence of the French Ecole de l' Ex~g~se, which was based on
the great civil codi.fication, the Code civil of 1804. At the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth century many countries, including
Japan, China, Greece and Turkey, looked less to France as an example than to the
German Civil and Commercial Codes or their relatives, the Swiss codifications.
German law gained considerably on prestige in Europe through its Historical
School of Law, and the causes for this shall be examined in the following.
As a frame for the development of German jurisprudence we must of course
keep in mind the political and constitutional conditions in Germany. These form
a background, not a basis, for nineteenth-century German legal development.
This was different in France, where politics and legal culture were more closely
linked. In France, the Revolution of 1789 eliminated the feudal system with a
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single blow and created a modern nation-state, which then under Napoleon
proceeded to a·comprehensive codification. The great codifications of the first
decades of the nineteenth century formed the basis from then on for the development
of legal culture in France.
In Germany the development was more gradual. The Holy Roman Empire of
the German Nation, essentially a creation of the Middle Ages, provided the
political context for German life until it broke apart in 1806 under the attack of
revolutionary France. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had in its
basic laws a constitutional frame, with the Emperor, the Imperial Diet and,
perhaps most importantly, the two highest imperial courts, the Imperial Camerla
Tribunal and the Imperial Aulic Council, as institutions of legal protection. Legal
scholars at the universities interpreted and taught the many different laws of the
particular state's, countries and cities, as well as Roman law, which was the
common law of the Empire. Especially the Gottingen University in the Principality
of Hanover developed in the late eighteenth century a legal science dealing in a
very exact historical analysis with Roman law, German private law and imperial
constitutional law . The most important professors of the Gottingen School were
Gustav Hugo for Roman law and Stephan Putter for German law and imperial
constitutional law . I shall return later to this school of though its importance for
the development of the Historical School.
In Germany, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation broke apart under
the influence of the French Revolution and Napoleon in 1806 through the
abdication of Kaiser Franz II, but a revolution, then or later after the collapse of
Napoleonic rule from 1813 to 1815, never took place. Instead, the princes of the
German territorial states initiated social and administrative reforms with the help
of their bureaucrats, who were legally educated noblemen or burghers. These
reforms brought the Germans to the conviction that a revolution with its devastating
consequences was superfluous. As early as in the late eighteenth century,
Prussia, which was next to Austria the leading German state, introduced reforms
of courts, procedure and legal education, as well as a comprehensive legal
codification, the Prussian Law Code of 1794. The Germans were of the opinion,
that their path to modern society and modern law did not lead throu'gh a
revolution, but through organic reforms. England was an example for the
Germans of such a development. The carriers of legal reforms were the princes,
their ministers 'and bureaucrats. However these princes were bound to the old
aristocracy and consequently to the feudal system. For this reason the danger was
constant, that reform projects would not be cat;ried through or would be swept
aside in periods of restorative politics.
From decade to decade, however, the interest of the German bourgeoisie in
the continuation of reforms grew. These were developing at the same time into a
new social class. This class was not nearly as well defined as the French or
English middle class, particularly not in the economic sense, For German bourgeoise,
money, property and economic strength were less constituting factors than
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cultivated education and an intellectual culture based on classical German
literature of the late eighteenth century, particularly that of Lessing, Herder,
Goethe and Schiller, and the humanities, which were intensively expanding since
the turn of the century. This emerging bourgeoise found its class identity and
consciousness as well as its political role in culture, education and science. The
class of burghers understood its political role as a party of progress, as a party of
liberalism as well as a factor of national unity in spite of the separation of
Germany in principalities, which were bound together politically only loosely by
the German Confederation. The term "organic" characterizes this evolutionary
historical principle.
The German Confederation, which was included by the Austrian Chancellor
Metternich at the Congress of Vienna in a European balance of power plan with
the main powers England, France, and Russia, achieved its purpose until the
middle of the century, to promote European peace and stability after the devastating
Napolenoic wars. But because of its loose politcal form it did not have the power
to introduce uniform laws in the states of the confederation. This was a great
impediment for economic development and industrialization, which was just
beginning in Germany. The law still contained many rules and definitions from
the feudal system which were of little use in a liberal bourgeois society. The
German bourgeoisie was interested in both legal unity and the developing law of
modern, liberal industrial society. This interest, along with the more political
questions of a constitution and the creation of a nation-state, grew among the
German bourgeoisie. These political demands became obvious in the Revolution
of 1848 and in the first German national parliament in the Paulskirche in
Frankfurt in 1848 and 1849. They found their fulfilment in the foundation of the
German Empire in 1871 under Prussian rule and Bismarck's leadership. A unified
law was created for the first time under this Empire, crowned by the enactment
of the German Civil Code of the First of January 1900. Until tben, German legal
scholarship was challenged with the task of unification and modernization of all
areas of private law. This great task and its fulfillment by German jurisprudence
gained through its high quality international renown.
This closes the basic historical constellation. I shall now trace the founding
substance, method and theory which contributed to the fulfillment of this task.
Exactly this question of the formation of a future civil law for Germany
became the subject of the most famous legal-political' controversy of the German
language in 1814, after the defeat of Napoleon and before the new German order
of the Congress of Vienna. In two legal pamphlets, which were read and discussed
not only by jurists, but by a broader educated bourgeois public as well, disputed
two of the most well-known young German professors. One, Thibaut, was from
Western Germany near the French border and a law professor at the famous
University of Heidelberg. The other, Savigny, was a professor at the new
university in the Prussian capital Berlin, which was founded in 1810 based on the
ideas of the humanistic reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt. Both authors agreed,
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that in light of the political situation of several separate German states and the
legal needs of society a legal reform was necessary. Their answers as to the
vehicle and the means of the reform were however quite different. Thibaut
criticized in his paper "On the Necessity of a Civil Law for Germany" the existing
legal condition of an unclear mixture of old Roman case law and German law. He
saw the solution in tbe creation of a German national code, wbich could be written
in two to four years on the basis of the French Civil Code. Such a code could
provide regulation for the growing economic relations as well as a basis for "civil
happiness". Tbibaut's solution strikes one as being modern. It could have
founded an exegetic legal school similar to tbat of France, but failed due to the
lack o( political backing from the German princes for a codification.
Very different was the solution presented by Savigny in his pamphlet, "On the
Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Legal Scholarship", which advocates
entrusting legal scholarship with the task of legal reform. Savigny's proposal
was politically more realistic and his argumentation was more profound. He
begins "On the Vocation of Our Time" with a study of the beginnings of all law .
"Law", he writes, "does not lead an isolated existence, but forms an expression
of all powers and activities of a particular people and is as much a product of the
people as language, customs and constitution. It develops in an organic connection
with the nature and character of the people." Savigny and others later referred to
this connection as being based on the "Volksgeist", the spirit of a people. In this
sense law for Savigny was "life itself, seen from a particular angle." He goes on
in tbe pamphlet to describe the evolution of law, as we would say in modern
terms. With the progress of culture the areas of activities specialize and with them
professions and their subjects. A class of jurists emerges, in whose hands law
becomes a science. Along with the connection to culture as the political element
of law, law develops through science a technical element. This legal technique
can be administered only by trained jurists.
In Germany and in the European Continent however, in contrast to England
wbose quite different development Savigny assessed positively ,in the very moment
of legal specialization Roman law was adopted. It represents the material of the
activity of European jurists necessarily, because the classic Roman jurists of
Antiquity developed legal tecbnique and juristical terminology to a high state of
perfection. Savigny compares this perfection of terms, rules and methods on the
one hand to mathematics Uurisprudence as "aritbemetic of terms") on the other
hand to the role of grammar as the normative frame for a language. If therefore
in Germany, Roman law and not ancient German law was developed further, then
this was not a coincidence, but bad a deeper historical reason. Savigny ignores the
fact that Roman law did not stem from the Volksleben and Volksgeist. For bim tbe
jurists are the legitimate organ of tbe people for the development of law. Savigny
did not examine this split between Volksleben and jurisprudence, and because of
this contradiction in his analysis he has been criticized on this point. Here lies the
paradox between the foundation of law in the Volksleben and Volksgeist and
Savigny's "specialists' dogma", that tbe jurist, without further legitimation than
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his expertise, is authorized to form and develop the law. Because Savigny, who
was politically conservative, held a distance to democratic ideas and the constitutional
movement, he did not consider the participation of the people through parliamentary
representation.
From this point of view Savigny criticizes in "On the Vocation of Our Time"
the idea of codification in general. He attributes it to the rationalism of the
eighteenth century, the Age of Enlightenment, which wanted to rule by legal
commands of the state. This was for Savigny in contradiction to the organic
correlation between law and the "silently working forces" that change it. This
constant organic change would have been much better represented by a customary
law, as carried out in earlier times by the people, and in the modern era by jurist.
Jurists for Savigny were only legal scholars, the leading professors at the German
universities like himself, a talented young nobleman of the old Reich. His version
was therefore politically better founded than that of Tbibaut., There was no more
uniformjurisdiction in Germany, which could have worked toward legal development
and unity. The German universities, however, did exist. These were carried and
attended by the cultural unity of the educated burghers. When one views the
development of law through science from this angle, then one sees a call on the
leading representatives of ,the educated burghers on legal science, to develop a
uniform and modern law for the German people. This assignment was fulfilled by
the German universities of the nineteenth century, because the drafting of the
German Civil Code and the other great codifications was achieved less through
parliamentary debates than through qualified legislation commissions, which
transformed the textbooks of German professors into law form.
This work of German legal scholarship was not possible through legal
technique alone, as in an exegetical school, but through a profound conscience on
the philosophical and methodological foundations of jurisprudence. These were
developed above all by Savigny and were adopted by his school. This school shall
be the subject of the following study. Savigny himself referred to his approach
as the founding of a Historical School, was the name has remained until this day.
Thibaut protested in vain that his view was called unhistorical. Historical was at
the time a positive description, and Savigny was capable of bringing it into
connection with his teachings. That this term was well-founded, is proved by the
fact that Savigny propagated a tenet of development, of evolution of law with the
essential reason that law is capable of adapting to change in history. That is why
he saw law as a part of life itself and therefore of historically changing society.
The material and method of law were for Savigny historical. The material of
Roman law was a historical "given" for European jurisprudence, as collected
~nthe Code of Justinian in the 6th century A.D. and'readapted by the Roman legal
school of Bologana in the twelfth century. He accepted as well the historical
material of ancient German law, which was developed in the Middle Ages and
since then along with Roman law represented an important factor in German legal
life -even though Savigny did not see the same standard of perfection of organization
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and tecbnique in German law. Savigny's metbod of ascertaining tbe meaning of
a legal norm was bistorical as well. He purposely did not use tbe science of tbe
past era of tbe eigbteentb century, but instead went back totbe birtbdate of tbe
norm, tbe Antiquity of the classical Roman jurists. He sougbt the meaning of a
norm in its origins. This demanded a great measure of historical knowledge on tbe
one band and a' hermeneutical and methodical education on tbe other. Savigny
presupposed botb for the scientifically educated jurists of bis time and witb them
extremely bigh standards, which corresponded bowever to the new scientific
standards of tbe nineteenth-century German academically educated bourgeoisie.
He placed the jurist in particular in terms of education and science on the same
level with the classical scholars of Antiquity, wbich enjoyed bigh prestige in the
period ofNeohumanism in Germany, but also with the philologians and theologians
of the blossoming German universities. He presumed a very different type of
jurist than the purely schoolmasterly educated law student of the humanistic
sciences, as issued from the university reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt in
Prussia. This harmony with the other humanities and the prestige they possessed
among the educated bourgeoisie, could not be founded on tbe basis of an
exegetical school. This formed the main basis for the social status of the jurists
of the 'German bourgeoisie and for the agreement of the academics in tbe most
important educational matters at the universities. In this sense it was important
for tbe unity of the middle class in general.
The jurisprudence Savigny founded was not based on the historical component
alone, but as Savigny especially in his early metbodological teachings in 1804
expressed it, on a philosophical component as well. This philosophical basis must
not be forgotten because it forms a main element in Savigny's legal conception
and in his methodological work on the draft of a new civil law, as elaborated in
bis great masterwork, "System des heutigen Romischen Recbts" ("System of
Contemporary Roman Law"). This philosophical element meant tbat Savigny did
not simply reproduce Roman law, but created a means for its organisation and
reformation. What exactly did philosophical mean for Savigny and on what
pbilosophy did he lean?
In an early statement Savigny expressed tbe wisb to become a Kant of
jurisprudence. Kant was bowever not tbe founder of Historism, of a historical
scbool, but of a systematical philosophy. In bis ethics as in bis legal tbeory, Kant
places in the center of bis considerations the person and his claim to freedom,
whicb finds its limit only in the freedom of another, which is to be respected
equally. Tbe idea of tbe person and bis freedom was Savigny' s systematical point
of departure for tbeorganisation of Roman law. Roman law was well adapted for
tbis, becausetbe person of tbe Roman citizen (civis romanus) is tbe initial point
of its legal order. Savigny eliminated large sections of Roman law whicb did not
correspond to this principle, as seemed appropriate for the nineteenth-century
liberal bourgeois society. "The person and his will" were for him tbe starting
point of a legal order, and with it the basic equality of the individual, free
expression of the will, contractual and testamentary freedom'and transferability
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of property. The development of a special feature of German civil law, the
summarizations of general rules based on the person, his declarations of intention
and the formation of contracts stemmed from this approach. Savigny formulated
in the first volume of his "System of Contemporary Roman Law" general rules of
civil law, at a level of abstraction previously unknown by Roman law. They
formed since then an official part of the German Roman civil law textbooks in the
nineteenth century, were adopted in the "General Section", the first book of the
German Civil Code, and have been the subject of German science and study to the
present day, which for this reason allots particular emphasis to the general
principles of civil iaw. This tendency of German science toward the development
of abstract principles, which then are adjusted by means of compromise to
particular legal problems, has been praised and criticized by scholars of other
countries. The transition from the division of civil law into the institutions of
Justinian, "personae, res, actiones", which the French Code civil still follows, to
the division into the five books, "General Section, Law of Obligations, Property,
Family Law, Law of Succession", which the German Civil Code follows, was
initiated b.y the Roman law textbooks of the Historical School. This is a more
differentiated subdivision, which is functionally' oriented and allows sharper
analytic divisions. The apparentness of connected legal rules is however often
broken up.
We have thus far seen in Savigny several, to soine extent contradictory,
working methods and thoughts. Savigny can be seen under many different
aspects, as a legal historian of the Romantic period, as an empirically working
hemeneut, and a legal dogmatist and systematist with broad legal and political
influence. Savigny's concept of the evolution of law is based on the term "V olk",
"people", as founded by Herder and developed in the Romantic period, on the idea
tbat law originates in history rather than in systematic, rationalistic natural law.
This legal systematology seems to have been drawn from Kant's freedom ethics
and from the value system of bourgeois liberalism. While Savigny rejects the
systematic thinking of natural law and the law of reason, he praises on the other
hand the method ~nd terminology of the Roman jurists and develops his own
system. Which influences and examples led him in doing so?
Savigny was interested since his youth in the many new movements in
German literature and philosophy and read contemporary classic German literature,
especially Goethe, as well as the philosophical Romantics such as the Brothers
Schlegal. He had friendly contact with young literary Romantics such as Achim
von Arnim and the Brentanos, with whom he was related through his marriage
with Gunda Brentano. He confidently took up his own role in the context of the
modern neohumanistic founding of the University of Berlin under the auspices of
Wilhelm von Humboldt, and he followed, as may be seen in remarks, reviews and
letters, the development of a general and political philosophy. These many
references have found a large number of interpretations in the scholarly literature
on Savigny. This is why there is no unified opinion as to whether Savigny' s many
different intellectual activities were disparate, only unified in the personality of
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the jurist himself, or if these were "fragments of a great confession" (Goethe)
with a single philosophy at their base. A new and difficult-to-read book by the
young legal historian Joachim Ruckert reconstructs behind Savigny's many
writings a metaphysical world view iwth an objective and idealistic philosophy,
which he pursues to the basic questions of morality and law, people and state and
the construction of legal terms. This would mean, that neither- Kant's critical
philosophy nor historism in the sense of historical relativism forms the basis of
Savigny's thought, but the understanding of the meaning and essence of appearances,
in which apparent contradictions disappear. In this essence behind appearances
and terms, Savigny finds the already mentioned objectivity and truth. Savigny's
obvious distance to Hegel and his school, as shown best by the critique of the
Hegel scholar and jurist Gans, would prove to be a competition between two
different ways. of thoughts of an objective idealism; in any case Savigny's
thought has nothing to do with Hegel's dialectical development ofreason in the
course of world history. Savingny's conception of objective truth is much more
static, and thus he finds a similar conception in the terminology of the Roman
lawyers. The Hegel student Karl Marx, who heard Savigny in 'Berlin, described
Savigny'l orientation on the present when he said, that Savigny wanted to sail to
the source and not on the sea.
Savigny stands as a jurist with a very broad literary and philosophical
education as well as a great legal talent as the founder of the Historical School of
Law. From this broad education flow the many different aspects of his work that
compose its richness and influence. This intellectual breadth moulds his language
as well, which in many respects reminds one of Goethe's. It stands far above a
legal jargon and was able to convince not only the jurist, but the educated burgher
as well, of the value and niveau of this legal science with its composed argumentation
and many learned associations.
Important as '!Yellfor the development of nineteenth century legal science was
another branch of the Historical School. With Savigny, a member of the Gottingen
School came to Berlin as a professor of law, Karl Friedrich Eichhorn. Eichhorn
worked together with Savigny as a fellow founder of the Journal for Historical
Jurisprudence of 1815, which was a consequences of Savigny's "On the Vocation
of Our Time for Legislation and Legal Scholarship", and represented the programme
of the school. Eichhorn was a Germanist, in contrast to the Romanist Savigny, and
as such a representative of German law. He also developed a historical, dogmatic
and formative view of law. Eichhorn lacked however Savingny's philosophical
basis. He remained an advocate of historical pragmatism, but founded nonetheless
a teaching tradition, which lies in the presentation of historical development, the
constitution and its legal sources in a textbook of German legal history, and in the
dogmatic construction of the figures of German law in a textbook of German
private law.
With the School of the Germanists, the scientific work on the German legal
heritage was included in the legal science of the Historical School along with
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Roman law. It was not to be overlooked that the work of the Germanists better
coincided with the theory of the "Volksgeist". Legal sources were studied here,
from the earliest times of th'e Germanic tribes to the present, which stemmed in
a continuity from the social foundations of German society and its development.
The idea of law as a particular aspect of social life and thus a historically
submitted to change, could also be better pursued in German law than in Roman,
which was viewed more as the static tradition of a class of educated jurists.
German law differed from Roman law in its structures and basic principles as
well. German law is always associated with a certain group of people from which
it stems, often as it was discussed and written down in a meeting; in the older
tribunal representative bodies, in manors and towns, in cities and guilds, in the
curia of the tenants or in the councils of the estates of the old Reich or of the
territorial states. The principle of a community and its law, the connection of law
to the social as well as political and constitutional relations is contained in the
sources of German law, whereas Roman law is abstracted from all this and
focuses on individual, isolated legal conflicts. German law tended more toward
a politically and sociologically founded legal science, which is sketched in
Savigny's theoretical reasoning. In this sense the Germanists were a legitimate
branch of the Historical School and felt themselves as such. Jacob and Wilhelm
Grimm, law students of savigny and his lifelong friends along with the Romantics
Brentano and von Arnim, were not only occupied with folk tables, saying~,
mythology and philology. Jacob Grimm remained in contact with law as a
Germanist and wrote "Rechtsalterttimer" (" Ancient legal Monuments"), a classical
work of legal history, and. edited "Weisttimer", a collection of sources of village
and folk law.
The legal Germanists necessarily had contact with the arising national
movement and tried to win this movement for German history and historiography,
with which the Germanists as legal and constitutional historians were personally
and professionally closely bound. The -Germanists identified strongly with the
political goals of bourgeois liberalism through their interest in the old German
freedom of participation of the people in political decisions and legislation in the
tribunals and folk meetings and in the constitutions of the estates. This liberalism
was "organically grown" German through its development in history. The Romanists
were less politically active and saw their task as purely legal, in cooperation with
legislation commissions. The Germanists, however, entered the political arena,
often as political speakers and representatives in the diets of the land, in
Germanist Congresses of the pre-revolutionary years 1846 and 1847 and in the
Frankfurt Parliament of the Revolution of 1848. They separated themselves from
Savigny's rejection of a codification and demanded national legislation toward
unity. Their goal was a political solution to the legal development on the basis of
the dogmatic and political striving of the legal scholars. From the middle of the
century until the passing of the Civil Code and beyond, a fruitful discussion
between the Germanists and Romanists flourished. The Germanist and later
representative in the Frankfurt Parliament, Georg Beseler, polemised in his book,
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"Law of the People and Law of the Jurists", in 1843 against the Savigny student
Puchta ("Customary Law", 1828) and demands a greater proximity of law and
legislation to the people. The above-mentioned Germanist Congresses under the
direction of Jacob Grimm demanded not only a parliamentary legislation, but also
juries and lay judges as in England. The last great nineteenth century Germanist,
Otto von Gierke, criticized the strongly Roman tendencies in the Civil Code and
called for a more German language and thought. That the structures, values and
principles of German law are quite different from those of Roman law, is well
shown by Gierke's lectures and political formation and legal dogma. This call of
the Germanists for a legal regulation for the contemporary societal developments
corresponded to that of the Historical School. The Germanists possessed many
rich materials in the areas of commercial, corporate, securities, .exchange, patent
and mining law from German sources, especially from medieval city laws. These
legal materials were of great i~portance for the development of law in a modern
industrial society, but were scarcely present in Roman law. The method of the
Historical School provided the opportunity to solve modern problems with legal
tools of the Middle Ages.
The Historical School of Law, founded by Savigny on the basis of the older
Gottingen School, and its two branches, the Romanists and the Germanists, spans
a broad area of Roman and German legal sources, which were worked out through
historical, hermeneutical and terminological, systematological methods to solve
arising legal problems in the developing bourgeois industrial society. These
sources were broader and more differentiated, but also more difficult to work out
than a codification, such as that of the French Ecole de l' exegese and similar
schools. The theoretical, methodological and philosophical basis of the historical
method was broad, profound and full of connections to all the other developing
sciences, but in its breadth was full of contradictions as well. My thesis is, that
this breadth and contradiction was productive for German legal science until the
end of the century and beyond, although since the mid-century a methodological
narrowing book over in the form of legal positivism and conceptual jurisprudence.
This narrowing is represented by the works of the Savigny student Puchta, the
great Romanist Jhering in his earlier period, the Germanist Gerber and the
constitutional jurist Laband.
This new development can only be shortly characterized here. Legal positivism
and conceptual jurisprudence removed the historical and sociological dimension
from the legal dogmatic work of the jurist. One consequence was the rise of an
independent science of history of law instead of Savigny's proclaimed historical
legal science, in which historical and philosophical, systematological and terminological
work was united. Under this new stream of thought, the work of the jurist was
understood mainly as dogmatic and terminological. It won however through this
limitation on constructive power andjuristic exactitude. This was the proclaimed
goal of the legal positivism and conceptual jurisprudence and corresponded to
the rule of law, in which the citizen possesses the greatest possible security over
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legal means and the judge is strictly held on the interpretation of statutes. This
narrowed conception of legal work is shown in the often-cited formulation of the
great Romanist Wind scheid in his speech of 1864, "Ethical, political or economical
questions are not the business of the jurist as such", that is, not the duty of the
jurist who applies the law, but that of the legislator who creates it. This limitation
of the duties of the jurist was universally accepted as progress toward greater
exactitude in legal method in late nineteenth-century German jurisprudence.
However the broader approach of the Historical School remained in many
respects fruitful. The normal jurist was freed of the task of having to combine
dogmatic, historical and philosophical work. The leading minds in legal science
transferred this task to other differentiated areas in light of the new problems of
a fully developed, national German bourgeois society, and the leading minds in
legal science consisted not only of elite law professors, but of judges of high
courts, members of legalisation commissions and high ministerial bureaucrats.
The original concept of the Historical School, which was to combine law with
history and philosophy in a single education, which would have enabled jurists to
structure law in the future, remained the tenet of this elite group and brought
German legislation, legal and cultural politics around 1900 to a zenith, which
was seen as an international example by many.
The span of this development shall be traced briefly here through a number
of great names. Rudolf von Jhering led the conceptual method to a pinnacle and
analysed with great exactitude its basis on historical experience and the benefits
of exact terminology. He superceded however in his later work conceptual
jurisprudence, criticized its shortcomings ad pursued instead a realistic analysis
of legal interests, which opened the path to a jurisprudence of interests as well as
to the sociological method of the future. Scholarly research has well shown, that
Jhering's concept of law in its sociological foundation and in the connection
between interest and law resembles closely that of Karl Marx. The previously
mentioned Germanist Otto von Gierke criticized legal positivism in constitutional
law as a negation of the political dimension and political dimension and political
theory beyond the constitution. Gierke emphasized in his critique of codification
the importance in private law of an ethical, sociological and legal-political
analysis and underlined the limited ability of Roman legal institutions to solve
modern problems. The legal institutions he developed on the basis of ancient
German law were broader and closer to the needs of contemporary society than
the Roman institutions. Gierke's institutions have influenced greatly the legal
developments of the twentieth century in private law and labour law. His theory
of corporations was cornerstone in the political concept of pluralistic society.
Theodor Mommsen, a young scholar active in the Revolution of 1848, edited the
publication of the Corpus Juris Civilis and oraganised scientific projects on the
level of government-sponsored projects and institutes. In doing so, he created for
Wilhelmine Germany an example of modern scientific planning and organisation,
which was of particular importance in the sciences. At the same time he helped'
form the consciousness of the educated burghers through literary achievements
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such as his Roman public law and his Roman history, which brought him the
Nobel prize for literature. In closing, I would like to mention MaxWeber, who as
a student of Mommsen and a true pupil of the Historical School began his studies
with works on Roman legal history, commercial law of the Middle Ages and
historical empirical research on the Prussian agrarian constitution in support of
reform legislation. On this basis he went on to found the sociology of law, a
theoretically based national economical theory, political science and a modern
theory of science.
In this analysis, I have concentrated my view on the German development and
thus have neglected international relations, which consist of a constant give and
take. My goal in doing so was to show, that the unique challenge of a difficult
national situation was answered by an interdisciplinary expansion of legal
science and that this expansion had fruitful implications not only for the legal
development itself, but for the sciences as a whole and for the status and influence
of German lawyers.

(1994) 6 NLSJ 25

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANSl
Dr. Kamal Puri*

1. Background
Indigenous peoples are entitled to community respect for their human rights.
Human rights involve relationships among individuals, and between individuals and
the State.2 Human rights can be most comprehensively protected through adequate
legislation, an independent judiciary and the establishment of autonomous institutions.
In addition, effective educational campaigns, taking due account of the cultural and
traditional aspects can be carried out at national and local levels to raise public
awareness regarding the. protection and promotion of human rights.
The two organizations which are actively involved in the setting and implementing
of standards designed to ensure respect for human rights of indigenous peoples
are the United Nations and the International
Labour Organization.
Since its
establishment,
~he United Nations has recognized that protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples is an essential part of human rights and a legitimate concern
of the international
community.3
A turning point came with the release of a
comprehensive report prepared at the behest of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities.4
There are several international declarations that set universal human rights
standards.
However, ratification
of such instruments
by Australia although
significant, is simply not enough. It is an executive act which has no direct legal
effect upon domestic law. It is trite knowledge that the rights and obligations
contained in the international instruments are not incorporated in Australian law
unless and until the laws provide for all of the legal powers and institutions
necessary to ensure their effective realization.5
As was stated succinctly by
*
Associate Professor of Law, The University of Queensland,
Brisban" Australia.
This is an abbreviated
Commission
of Jurists

version of the address delivered by the author to the International
(Swedish Divsion) in Stockhom on 20 August 1993.

2

The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 defines "human rights" in a
'broad manner, stating that "human rights" mean the rights and freedoms recognised
in the
International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and other international
instruments
(section 3). These include right to self-determination,
right to life, right to liberty and security
of the person, right to liberty of movement, right to equality, right to privacy, right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom of association, right to equal opportunity
and right to enjoy one's culture. See generally, D.J. Harris Cases and Materials on International
L.luY. (4th ed., 1991).

3

"The world community has long acknowledged
that the distinct cultures and languages
of
indigenous peoples form part of the cultural heritage of mankind and deserve protection~'.
See,
Human Riwhts: The Riwhts of Indiwenous Peoples United Nation Fact Sheet No.9 (1990)

4

Study of the Problem of Discrimination
awainst Indiwenous Populations
E/CNA/l98617(5
vols). In this report, Mr. Jose R Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur,
suggested national and
international
measures for eliminating discrimination.

5

Dietrich v R (1992) 109 ALR 385 at 391, citing Broadley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557,
582; Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636, 641; Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550,570-571.
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Gibbs CJ in Koowarta v Bjelke Peterson - "[T]reaties when made are not self~
executing; they do not give rights to or impose duties on members of the
Australian Community unless their provisions are given effect by statue·"6
Furthermore, because of the federal structure of Australia, many matters referred
to in international treaties relate to areas of legislative responsibility constitutionally
allocated to the States and Territories. Consequently, domestic implementation
of the instruments becomes difficult because of such constitutional constraints
flowing from federalism.7
In 1986, the Australian Law Reform Commission concluded that "in a number
of respects present Australian law or its administration fail to respect fully the
rights of Aboriginal people. Thus the non-recognition of Aboriginal marriages,
and the excessive intervention by child welfare agencies in Aboriginal families
that has been a feature of welfare practice in Australia, constitute a failure to
respect Aboriginal family life. Aspects of police interrogation and court procedure
have sometimes led in effect to Aboriginal defendants being compelled to confess
guilt. The need to respect the human rights and cultural identity of Aboriginal
people supports the case for appropriate forms of recognition of Aboriginal
customary laws."s More recently, a Joint Committee of the Commonwealth
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has observed: "The most significant human
rights problem in Australia remains the condition of the Australian Aborigines.
On the whole our failure to ratify various articles of the international conventions
or our failure to comply with aspects of international human rights obligations
involves the conditions of the Aboriginal people .... Rectifying these omissions
would be an act of faith in our seriousness in trying to deal with the most difficult
human rights problem in this country. 9
2.

World's oldest Living Culture

Out-of the estimated 15000 cultures remaining on earth, Australian Aborigines
represent the world's oldest living culture. Scientific data has established that
Aborigines have occupied Australia for more than 40,000 years. In 1981, the
Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs estimated that, out of Australia's

6
7

8

9

(1982) 153 CLR., at 193.
See, Abori~inal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission's First Report (AGPS
Canberra 1993) at 86-87. However, note that the High Court has given a broad interpretation
to the external affairs power contained in section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution 1900
in the context of a Commonwealth statute implementing Australia's treaty obligations. See
Koowarta v Bjelke Peterson.Supra n. 6 and Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 57 ALJR 450.
Australian Law Reform Commission's Report: "The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary
Laws" Para 193(AGPS 1986). See also, P. Ford, "Australia's Human Rights Record and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee," Australian International Law News 38 (1989) See
generally, (B Hocking ed., 1988) International Law and Abori~inal Human Ri~hts .
A Review of Aust-ralia' s Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights (AGPS 1992) Parliamentary
Paper no 514, December 1992, at 60.
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population of 16 million, there were about 168,000 Aborigines, representing 1.1
percent of the ~otal populating living in Australia. Contrast this figure with the
estimated population of Aborigines in Australia at the time of European settlement in
1788, between a half and one million. While the population of the world has increased
at an exponential rate, the Aboriginal population has suffered a reverse in its
population trend. It is horrendous to realise that, in the first hundred years of British
settlement in Australia, only 60,000 of an estimated 500,000 to one million Aborigines
survived the devasation caused by racial conflicts, introduced disease and alcohol.

3. Who is An Aborigine?
The term "Aborigine" is normally taken to mean a person of Aboriginal
descent identifying as an Aborigine and recognised as such.10
Physical
similarities, a common history, a common religion or spiritual beliefs, and a
common culture are factors that create a sense of identity amongst members of a
race. As the people of a group identify themselves and are identified by others
as a race by reference to their common history, religion, spiritual beliefs or
culture as well as by reference to their biological origins and physical similarities
an indication is given of their Aboriginality.11 Recently, the High Court of
Australia has stated that "Membership of the indigenous people depends on
biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual recognition of a
particular person's membership by that person and by the elders or other persons
enjoying traditional authority among those people."12 The criteria commonly
used for judging are those adopted by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, viz
descent, self-identification, and community acceptance.13
Although Aborigines have a long h,istory, it was not until 1770 that the first
European observations of Aboriginal Civilization and its rich cultural store were
made. In that year, the legendary sailor, Captain Cook, laid claim on behalf of the
British sovereign to the land that was later to be called Australia. Cook's diary
recorded his impressions of the native people in the following words:
Being wholly unacquainted not only with the superfluous but the
necessary conveniences so much sought after in Europe, they are
happy in not knowing the use of them. They live in a tranquillity not
10

11

12
13

There is some controversy as to whether" Aborigine" or "Aboriginal" is preferable. However,
there appears to be some preference for the expression "Aboriginal people" to the word
"Aboriginal". See,H McRae, G Nettheim and L Bearoft, Aborieinal Leeal Issues: Commentary
and Materials (1991) at vii. Note that Torres Strait Islanders, who are also indigenous
inhabitants of parts of Australia, like, Aborigines, have been greatly affected by European
settlement. See further. Australian Law Reform Commission's Field Report no 6 The Torres
Strait Islands (1979).
See. Commonwealth v Tesmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 at 792-793. A "Maori" is defined under
section 2 of the Maori -Affairs Act 1953 as "a person of the Maori race of New Zeland; and
includes any descendant of such a person".
Mabo v The State of Queensland (1992) 66 ALJR 408, 435 (per Brennan J).
See, Supra n.8 at 68.
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disturbed by the inequality of condition: the Earth and Sea of their
own accord furnishes them with all things necessary for life, they
covet not magnificent houses, household stuff and similar; they live
in a warm and fine climate and enjoy a very wholesome air.14
A telling illust,ration of the change in attitude during the first hundred years
of European settlement is provided by the observations of Captain Wharton FRS
who described Aborigines as "wild beasts to be extirpated."15
From the commencement
of British settlement in 1788 until very recently,
little respect has been shown by the laws of the Commonwealth,
six States and
two Territories of Australia for the rich Aboriginal culture and their proprietary
rights in land as well as intellectual property, and their human rights. Despite
their ancient occupation of Australia and elaborate cultural heritage, Aborigines
have been treated as unequals and aliens in their own country.16 The economic
and political realities have remained masked for a long time by a view of
Aborigines as primitive, if not sub-human.
This view revealed an underlying
disregard for the Aboriginal race and their basic human rights.17
However, legal developments in the past 20 to 25 years display changing attitudes,
accompanied by the growth of political awareness, cultural pride and political
organisations on the part of Aboriginal people. It is only in recent years that attempts
have been made to acknowledge and rectify past injustices, for example, Aborigines
did not become entitled to vote at federal elections until 1962.18

Aboriginal Culture (Department

14

Reproduced
from Fact Sheet on Australia
and Trade March 1990).

of Foreign

Affairs

15

From the Log Book transcribed
by Captain Wharton in 1893, cited in Mabo v The State of
Queensland, supra n. 12 at 450 (per Deane and Gaudron JJ).

16

J.P. Evans, "The critical issues posed for domestic legal systems is the concept of selfdetermination
relating to indigenous minority group and the most appropriate course for resolving
them"
3 Ngulaig (1990) at 1 alleges: "Dispossessed
Aborigines
as one of the most visible
'deviant' groups in white colonial society, had been socially and environmentally
recast from a
sovereign into an alien status and capacity by the destructive processes of Western colonization".

17

See, P Dudgeon

and D Oxenham,"The
Complexity
of Aboriginal
Diversity:
Identity and
Kindredness"
I Ngulaig (1990) at 3: "To Anglo-Europeans,
Aborigines have been and still are
perceived as savage, dirty, worthless, pitiful and animalistic,
'sons of ham' and therefore not
party to divine creation".
This is a damning criticism, but regrettably,
true account of some
Anglo-Europeans.

18

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962 omitted section 39(6) ofthe principal Act (Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918) which required a State voting qualification for Aborigines, thus giving them the
right to enrol for Federal elections. The 1962 Act was designed to give an "Aboriginal native of
Australia" the right to enrol and vote as an elector of the Commonwealth.
It should also be noted
that as a result of a national referendum in 1967, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
1900 was amended in two respects, viz. section 51 (xxvi) was amended so as to give commonwealth
power to legislate in respect of Aborigines in the States, and section 127 was repealed so that
Aborigines could henceforth be counted in reckoning the population of Australia, and of its States
and Territories.
Section 127 before its repeaf by the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals)
1967,
provided as follows: "In reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth,
or other part of the Commonwealth,
aboriginal natives shall not be counted."
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British colonisers treated Australia as terra nullius - a land without owners,
without a system of government and no recognizable commerce. With th~
colonization of Australia after 1788, a new legal regime was imposed based on the
common law. Australia was treated for the purposes of its acql1isition and the
application of English law, as a settled colony, that is, one uninhabited by a
recognised sovereign or by a people with recognizable institutions and laws. No
treaties were cqncluded with Aboriginal groups, and no arrangements were made
with them to acquire their land, or to regulate dealings between them and the
colonists. They were treated as individuals not as groups or communities.
Aboriginal people were therefore fully subjected to English law.2o This law
did not recognise Aboriginal customary laws nor, as a consequence the Aboriginal
peoples right of self-determination. This stance was reaffirmed in the Milirrupum
v Nabalco Pty Ltd.21 case in which a group of Aborigines sued a mining company
and the Commonwealth. The Aborigines claimed relief in relation to the possession
and enjoyment of areas of land owned by them under customary laws. Blackburn
J of the Northern Territory Supreme Court decided that Aborigines had no legal
claim to the land since all relevant English law came into operation in the colony
from the date of settlement. 22
5. Mabo v The State of Queensland23
This view that Aboriginal rights. were completely terminated by the act of .
annexation was unequivocally rejected in the recent decision of the High Court
in M abo. In this path-breaking judgment, the highest court of the land recognised
Aboriginal native title, whi<:hthe court ruled had not been extinguished by white
colonisation.
19
20
21
22

23

4

Supran.8
R v Murrell (1836) Legge 72; R v Wedge [1976] I NSWLR 58!.
(1971) 17 FLR 141 (the Gove Land Rights case).
But see, Delgammkw v British Columbia [1991] 3 WWR 97; (1991)79 DLR (4th) 185 and Calder
v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313; (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145. In Calderthe
Supreme Court of Canada held that Aboriginal title can survive British acquisition of sovereignty.
In Cooper v Stuari (1889) 14 AC 286, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said that the
introduction of the common law to the new colony was not on a wholesale basis: only so much
of it as was relevant was introduced. It follows that as per the &octrine of continuity, rights which
existed prior to colonization continued through the act of colonization. See also, Johnson v
Mcintosh (1823) 8 Weaton 543; 5 Law Ed (2d) 681, where Marshall J recognised that prior to the
creation of any treaties, the aboriginal title did exist In the original occupiers.
Supra n. 12. The Full Court of the High Court handed down this very lengthy decision on 3 June
1992. It consists of four different judgements. The Court comprised of Mason CJ, Brennan,
Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh n. this part of the paper containing a comment
on Mabo formed part of a paper, entitled "The Demise of Terra Nullius in Australia" which the
author delivered at International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Researching
in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) Congress at WIPO Headquarters in Geneva, June 29 - July 1,
1992.
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The High Court by a majority of 6 to 1 (Dawson J dissenting) incontrovertibly
recognized the prior legal occupation by Aborigines of the Murray Islands in the
Torres Strait. As a result, the Meriam people, who were in occupation of the
Islands for generations before the first European contact, were granted occupation
use and enjoyment of their native lands in accordance with their indigenous laws
or customs. This landmark ruling has established a major precedent for future
land rights and arguable intellectual property and human rights cases.24
The decision in Mabo is significant for all Aboriginal people because the
High Court for the first time has examined (and rejected) the validity of two
fundamental propositions which had been endorsed by long established authority
and used as a basis of the real property law in Australia for more than one hundred
and fifty years
(i)

that the territory of Australia was, in 1788, terra nullius in the sense of
"unoccupied or uninhabited" for legal purposes; and

(H) that full legal and beneficial ownership of all the lands of this continent
was vested in the Crown, unaffected by any claims of the Aboriginal
inhabitantsY
Nevertheless the High Court took the view that these positions, which have
provided a legal basis for and justification of the dispossession of Aborigines.
were no longer valid.26 The Court further observed: "The acts and events by
which that dispossession in legal theory was carried into practical effect constitute
the darkest aspect of the history of this nation. The nation as a whole must remain
diminished unless and until there is an acknowledgement of and retreat from,
those past injustices."27
6. Sources of Australia's

Human Rights Obligations

The three general sources of what may loosely be termed Australia's "human
rights" obligations are:
i) International instruments;
H) Domestic legislation; and
Hi) The common law and more specifically, the extent to which it recognises
international jurisprudence on the subject.
24

25
26
27

The inadequacy of the present intellectual property regime, especially copyright law, for the
protection of Aboriginal Folklore is well-established. See Report of the Working Party on the
Protection of Aboriginal Folklore Department of Home Affairs and the Environment (Canberra
1981). For an analysis of this and related issues, see K Puri Australian Aboriginal People and
THeir Folklore NGULAIG Monograph 9, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Unit,
The University of Queensland (Brisbane 1992).
Supra n.12 at 451 (per Deanne and Gaudron JJ).
The application of the doctrine of terra nullius to Australia has also been strongly criticised in
H Reynolds, The Law of the Land (1987).
Supra n.12 at 451 (per Deane and Gaudron JJ).
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(i) International Instruments
A number of international instruments govern Australia's human rights
obligations. The following four are the most significant instruments:
A. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966
(lCESCR).
Australia ratifed this document on 10 December 1975 and the Covenant
became operational within the country on 10 March 1976. The explanatory
memorandum attached to the ICESCR's instrument of ratification stated that
"Legalisation is not necessary for Australia to meet its international obligations
under the Covenant". The implerp.entation of this agreement is overseen by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).
This Covenant came into force on 23 March 1976. Australia signed the
Covenant on 18 December 1972 and ratified it on 13 August 1980.28 The ICCPR
is now contained in Schedule 2 to the Human Rights and Equai Opportunity
Commission Act, 1986. However, inclusion of the ICCPR does not appear to
make it part of Australian municipal law, nor does it create any justiciable rights
for individuals.29
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations oversees the implementation
of this agreement.30 The First Optional Protocol under this Covenant was issued
in December 1966, and provides a right of individual petition to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee.
Australia ratified this Protocol on 25 September 1991, it being effective from
25 December 1991.31 Au~tralia's accession makes it possible for individuals
within Australia who consider that any of their human rights as set out in the
ICCPR have been violated or infringed, to take their case to the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. Although the Committee's recommendations or "views"32
28

See generally, G Triggs "Australia's
Political

Rights: Endorsement
Quarterly 278. (1982).

Ratification
or Repudiation?"

of the International
31 International

Covenant

on Civil

& Comparative

and

Law

29

See, Dietrich v R Supra n.5 at 434 (per Tohey J),Re Mathtieson and Department of Employment
Education and Training (1990) 20 ALD 253 and ReJane (1988) 12 NSWLR 558.

30

The Human Rights Committee was set up in 1976 under the ICCPR. This Committee is distinct
from the United Nations Human Rights Commission which was established
in 1946 to receive
complaints
of gross violations of human rights. The Commission's
jurisdiction
is much wider
than the Human Rights Committee. Unlike the latter: it can address alleged violations of rights
under tlie other human rights conventions.
The Commission
consists of over 43 political
representatives
of United Nations members. Supra n. 2 at 602.

31

It may noted that Australia has also r.atified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, with
Article 1 (1) providing that "No one within the jurisdiction
of a State party to the present
Protocol shall be executed". The Second Optional Protocol commenced in Australia on 11 July
(1991); See, Australian Treaty Series, Nos 19 and 39 (1991).
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are not legally enforceable in a domestic jurisdiction, any adverse findings
against a member state does carry considerable moral pressure. As one commentator
has put it, "Many states shy away from adverse publicity of their human rights
record."33
The rules of the Human Rights Committee require such a person to establish
to the satisfaction of the Committee that all available domestic remedie.s were
exhausted, or that the relevant legal processes had been unreasonably prolonged.34
It also needs to be established that the individual had been a victim of an abuse
of human rights. Acts which violate 'human rights must be attributed to a
government agency since only the state has obligations under the ICCPR.35
Australia's accession tOlhe First Optional Protocol emphasises the importance
accorded by the federal government to the protection of human rights and it so
conviction that human rights performance of Australian governments at all levels
should be fully open to international scrutiny. 36
C. Internatio!lal Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination 1969.
Australia signed the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on 13 October 1966. Ratification took
place on 30 September 1975.37 On the basis of CERD, the Commonwealth
Parliament enacted the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The implementation of
this agreement is overseen by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination.38

D. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

33
34

See, K Eastman,

"Human

Rights Remedies:.

A Guide"

17 Alternative Law Journal 169 at 171

(1992).
For a good historical account, see, A A Trindade "Exhaustion of Local Remedies Under the UN
Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol",
28 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 734 (1974). See further, J Davidson, "The Procedure and Practice
of the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights",
4 Canterbury Law Review 337 (1971) and H Charlesworth,
"Australia's
Accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights"
18, Melb Univ. Law Review 428 (1991).

35

See, Supra n.33 and supra n.7.

36

However,
note that Canada and New Zealand have provided
petition under this Protocol since 1976 and 1989, respectively.

36

A Copy of the text of this Convention
Act 1975 (Cth.)

38

See further, Supra n.7 at 103-105.

is set ourin

the Schedule

individuals

with the right

to the Racial

Discrimination
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The convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 10 December 1984. It was signed by Australia on 10 December 1985.
Ratification took place on 8 August 1989. A copy of the English text of the
Convention is set out in the Schedule to the Crimes(Torture) Act, 1988 (Cth)
which was enacted to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention.
In late 1992, the Commonwealth Government made a declaration under
Article 22 of the Convention to provide a right of individual petition to the
Committee Against Torture in accordance with Recommendation 333 of the
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 39
(ii) Domestic Legislation
When states ratify a human rigbts instrument, they either incorporate its
provisions directly into their domestic legislation or undertake to comply in other
ways with the obligations contained therein. As a result, universal human rights
standards and norms find their expression in the domestic laws of most countries
today. In Australia, four Commonwealth statutes are specifically designed to
protect and promote human rights ..•
Racial Discrimination Act 1975
It has been noted above that the Racial Discrimination Act was enacted
pursuant to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. The major objectives of this Act are (1) to promote the
equality before the law of all persons regardless of their race, colour or national
or ethnic origin and (2) to make discrimination against people on the basis of their
race, colour or national or ethnic origin unlawful.
Section 9( 1) of the Racial Discrimination Act is a general provision rendering
unlawful the impairment of a person's rights and basic freedoms on the basis of
their race, colour or national or ethnic origin in accordance with Article 1 of
CERD. However, the Act does not fully implement CERD. Australia qualified its
ratification by declaring that it was not in a position to treat as offences all the
matters covered in Article 4(a) of the Convention in which member states
undertake to "declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
39

See, 3 Aboriginal Deaths in Custody - Response by Governments to the Royal Commission
(AGPS 1992) at 1269. The Royal Commission was set up jointly by the Commonwealth,
the
States and the Northern Territory on 16 October 1987 in response to concern that deaths in
custody of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were too common and public explanation
too evasive. The Royal Commission's
published two reports - an interim report (December
1988) and the final report (April 1991.) In eleven volumes and around 5000 pages, the reports
looked into the circumstances
of the (99) deaths, action taken by authorities
following
the
deaths and underlying causes, including social, cultural and legal factors. The Royal Commission
made 339 recommendations
covering reform of law and justice systems. and measures to
address endemic Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage.
The Commonwealth,
State and Territory Governments
have responded to each of the 339 recommendations
of the
Royal Commission
in the above mentioned document in Volumes 1-4.
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based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination ". It is
heartening to note that compliance with this article is currently being addressed
by the introduction of a Commonwealth Bill for legislation to prohibit racial
vilification.
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986
Five international instruments dealing with human rights are found within the
Schedule to this Act.4o The Act establishes and empowers the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission to deal with specific instances of abuse of human
rights as well as having a broad policy formulating function. The Commission
also examines federallaws41 and international instruments42 to ensure that they
do not contain anything inconsistent with human rights.
Sex Discrimination Act 1984
The Act gives force to Australia's obligations under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Its major objectives
are (i) to promote equality between men and women; (ii)to eliminate discrimination
on the basis of sex, marital status or pregnancy; and (iii)to eliminate sexual
harassment at work and in educational institutions.
Privacy Act 1988
The Act give effect to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data. The Act makes provision to protect the privacy of
individuals in line with Australia's undertakings under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17 of this Covenant requires each member
State to adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their
privacy, family, home or correspondence.
Although Australia's legislative reforms in protecting and promoting human
J;ights have a good track record (for example, political rights for women were
40

41
42

See, Schedules'I-5 to lhe Human Rights and Equal Opporlunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth.)
These legal instruments, to which Australia is a party, are: (i) the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; (ii) the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention
1958 (International Labour Organisation Convention II/); (iii) the III Declaration of the
Rights of the Child 1959; (iv) the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons
197/; and (v) the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 1975.
See, Section 11 (f), U) and (k). Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986
(Cth.)
Section 11 (I) (m) requires the Commission: ".... to examine any relevant international
instrument for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are any inconsistencies between that
instrument and the Covenant, the Declarations or any other relevant international instrument,

andto reportto the Ministerthe resultsof anysuchexamination".
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recognised soon after independence in 1902), its "white Australia" immigration
policy has been condemned in most parts ofthe world. The Australian government
as well as the general public were largely unaware of the plight of Aboriginal
human rights until 1974. At the opening of Parliament, Aboriginal people
engaged in a strong demonstration, protesting against their deplorable situation.
This resulted in an increased awareness which led to the enactment of several
pieces oflegislation both at federal and state levels, including the Race Discrimination
Act 1975 and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.
There has also been a noticeable development towards an attitude of "multiculturism"
in the country.
Nevertheless. Australia's poor record regarding the protection of Aboriginal
human rights was again drawn to the world's attention in January 1988 when
thousands gathered in Sydney to protest against
Australia's celebration of the
•
bicentennial of the arrival of its first white settlers. Boycotting the festivities, the
Aborigines pointed out that for them the two hundred year period had been one
of annihilation, dispossession, and increasing poverty. They had become outcasts
in their own home, living on reservations or in urban slums, suffering infant
mortality three times the national average and earning half the national average
wage.
These protestations have had a positive result in the sense that government
policies now increasingly recognise the special needs of Aborigines to retain their
own culture, customs, traditions and life-styles. The Commonwealth government has
taken a number of significant measures which seek to provide protection for Aboriginal
cultural heritage, eg., the Australian Heritage Commission Act, 1975 which protects
places associated with the Aboriginal history, culture and beliefs; the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 to protect significant Aboriginal
sacred sites an<,lobjects, the Museum of Australia Act, 1980, the Protection of
Movable Cultural Heritage Act, 1986. Several States have followed suit and enacted
legislation to safeguard and preserve the Aboriginal culture.43
(Hi) Common Law Recognition
One particularly relevant facet of the Mabo decision is the Court's reference
to human rights as enshrined in the international treaties and the likely effect
these will have on the future of Australia's indigenous peoples. Brennan J made
a few references to the way in which the common law should adapt itself to
human rights principles. Thus his Honour stated:44
The opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to
Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the International
43

44

The prevailing opinion still appears to be that any concessions to Aboriginal claims are a matter
of benevolent charity, however, rather than rights governed by the international human rights
instruments Australia has ah;;:ady ratified." RL Barsh "Indigenous Policy in Australia and
North America" InterlUltional Law and Aboriginal Human Rights 99 (B. Hocking ed. 1988)
Supra n.12 at 422, (with Mason CJ and McHugh J concurring)."
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... brings to bear on the
common law the powerful influence of the Covenant and the international
standards it imports ... [I]nternationid law is a legitimate and important
influence on the development of the common law, especially when
international law declares the existence of universal human rights.
In Dietrich v R , Brennan J put forward his view in even stronger terms. While
referring to Ariele 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the influence which that provion has on the development of the
common law, his !-Jonour stated, "Indeed, it is incongruous that Australia should
adhere to the Covenant containing that provision unless Australian courts recognise
the entitlement and Australian governments provide the resources required to
carry that entitlement into effect. But the courts cannot, independently of the
Legislature and the Executive, legitimately declare an entitlement to legal aid. "45
In other post Mabo decisions, Kirby P of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
emphasised that regard should be had to the human rights principles in deciding
cases in domestic courts.46
7. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
The United Nations is presently in the process of drafting the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is based on the perception of indigenous
peoples, distinctive cultural values and political situation as previously free
peoples. Currently, with the limited exception of International Labour Organization
Resolution 169 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, no international
instrument refers specifically to the rights of indigenous peoples. Once the draft
~s finally approved by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, it will go
through various committees and ultimately to the United Nations General Assembly
for adoption. The key prinCiple of the current text of the Draft Declaration is the
concept of self-determination.47
8. Relationship

of Australian Domestic Law to International

Human Rights

It remains unclear whether the ratification by Australia of various human
rights instruments could be deemed to incorporate in the Australian common law
45
46

Supra n.5 at 404.
See R v Stephen Lorne Astill (25 August 1992) Unreported Supreme Court of NSW Criminal
Division, No CA 060477 of 1991; R v George Stephen Greer (l4 August 1992) Unreported
Supreme Court of NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, No 60495 of 1989; Chow v Director of
Public Prosecutions (4 September 1992) Unreported Supreme Court of NSW Court of Appeal,
No CA 40318 of 1992, and Director of Public Prosecutions v Saxon (27 August 1992)
Unreported
NSW Court of Appeal. It should be noted that the Hon Justice
the NSW Court of Appeal is now the Chairman of the Executive Committee
Court of Justice, Geneva.

Kirby, President of
of the International

47

See,Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission's First Report and supra

48

above-mentioned report.
See, Supra n.28 at 289.

n.7 at 110-113.

The current

text of the Draft Declaration

is reproduced

in Appendix
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the universal human rights standards and norms, even though such provisions
have not been adopted into the domestic laws.48 In Bradely v Commonwealth of
Australia49
reliance was sought to be placed unsuccessfully by a party on tbe
resolutions of tbe Security Council of the United Nations arguing tbat tbe Cbarter
of the United Nations Act, 1945(Cth) provided that "the Charter of tbe United
Nations (a copy of which is set out in -the schedule to tbis Act) is approved". Tbe
High Court stated: "Tbat provision does not make the Cbarter itself binding on
individuals within Australia as part of the law of the Commonwealth."
Again, in Jabanardi v R,50 the Supreme Court of Northern Territory pointed
out that unless an international declaration is made part of the municipal law of
Australia it does not have the force of law; it has political force only. It is for the
le&islature to convert the terms of the international instrument into domestic law
cognizable by the courts.51 In this case, the applicant was found to be unfit to plead
to tbe charge of murder by reason of his inability to comprehend the nature of the
cbarge. He was therefore ordered to be detained in custody for an indefinite period.
The applicant's counsel argued that the passing of the Human Rigbts Commission
Act, 1981 (Cth) was a legislative recognition or approval of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and declarations wbich made up the
scbedules to that Act. In his obiter remarks, Nader J seemed to regard that as
legislative recognition. However, his Honour observed that tbe Act does not make
that covenant or those declarations directly applicable as laws of Commonwealth.
Further, tbe Human Rights Commission Act binds the Crown in the rigbt of the
Commonwealth but not in the right of the States or of tbe Northern Terr-itory.52
This matter was debated at some length by the Higb Court of Australia in a
recent case of Dietrich v R, 53 although the Court did not consider it necessary to
make any conclusive pronouncement. The case involved an applicant who had
been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for seven years for committing the
offence of importing into Australia a trafficable qua'ntity of heroin in contravention
of the section 233B(1)(b) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The applicant applied
for special leave to appeal to the High Court, claiming tbat his trial bad miscarried
by virtue of the fact be was unrepresented by counsel througbout the entire course
of the trial. The High Court, by a majority decision (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey,
Gaudron and McHugh 11; Brennan and Dawson 11 dissenting) ordered a new trial
holding that the trialjudge had erred in refusing to grant adjournment, postponement
or stay until legal representation was available to the indigent accused, wbo
through no fault of bis was unable to obtain legal representation. Further, the
Court quashed the conviction of the accused on the ground that there had been a
miscarriage of justice in that the accused bad been convicted without a fair t~ial.
49
50
51
52

(1973) 128 CLR 557.
(1983) 22 NTR I.
Ibid at 21.
Ibid.

53

(1992)109 ALR 385.
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The applicant relied primarily on the explication of the right to a fair trial in
the various international instruments, particularly, Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR).54However, although Australia
is a party to this instrument,55 the High Court was quick to point out that the
Commonwealth Parliament had not yet passed any specific legislation to give
effect to this particular provision.56 Although counsel accepted that the ICCPR
does not form part of Australian domestic law, he submitted that the common law
of Australia should be developed in a way which recognises the existence and
enforceability of rights provided for in in.ternational covenants to which Australia
is a party. Reliance was placed on Kirby P's statement in Jago v District Court
vf New South Wales57
that, where the inherited common law is uncertain,
Australian j tidges may look to an international treaty which Australia has ratified
as an aid to the explication and development of the common law.
Reference was also made to the position in England where, in construing
domestic legislation which is ambiguous, English courts will presume that
Parliament intende.d to legislate in accordance with its international obligations. 58
"English courts may also have resort to international obligations in order to help
resolve uncertainty or ambiguity in judge-made law."59 The majority of the High
Court in Dietrich, while firmly supporting this "common-sense approach" ,60
pointed out that in the case in hand the court was not being asked to resolve
uncertainty or ambiguity in domestic law but to declare that a right which had
hitherto never been recognised should now be taken to exist. Dawson J, who
delivered a dissenting opinion, while agreeing with the majority in regard to the
construction of ambiguous domestic legislation, was not sure about extending
that approach to the resolution of uncertainty in the common law.61

54

55

56

Article 14 (3) relevantly provides "In the determination
of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees,
in full equality: .... (d) To be
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing; to be informed, if he does not h~ve legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay h."
Reference was also made to Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and to the relevant Canadian and United States' provisions
guaranteeing
certain rights to the accused.

Supra n.5 at 391. However,

Mason CJ and McHugh J made the observation
that "it may seem
curious that the Executive Government has seen fit to expose Australia to the potential censure
of the Human Rights Committee (by acceding to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR)
without endeavouring
to ensure that the rights enshrined in the ICCPR are incorporated
into
domestic law, but such an approach is clearly permissible."
(idem).

57

(1988)

58
59

Supra n.5 at 392, citing R v Home Secretary; Exparte Brind [1991] lAC 696, 747-748.
Ibid. The High Court made reference to Derbyshire Country Council v Times Newspapers Ltd
[1992]

60
61

12 NSWLR

558, at 569.

3 WLR 28,44.

Ibid at 392 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J) ; at 434 (per TooheyJ).
Ibid at 426.
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Be that as it may, the High Court h~41that it was unnecessary to consider that
question in this case because to extend to the common law the principle which
underlies Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR would not be to resolve ambiguity or
uncertainty but to effect a fundamental change.62 Furthermore, in the Court's
view Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR did not support the absolute right to have
access to legal assistance; the right is expressed to arise "in any case where the
interests of justice so require".63
There are decisions of Australian courts where prinCiples of customary
international law have been incorporated into the domestic law so far as these
were not inconsistent with any appli~able statute law or with any binding
precedent.64 However, the consensus of judicial opinion seems to suggest that,
while it is open to have regard to sucJ:linstruments as an aid to determining what
the common law is in the event of doubt, ego the existence of a particular right,
they are not by their terms incorporated into Australian dpmestic law. It is,
nevertheless, permissible and useful to have regard to them in considering the
exercise of discretion.65
9. Enforceability
To what ext.ent are any provisions such as those in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights enforceable? Obviously, those provisions in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are rendered
enforceable by the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975(Cth). It has been strongly
argued in some cases that the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act, 1986
impliedly incorporates the provisions of the various international covenants into
Australian law, particularly since five of those covenants have been appended to
the Act in Schedules 1-5 and also because the Commission has been given an
intervener function under the Act. However, an authoritative ruling on this point
is still awaited.
There is however, a mandatory reporting procedure under Article 40(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 whereby every five
years each signatory State is obliged to submit to the Human Rights Committee
a report on its own human rights situation. Mention may also be made of Article
41 which provides for an inter-State complaint procedure although this is rarely
used for reasons of diplomacy. FiI1ally, as already stated, there is also the
procedure for individual complaints to the Human Rights Committee under the
First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966. It should be noted that this mechanism has not been invoked as yet
in the Australian context. However, in the Lovelace case, a reference from
62

Ibid at 426.

63
64

Ibid at 425 (per Dawson J).
See, eg, Chow Hung v R (1949) 77 CLR 449, 477-479; Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR
60, 80-81.
See,Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550,570,630.

65
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Canada, the Human Rights Committee observed that Article 27 of the Covenant
did impose some positive duties on State parties to acknowledge the cultural
rights of its citizens as individauls.66
10. Conclusion
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the
principle of the unacceptability of discrimination and proclaims that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind,
and that this applies to indigenous peoples of the world. Every State which is a
party to the international covenants on human rights has the obligation to ensure
the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil
and political rights. 67 Although no legally enforceable sanctions are yet available
against an offending state, persuasion, exposure, public criticism and in extreme
cases, isolation, do have a strong moral force. More importantly the fact that each
member state now accepts that is own I)ationals can have recourse outside the
domestic jurisdiction shows clearly that the protection of human rights is now
within the domain of international law.
Australia's accession to the First Optional Protocol combined with the Law
Reform Commission's report into The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary
Laws68 the report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody69
and the Mabo and Dietrich findings in 1992 all indicate the importance that the
Australian government has placed on the various international agreements and an
intention to abide by them in its domestic activities. Especially in the case of
indigenous peoples of Australia, these also reveal a desire for reconciliation and
to remedy the past wrongs. Australia is morally bound to accord its indigenous
peoples the universal human rights provided for under the Conventions. It is
suggested that the common law in Australia should develop in a way which
protects standards of human rights which are broadly accepted by the Australian
executive and legislative arms of government and by the Australian community.
Side by side, Australia should adopt a domestic bill of rights to bring its law under
the discipline of international human rights jurisprudence.

66

Annex XVIII,
166. For discussion, see The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws Note 8 above, at para
176 etseq. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 provides:
"In those States in which ethnic, religious Of linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language."
-

67

These principles
have been reiterated
Vienna, 14- 25 June 1993.

68

Supra n.8.
See, Supra n.8.

69

Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR 36th Sess, Supp No 40 (A/36/40),

recently
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Conference
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Undoubtedly, the protection and promotion of Aboriginal human rights,
including a grant of the right of self determination,1°
will contribute to
Australia's international prestige, and provide a basis for national pride. Enormous
social and economic benefits will also emerge out of this, but most importantly,
this will make the original inhabitants of this vast island continent feel at borne
in their own home. History is a witness to shameful miseries inflicted on this
culturally profound and non-violent race in.the past two centuries. It will be sad
if non-Aboriginal Australians are not able to recognise the universal human rights
of the indigenous peoples, if, for no otber reason, then at least as a gesture of
repentance for tbe wrongs of the past.
Finally, although the injustices of the past can perhaps never be compensated
for in monetary terms, present development do manifest commitment which, if
maintained, is likely to lead to a brighter future. In such a future there would be
no need to question whether the indigenous peoples of this country were being
afforded their basic human rights. There would be no grapbic discrepancies in the
statistics of law and justice, health, housing, education, employment, etc, to
suggest otberwise.
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It is significant to note that both international covenants, viz International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
contain the same wording in Article I: "All peoples have the right of self·determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." See generally, R L Barsh "Indigenous Peoples and the Right
to Self-determination in International Law" International Law and Aboriginal Human Rights
(Law Book Co 1988)68-82; P Ditton "Self Determination' or 'Self Management' ?"Australian
International Law News 3 (1990).
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CUSTODIAL DEATHS IN INDIA: A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO
.LAW, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
p. Srikrishna Deva Rao *
Amnesty International's Report on 'Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody in
India' highlighted the continuing practice of torture by police and para-military
forces. It evoked varied reactions from government, media, Human rights groups
and raised a controversial debate in National and International circles. Nonetheless,
Amnesty report has brought once again the issue of police abuse into the forefront
of public attention.
The beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles,l Jhon Pat in Australia2 or
blindings of under trials in Bhagalpur or encounter deaths or killings of civilians
by the Provincial Armed Constabulary in Meerut and scores of other incidents
demonstrate the increasing lawlessness in the law enforcement. But the question
is as long as we treat the police abuse as a series of isolated incidents or as a
regrettable by-product of the war on crime or Extremism, these practices will
continue.
The lack of information and data on the incidents of excessive force and other
forms of police abuse is a significant barrier to both legal and political reform. In
fact, there are no real estimates of custodial deaths in India or anywhere in the
world due to obvious reasons. A little systematic data exists where ever human
rights groups are active. Without any credible information on the scope and
pervasiveness of the problem, the public is left with the impression that the
abuses are more aberrational than systemic. Even the manifestation of indifference
to documented abuses by the state and fostering the official violence through
social, political and legal structures reinforces the patterns of unlawfulness.
The real questions that emerge from this are how far are the institutions,
structures, programmes, policies and principles we have developed to regulate and
control the police behaviour sufficiently sensitive towards containing the police
violence? Why have the principles of accountability and organisational control
failed to apply the basic percepts to law enforcement officials? This has brought the
whole issue of policing within the legitimate political debate as a necessary
precondition for a long term and a broader popular democratic critique of police.
*

2

Faculty Member, National Law School, Bangalore
This article is a part of M.Phil work submitted to National Law School, 1993.
The beating of Rodney King by Los Angels police in 1991 and the controversial acquittal of the
officers involved focussed attention on the problem of police abuse and demonstrated the
continuing existence of the practices.
Death of a sixteen- year old aboriginal youth, John Pat in Roeburne, Western Australia in 1983
and later acquittal of five policemen charged with the death led to the formation of committee
to defend Black Rights which spearheaded the campaign for the Royal Commission of
aboriginal deaths in custody in Australia.

Custodial Deaths in India

Vol. 6]

43

Social background
The increasing pattern of police abuse has to be analysed in the light of the
social background of custodial violence in India.
The forty six years of democracy have brought little benefit to the marginalised
sections of society whose survival was threatened by the failure of the trickle-down
theory of government planning from mid 1960's. This led them to engage in violent
struggles to assert their legitimate rights. Since seventies, there have been various
grass root level social movements claiming for more autonomy and social justice.
This discontent was manifested in wide-spread protests culminating in full fledged
struggles. The state began to resort to more and more wideranging and fierce forms
of suppression by using police and para-military forces as a 'whipping boy'. The
continuous use of police and para-military forces to suppress the dissent to maintain
order and resolving social conflicts led to the erosion of legitimacy of state.
With this, the ordinary citizens and particularly the poor strata are exposed more
to police than to the politicians who seem to have withdrawn from the earlier role
of mediating conflicts by handing them over to police as a means of last resort. Due
to this, the police image has declined sharply as custodians of order and instead
given place to one of a "barbaric, brutal and bloody-thirsty lot." This is reflected in
tremendous growth in governmental expenditure on police. (See Table 1).
Table-l
Governmental Expenditure on Police
Year

Combined budgetary
transactions (RS)

1951

587:3 million

1961

1.075 billion

1971

3.89 billion

1985

13.76 billion

Source: P.R. Rajagopal, Violence
Justice system. (1988) 20-21.

&

Response:

A critique of the Indian Criminal

The Table-l shows the 23 times increase of the total police Budget during the
period from 1951-85. What is alarming is.the pattern of state's response in the face
of its inability of enforce social control. A vast coercive apparatus has been built
iIp by the state which instead of strengthening the legitimacy tends to erode it even
further.
The authoritarian character of the state has manifested itself also in a host of
legislations like Terrorist Act, National Security Act, Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Disturbed Areas Act. These
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have provided the police a powerful array of new law enforcement measures to
make arrests, conduct searches without warrant and to shoot and kill. In the net
result, it authorised increasing invasive practices of police in the name of 'law
and order', maintenance of security of state and integrity.
Gravity of the Problem
The custodial crimes are qualitatively different from other crimes due to the
fact that what happens in police station is not open to public scrutiny. The denial
of open accessibility to the police station fuels the demand to bring every day
police operations under popular democratic control.
The police are charged with particular public responsibilities and equipped
with considerable public resources and extensive powers to manage and coerce
the lives of others in their care or custody. Whenever the state takes a person into
its custody, then it is responsible for the care, well-being and guardianship of that
person. If that person dies, then the state has failed to meet its responsibility. The
circumstances surrounding death should be inquired into not just for apportioning
blame to the individuals, but for identifying the diverse factors contributing to
such deaths.
Conceptualising

custodial death

Custody is not defined either in substantive or procedural laws. Dictionary
meaning of custody is - care, guardianship and safe-keeping. It is in vogue to
identify a police station or premises of allYstation house as 'Custody'. But it lacks
the real meaning of the term 'custody'. The terms 'arrest' and "custody' are not
synonymous, as are commonly understood. It is true that in every arrest, there is
custody, but not vice-versa. Custody begins, however, at the initial point of
detention when the police uses its authority to restrain a suspect or an accused
from moving on his way.
Custodial death can be interpreted narrowly as death of a person in a police
lock-up. But sometimes, death takes place outside the premises of a police station,
in a hospital or on streets, but technically in the custody of police. As David Biles
has rightly argued there are highly complex dilemmas inherent in the different
aspects of the definition.3 The definition of custodial death should include:

3

1.

All cases where a person dies of whatever the cause while in police
custody, whether the custody is lawful or not, regardless of the actual
location of death. Thus, a person dies in a hospital but is still technically
in the custody of police at the time of death.

2.

It would also include the cases where the deceased was out of custody
at the time of death, but where the death may have resulted from injuries

David Biles "Deaths in Custody: Nature and Scope of the Problem", Criminology Australia,
7 (1991)

Custodial Deaths in India

Vol. 6]

45

sustained during the period of custody. For instance, if the detenue was
seriously ill and released a few days before the death.
3.

Where a person dies having escaped from police custody. If such a
person is killed in the act of escaping it would clearly be a death in
custody. But, it would be more difficult to classify the case, if the
person had been an escapee for a long period of time. In fact, there is a
consistent argument by civil liberties groups in India that the 'encounter'
death is also a custodial death.

Causative Factors
Police brutality does not occur due to some overzealous police officers nor is
it an individual aberration. It is a larger question that goes beyond the Criminal
Justice administration. As succinctly observed by Upendra Baxi "What is truly
striking about India is the lack of respect for rule of law, not just by the people
but those who make and enforce them."4 Therefore to understand reasons for
police behaviour requires consideration of the broadest features of social structure
and fundamental analysis of the determinants, nature and consequences. A probe
into police abuse has to begin with an analysis of nature, culture, and how and
why the torture is institutionalised in the police process.
Police brutality is often a consequence of a larger problem of criminalisation
of politics. The excessive use of force is a product of police culture that
rationalises physiciil abuse as appropriate punishment for persons who are
viewed as trouble-makers or deviants.
The lack of proper legal restraints on police powers to regulate and control is
one of the main reason for continuous police abuse. The police are quite sophisticated
in exploiting the many loopholes created by the legislature and court's constitutional
remedies jurisprudence. The police abuse is catalysed when the authority of
police is being questioned or defied or when their power and position is-threatened.
The police may use force on detenues due to displeasure, ill-will, insult, vendetta
or to demoralise the offender or to teach them a lesson or to curry favour of
politicians.
Police Sub-culture
The police develops a distinct working personality and an occupational
culture different from other professions called the police 'sub-culture' which has
been evolved to manage the stress of their roles. The frustration in police job
performance is characterised by factors such as negative public image, stress of
work without fixed hours of job or holidays, bad living conditions, personal
isolation leads police to be prone to violence. -Considerable theoretical scholarship
on police agencies have reported the frustration and strain as the main factor in
4

Upendra Baxi, 'Crisis of Indian le~al system' 6 (1982).
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explaing police deviance. But, torture cannot be justified under any circumstance.
The human rights groups argue that it is a calculated assault on human dignity to
subject a person to torture. Once it is justified and allowed, it will be used against
increasing proportion of the population.
Custodial Trauma
The arrest and detention in police custody creates a psychological impact on
the detenues. The anxiety, fear and stress of being arrested and detained causes
a mental pressure or trauma on the detainee. The suspect or accused will come
into the police station obviously in a state of shock and it varies enormously from
person to person with respect to their capacHy to cope with the situation.
The detainee is under tremendous psychological strain during interrogation
due to low mental and physical condition. A person will not die in custody of
police only due to torture. As Balagopal explains: "the inability of the victim to
defend himself, the state of demoralization induced by indefinite confinement, in
an ill-ventilated and stinking lock-up far removed from the sight of the world, the
lowered resistance caused by poor and meagre food and the insanitary conditions
of incarceration makes the person prone to easy death.us
, The process of interrogation and surrounding circumstances in custody
affects the mind of the arrested person which influences him to crumble. It builds
up a kind of pressure on the mental state of the person interrogated. When it
crosses the limits of a mere pressure of fact building on the mind and gets in to
the domain of physical pressure on the weak bodily health of the victim, it results
in death. If third-degree methods are applied in this half-starved, unhygenic
existence added to the fear, demoralisation and lack of medical attention, it leads
to easy death of a person in police custody.
Police and Legal Frame work
Civilised standards of every Justice system accord certain basic rights to the
accused. The law does not permit torture. The torture by police is violative of tbe
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The
Constitution, Criminal Procedure Code, Indian Evidence Act, Indian Penal Code
and the Police Act explicitly guarantee safeguards of Human rights. Article 22 (2)
of the Constitution and sections 56 and 57 CrPC guarantee the right to be
produced before the magistrate immediately and within 24 hours. The delay in no
case shall exceed 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from
the place of the arrest to the court. These provisions also provide that the police
arresting with or without warrant to inform the arrested person without delay the
grounds· of arrest. It enables the accused to apply for bail or to present defence
against the prosecution.
5

K. Balagopal, "Deaths in police custody: some Anatomical considerations",
Political Weekly 1924 (1986)
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The right to bail arises from the moment an individual is arrested and
detained. 'Bail is a right and Jail is an exception' in all Bailable offences.6 The
Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure recognise the right of every
,arrested person to consult a legal councel of his choice.7 The Supreme Court has
recognised right to remain silent during custodial interrogation. 8 Even the state
is under a constitutional mandate under Article 21 to provide free legal aid to an
indigent person. This right can be claimed even when the accused is produced for
the first time before the magistrate.9
Article 20 (2) of the Constitution ensures protection from prosecution for the
similar offence twice. The fundamental right to criminal justice is the right to
have the benefit of presumption of innocence in his favour till the guilt is proved
under Section 101 of Evidence Act. Section 100 (3) (4) (6) ,and (7) provides
sanctity and privacy of a citizen's home against illegal search and seizure. Section
54 CrPC gives the accused the right to have medical examination in case of
complaints of tort~re by police. It is also the duty of the magistrate to inform the
arrested person about the right to have himself medically examined.
The law does not recognise confession made to police as evidence. The
protection against 'involuntary' confessions of any kind are contained in the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). Section
162 of Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 24, 25 and 26 of Evidence Act and
sections 330 and 331 of Indian Penal Code and section 29 of Police Act, treat it
as an offence. One of the important safeguards in case of illegal arrest is the writ
of Habeas Corpus under Article 32 to Supreme Court or under Article 226 to
approach the High court. Section 97 code of Criminal Procedure also provides the
power to search for the person in illegal detention.
All the safeguards are provided by law. But police flout everyone of them
by a simple trick - they do not ever record the arrest, do not ever produce him
before a magistrate until the required information has been taken from him.
Thereafter they produce him before the magistrate misrepresenting that he was
arrested less than 24 hours ago to follow the 'quaint ritual' of judging the guilt
by the magistrate.
Procedure for investigation
The public have substantial interest a~d suspicion with regard to custodial
deaths because of the fact that the death has occurred in the facades of police
station and the imQ1ense chances of the facts being suppressed. Therefore, there
lies a heavy burden on the investigation to unravel the mysteries to present an
6
7

See, Sections 50 (2), 436, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1976.
See, Article 22 (I), Constitution of India Sec. from 303 and 304 Code of Criminal Procedure,
1976

8
9

Nandini Satpathy v. PL Dani, 1978 Cri LJ 968
See Khatri v. State of Bihar, 1981, Cri LJ, 470; Sheela Barse, AIR 1983 SC 378 ; Sukhdas v.
Arunachal Pradesh, 1986 Cri LJ 1084.
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objective, impartial and effective inquiry for determining the circumstances and
persons responsible for custodial deaths.
Since the death has occurred in the custody of the police, in order to instill
confidence in public mind, the enquiry process is entrusted to a coroner or a
magistrate regarding him as independent, impartial, distinct and different from
police.
Inquest
The inquest is made in case of all unnatural deaths and it is mandatory in case
of custodial deaths. Two types of procedures are followed for inquest in India.
One is by a magistrate under section 176 Code of Criminal Procedure and the
other by coroner appointed under Coroners Act in the city of Bombay and
Calcutta.
Inquest is a preliminary on the spot enquiry to record the findings as to the
apparent cause of death. It is the public examination of the thoroughness or
otherwise of police investigation and an independent check on the opinion of the
police. The fact that an inquest is mandatory in all cases of custodial deaths
speaks of its significance within the investigatory procedure.
Inquest is supposed to be an open forum and to be publicly held. But there are
allegations that there was little or no information given concerning dates of
inquest, place and details to interested parties.
It is the mandatory duty of station house officer to inform immediately the
death of a person in police custody to the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
District Magistrate and his official superiors. The station house officer has to
register an FIR under section 174 IPC after the incident and the accusation against
police officials present at that time and send the information to the Executive
Magistrate. The executive magistrate has to inspect the body and examine the
police station and record statements of accused police officers. The relatives of
deceased, friends, and human rights groups are to be informed about the inquest
and their statements are to be recorded.
After the inquest, the body is to be sent to the doctor for post-mortem
examination. If the post-mortem reveals that the death is due to injuries sustained
during police custody, the executive magistrate can issue arrest warrants to
concerned police officers and file the complaint under section 302 Indian Penal
Code before concerned magistrate for taking cognisance. If no prima-facie case
is disclosed, the executive magistrate will s~bmit a report to the district magistrate.
The law is not exhaustive in explaining the procedure for inquest, examination
of witnesses, access to information and is silent in other matters unlike the
Corners Act. The law is uncertain as to what the executive magistrate has to do
after inquest, leaving scope for different interpretations.
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Coroner

The Coroner is an English institution which originated in 1194 in England.
The duty of Coroner is to hold inquest in all unnatural deaths including deaths in
police custody and the object of the inquiry is to satisfy public conscience that an
unnatural death was not hushed up. The person having not less than 10 years
holding of judicial office or practise as advocate or solicitor of the High Court
shall be eligible to be appointed as a Coroner.
The Coroner performs mainly three functions:
a) Investigativ.e b) Judicial and c) Administrative. The investigative duty
includes the inquiry into the manner and circumstances of death, the administrative
duty is of empanelling the jury and conducting the inquest and the judicial duty is
of examining the witnesses, conducting the preliminary inquiry and summarisingthe verdict.
If the Coroner is satisfied as to the cause of death and if a post-mortem
examination is in his opinion not necessary, then the coroner may authorize the
body to be disposed of. If the coroner is satisfied that the police were in no way
responsible, he often records the finding without further inquiry. This broad and
discretionary powers of coroner without any public accountability can therefore
result in abuse, defeating the very object of public justice.
But the provision for juries at inquests is one of the most enduring and
endearing feature of the coronial system. It is a significant check on the coronial
process, a means of ensuring that both police and coroner adequately perform
their functions. If the jury finds that death of deceased person was occasioned by
an act which amounts to an offence under law, tbe matter is forwarded to
Commissioner of police. The coroner can issue warrant for apprehension of the
person alleged to have caused death and send him forthwith to a magistrate
empowered to conduct trial.
Evidence in custodial deaths
It is very difficult to ascertain the person who is directly responsible for
custodial death, because the eye-witnesses to the death are either policemen or
the co-detenues, who are naturally unwilling to testify.
As rightly pointed out by Justice Chandrachud in Ramsagar Yadav's case,10
"Police officials alone no one else can give evidence regards to the circumstances
in which a person in their custody comes to receive injuries while in custody. Bound
by ties of brotherhood, they often prefer to remain silent in such situations and when
they choose to speak, they put gloss upon facts and pervert the truth. The result is
that persons on whom atrocities are perpetuated by the police in sanctum sanctorum
of the police station are left without any evidence to prove who the offenders are".
This situation results in such a paucity of evidence that the guilty often escape.
10

State of UP

v

Ramsagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416.
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The Supreme Court also observed in Gauri Shankar Sharma's casell that "it is
generally difficult in cases of custodial death to secure evidence against policemen
responsible for resorting to third-degree methods, since they were incharge of the
police station records which they do not find it difficult to manipulate the case." This
fact is also observed by Justice A.D.V Reddy subsequent to the Judicial inquiry
appointed to investigate into the death of Narasimha in Andhra Pradesh. The
Commission observed that "a whole lot of records, entries in the diary, crime diary,
punchanamas, FIR, arrest card, entry in sentry relief book, requisition to take the
culprit to hospital, everything was fabricated to support their case."12
The Supreme Court while convicting the accused for life imprisonment in
Bhagwan Singh case13 observed that, "if a person is in the police custody, then

what has happened to him is peculiarly within the knowledge of police officials
who have taken him into custody. When the other evidence is convincing enough
to establish that the deceased died because of injuries inflicted by accused, the
circumstances would only lead to an irresistible inference that the police personnel
who caused this death must also have caused disappearance of the body". A
similar observation was made by Justice Sri Ramulu, while investigating into
death of A. Prabhakar Rao in Andhra Pradesh, "if a person dies in police station,
the circumstance itself is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion and when
death is of a young and healthy person in a matter of few hours of arrest, in the
absence of explanation by police regarding death of the person with injuries on
his body, there is all the more justification to presume that the police are
responsible or having something to do with death."14
Recognising the difficulty of getting evidence, Justice Chandrachund had
pleaded for amendment of law relating to burden of proof in case of custodial
deaths in Ramsagar Yadav case. In response to the Supreme Court judgment the
Law Commission of India submitted its 113th report on 'Injuries in Police
Custody' in 1985 and recommended for insertion of section 114 -B into Indian
Evidence Act to place the burden of proof on policemen. But, unfortunately, nine
years have passed since the Supreme Court judgment and Law Commission's
recommendations and the legislature has slept over both.
The real question is, is it necessary for an amendment in Evidence Act to
enable the court to presume that the police men, in whose custody the death has
occurred, were responsible for that death? Justice Sri Ramulu has rightly observed
that, "though there is no law for the present that a presumption shall be drawn
against the police that they should be held responsible for custodial death, yet, the
11
12
13
14

Gauri Shankar Sharma v State of UP AIR 1990 SC 709 . See also. Sate of West Bengal v Sunil
Biswas, 1990 Cri LJ 2093.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the death of U. Narasimha in the police custody at
Sanjeeva Reddy Nagar Police station, (1986).
Bhagawan Singh v State of Punjab, JT 1992 (3) SC 216.
Report of the Commission of enquiry in to the death of A. Prabhakar Rao in the police custody
of Chirala of AP (1985).
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circumstances which lead to death of the deceased who was in the custody of the
police, being within the special knowledge of the police, it is for the police to
prove that they are innocent and not responsible for the death."15
Even the Police Manual holds the officer in-charge of a police station
personally responsible for the safe custody of all prisoners brought to the station.
Before detaining a person in the lock-up, he is required to examine the person of
the prisoner, preferably in the presence of two independent witnesses, to see
whether the arrested person has on his person any injuries. If on such examination,
he finds that there are injuries on the arrested person, a full description thereof
shall be entered into the station diary in the presence of the witnesses. Section 29
of the Police Act makes any wilful breach of these regulations and employment
of third-degree methods to cause personal violence to a person in custody
punishable with fine or imprisonment.
As rightly argued by Gouse, "the court can presume that the policemen incharge of a police station are responsible for the custodial death, if, it is proved
that the person arrested was in sound health at the time of arrest, he was in police
custody until his death and the death took place in police custody. All these
circumstantial evidence considered in the light of Police regulations and Manual
and Section 29 of the Police Act, is enough to raise such a presumption."16
Role of Executive Magistrate
The legislature with an intention to find out the truth in custodial deaths made
it mandatory for Executive magistrate to conduct inquest. This duty was entrusted
to him as he was considered to be an impartial and independent person who could
justly ascertain the cause of death. But there is a consistent allegation against
Executive Magistrate that the police wield much influence and pressure over him
to ensure that the report is in their favour. In many instances, the courts have
disbelieved the inquest report of Executive magistrate and ordered enquiries for
further investigati?n by CBI.
In Bharat Bhushanl? case, the Delhi High Court held that the inquest report
was far from satisfactory and hence directed the CBI to conduct the investigation
again. Kashmiri Devi caselS revealed the haphazard manner in which investigation
was conducted with a view to shield the.guilty members of Delhi police and there
fore CBI was enlisted to conduct a proper investigation. In Mohanlal Sharma
casel9,
the Supreme Court observed that the SDM had 'overlooked various
aspects and quite a few features of evidence whose significance had not been fully
15
16
17
18
19

Report of Commission of Inquiry into death of M. Anjaiah in the police custody of Thungathiarthi
of A.P. (1986)
Mohammed Ghouse, "State lawlessness and constitution of India: A study of custodial deaths",
Comparative Constitutional Law 270 (Mahendra P. Singh ed., 1989).
Bharat Bhushan v State of Delhi, 1986 Cri LJ 1624.
Kashmiri Devi v Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 1323.
Mohan Lal Sharma v State of UP (1989) 2 SCC 600.
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appreciated'. Therefore, doubts arise as to the real independence, impartiality and
fairness of inquest report of Executive magistrates.
Role of Doctor
The Medical report is the most substantial and significant evidence of
scientific examination which can assist in the identification and prosecution of
guilty. The post-mortem report can only provide an impartial and independent
evidence on the nature of injuries. If he suppresses the material facts, it is a great
harm to humanity.
The Supreme Court and many judicial inquiries have clearly established the
'conspiracy of silence' on the part of the doctor in suppressing the facts of death
which goes against medical ethics and the international instrument on Principles
of Medical Ethics in the Protection of Detainees Against Torture, 1982 and Tokyo
Declaration of World Medical Association, 1975.
Justice Muktadhar passed scathing remarks against doctors in the famous
Rameejabee case, where a woman was raped in the police station and her husband
was tortured to death in Hyderabad. Justice Muktadhar observed: "It is extremely
regrettable to note that the officers of department of forensic medicine who are
supposed to perform their duties with the utmost dedication and service to
humanity could stoop down to such depths to help and save the skins of some who
have openly committed henious crimes by taking advantage of the authority,
position and helplessness of the victim. It is sad to note that a department which
has been established to bring out the truth is manned by officers of questionable
integrity who could suppress or distort the truth to accommodate criminals. The
earlier the Forensic Science department gets rid of such officers the better it will
be for Indian citizens."2o
Custodial Violence: Judicial Approaches and Responses
The Constitution of India is the product of two conflicting cultures. One
representing the founding fathers normative concern for political liberties and
for creating a liberal political democracy and the limits to arbitrary powers, and
the other reflecting the new concerns of the state for unity, security and
administrative efficiency. While the former laid the establishment of a constitutional
state, the latter resulted in setting up an authoritarian
state like the earlier
colonial rule.21
The true test of the legal system's commitment to Constitutional constraints
is how the state and courts responded to the systemic deviations from constitutional
20
21

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into detention of Rameejabee and death of Ahmed
Hussain in Hyderabad, p. 102.
Amal Ray, "From Constitutionalism to Authoritarian System of Government: Interaction
between Politics and Constitution of India", Journal of Common Wealth & Comparative
Politics (1990) ..
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norms.!t was contended that the ideology of constitutionalism had disappeared
both structurally and functionally during the emergency. It gravely alarmed
people who realised for the first time that democracy could be subverted and
constitutional provisions could be used arbitrarily but "legally" against citizens.
There is a visible transformation of the role of court in post-emergency period
with a new role perception and a new judicial function. A new constitutionalism
burst forth from the court in post-emergency era resulting in constitutionalisation
of criminal process. Judicial activism is an almost inevitable consequence of the
failure of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for regulating police
practiCes.
The post-emergency era gave two important positive contributions to Indian
democratic process. One is the public interest litigation and other the emergence
of civil liberties movement in India. The former is to increase the legitimacy of
judicial process and the latter an alternate movement for protection of Human
rights outside the court.
Constitutionalisation

of Criminal process:

Maneka Gandhi's case22 blazed a new trend. Article 21 of the Constitution
which was a 'lifeless incantation of the right to life and personal liberty' was
given a new or dynamic meaning by Supreme Court in Maneka. It resulted in the
outburst of due process decisions converting much of Article21 into a regime of
positive rights. Supreme Court for the first time took the view that Aticle 21 gives
protection not only against executive action, but also against legislation.
A

Another trend setter in criminal jurisprudence is Nandini case23 through
which Supreme Court wanted to make the police more sensitive to humanity and
to respect the dignity of the individual.
Sheela Barse 's case24could have enlarged and enriched Nandini Sathapathy' s
case but, surprisingly, the court did not refer to it, nor right to consult a lawyer
during custodial interrogation. The court however did lay down in this case some
important guidelines for effective measure to prevent custodial violence.
Judicial Policing of police
"Torture or killing of a person in police custody is, to put it mildly, illegal.
But the real question is: When gold rusts, what can iron do? Who can police the
police? Because of the system of linkages, the accountability of police to the
political process is purely notional. So, the question arises whether courts can
police the police?"25 Of late, the courts have taken up the responsibility and it is
reflected in many judicial decisions.
22
23
24
25

Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.
Nandini Satpathy v P.L. Dani 1978 Cri. LJ, 968.
Sheela Barse v State of Maharastra AIR 1983 SC 378.
Supra n. 16.
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Venugopal's case 26 is supposed to be the first case that came up before the
Supreme Court in 1964 on custodial deaths. In this case, the deceased Arige
Ramana was taken into custody for interrogation of stolen property. About three
days later he was found lying dead in the outskirts of village. The trial court
convicted the respondents and awarded a sentence of five years and later, on
appeal, the High Court acquitted them. The Supreme Court restored the trial
court order.
Ram Sagar Yadav case27 is a gruesome story of extorting illegal gratification
from Brijlal in connection with a complaint which was filed against him for cattle
trespass. The police had succeeded in obtaining a sum of Rs.100/- from Brijlal
with an assurance that no steps will be taken against him in that complaint. But,
when the police further demanded money for hushing up the case, the deceased
refused to pay and instead sent a complaint to Superintendent of police. Being
incensed by the complaint, the police brought Brijlal without any charge to 'teach
a proper lesson' . Just after two hours of arres t, he was brought to court for remand
in a badly injured condition.

Brijlal had no injuries when he was arrested, but when he was sent to remand,
he had about 19 injuries on his body. The trial court convicted the police under
section 304 of. Indian Penal Code. A single judge of Allahabad High Court,
however, allowed the appeal. Later, Supreme Court reversed the High Court
order, criticised its reasoning and expressed regret that the sessionsjudge instead
of convicting them under section 302 of the Penal Code had convicted the
respondents under section 304 resulting in 'undue liberality in favour of
undeserving culprits like respondent police'.
These judicial decisions reflect on a humanist constitutional order and give
a message that an undue liberality cannot be granted for those who use their
authority and power for oppressing innocent citizens. But, in Maiku28, the
Supreme Court very narrowly interpreted section 147 and section 149 of Penal
Code by acquitting the police. The case arose out of conviction of trial court under
section 304 of Penal Code later on High Court partly altered it from section 304
to section 325. Bharat, the deceased was arrested in connection with a burglary.
Later on interrogation revealed of committing another murder and he volunteered
to get the dead body recovered. When police party was taking him towards the
place, he attempted to runaway. The police apprehended him, overpowered him
after beating him up and he died on the spot.
The magisterial enquiry revealed that the police story was false and deceased
was beaten to death. The Supreme Court accepted that the deceased had some
injuries by hard blunt weapon on his body, but it is not clear under what
circumstances it happened and how the appellant was connected to it. But the
26
27
28
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narrow interpretation of Supreme Court in this case was a step in the wrong
direction. It is unfortunate of supreme Court's stand on justifying the use of
unlawful force by police which it considered as lawful as it was used in the' course
of a lawful object of investigatory powers conferred on police by law.
In Gauri Shanker Sharma's case29 observing that "death in police custody
must be viewed seriously, for otherwise it will help to take a stride in the direction
of police raj. It must be curbed with a heavy hand and the punishment should be
such as would deter others from indulging in such behaviour."
Bhagawan singh's case30 is a disturbing story of brutal torture of deceased by
the Central Intelligence Agency, a special wing of Punjab police. The deceased
was interrogated for smuggling narcotic powder along with others. It was alleged
that he was brutally tortured and dead body was taken in a car and was thrown in
to the river. The SP while conducting investigation found the walls of interrogation
room stained with blood but could not trace the dead body.
The Supreme Court gave a very liberal interpretation of presumption of death
on the basis of evidence of injured witnesses and circumstantial evidence that the
police personnel who caused death must also have caused disappearance of body.
This case holds that presumption is permissible even without an amendment of law.
Sunil Biswas' s case3! demonstrates the extent of inhuman torture and
degrading treatment meted out to a prisoner in police custody resulting in death.
The trial judge accepted the prosecution case that the deceased was mercilessly
assaulted and die~ as a result of it. But, the judge was of the opinion that,
prosecution could not prove by unimpeachable evidence beyond reasonable
doubt the involvement of police in the assault and accordingly acquitted all
accused. High Court on appeal convicted the accused for seven years pointing out
the difficulty in securing the evidence against police as they are in-charge of
police station records which they can easily manipulate.
Compensatory Jurisprudence
Whenever the state takes a person into custody, the state is responsible for the
case, well-being and guardianship of that person. If any thing happens to that
person, it is the failure of the state to meet that responsibility. The state has the
legal duty of not only protecting the rights of citizens, but also the social duty to
compensate for illegal arrest, torture or death. This is based on the contract
between the state and the citizen a breach of which occurs when the state fails to
protect the citizen from criminal injury. The compensation is seen as a "tangible
expression of the state's sympathy and concern for those who, though no fault of
their own, suffer unjustifiable invasions on their personal integrity."32
.
29
30
31
32

Gauri Shankar Sharma v Siate of UP AIR 1990 SC 709.
Bhagwan Singh and Uttam Chand v State of Punjab JT 1992 (3) SC 216.
State of West Bengal v Sunil Biswas 1990 Cri LJ 2093.
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When the state itself violates human rights, then it is not only liable for
criminal prosecution, but also to compensate for its misconduct. The first known
case of compensation for state lawlessness was the famous Jallianwala Bagh case
in 1919. The Hunter commission which investigated into Jallianwala Bagh
massacre by General Dyer on April 13, 1919, held that the shooting was unjustified
and awarded compensation of Rs. 2,000 each to relatives of those who are killed.
The question of state liability to compensate for the infringement of fundamental
rights in independent India was first time raised before the Supreme Court in
Khatrp3
and Veenasethi34. The Supreme Court refused to order compensation
by exercising the writ jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution in the above
two cases. The court was not prepared to forge new tools or devise new remedies
until Rudul Shah in 1983. Rudul Shah heralded a new era of compensatory
Jurisprudence in Indian legal history. The Supreme Court maintained that "its
refusal to pass order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing
mere lip-service to fundamental right to liberty which the state government has
so grossly violated."35 The principle laid down in Rudul Shah was applied in
Oraon,36 Sebastian M. Hongrary37 , Bhim Singh38 and many other cases.
is the first case of awarding compensation in case of
custodial death. In this case, two persons were taken into army custody had
apparently been killed and were not produced before the court in a Habeas Corpus
writ. The Supreme Court awarded compensation of one lakh each to the widows.
Sebastian

M. Hongray

Supreme Court in PUDR v. State of Bihar39 for the first time attempted to
evolve a 'working principle' for awarding compensation to victims of police
atrocities, but which is indeed not a good working principle. In this case, 21
persons including children died and many more injured in Arwal, BihClr due to
unwarranted police firing. The court awarded compensation of Rs. 20,000 for
death and Rs. 5,000 for injuries.
The Supreme Court awarded compensation for the first time to encounter
victims in R.S. Sodhi case.40 Rajan case41 is a trend setter in compensatory
jurisprudence. Challa Ramakonda Reddy42 is yet another land mark case where
the Andhra Pradesh High Court awarded Rs. 1,44,000 to the family of the
detainue who died in judicial remand due to attack by bombs by the opposite
party.
33

34
35
36
37

38

Khatri v State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928.
Veena Sethi v State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 339.
Rudu/ Shah v State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086.
Oraon v State of Bihar (Unreported).
,
Sebastian M. Hongray v Union of India AIR 1984 SC 571.
Bhim Singh v State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1986 SC 494.
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AIR 1987 SC 355.

40
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R.S. Sodhi. PUCL v State of UP 1991 (2) SCALE 463.
Eechara Warrier V State of Kerala (Unreported).
Ch. Ramakonda Reddy v State of AP AIR 1989 AP 235.
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The courts in India have awarded compensation to relatives victims in
custodial deaths in many cases.43 These cases illustrate a positive trend of the
judicial policy for compensating victims of custodial deaths. Now, it is a well
settled law that for death of a person in police custody, the state should pay the
compensation. But the question unresolved is who is to pay the compensation: the
delinquent police official responsible for death or the state? If it is proved that the
police officer is responsible for the death of a person in police custody, then he
should be made personally liable and the compensation should be recovered from
the salary of police but not from the public exchequer.
The rationale and conceptual basis for award of compensation is also not
settled. The lack of guidelines, rules or legislation for award of compensation left
the matter to the varying discretion of the individual judges. In all the above
cases, the courts awarded compensation without any basis or principles for
quantifying the amount.

Priorities for Prevention
The fundamental duty of the democratic state is to effectively guard against
the excesses of the executive with appropriate mechanisms of public accountability.
It is more so in case of police as they are armed with nearly total powers over the
detenues in their custody. These powers must be in compliance with proper legal
restraints.
The state has done very little to reform the legal system to detect, prosecute
and punish the persons responsible for these crimes. The procedure for investigation
in to these crimes is totally perfunctory. The recommendation of National Police
Commission for a manadatory Judicial Inquiry by a District Sessions Judge and
recommendation of 113th report of Law Commission for amendment of burden of
proof in case of custodial death, has not become the law.
The Law Commission ofIndia's recent working paper on 'custodial crimes'
has raised some pertinent issues with a view to review the custodial interrogation
methods and practices. It sought to subject the police to meaningful restraints and
to democratise the existing policing powers.
The main issues in custodial violence could be broadly classified under six
heads:
1. Law of Arrest: The fact of arrest, detention in custody and interrogation
creates a psychological pressure and depression. The shock of sudden arrest,
removal from home and family, indefinite detention and coercive and oppressive
atmosphere of interrogation creates physical trauma in the detenues. The lack of
proper safeguards and accountability against the wide powers of arrest in cognisable
43

See, Shaheli v Commissioner of Police AIR 1990 SC; PUDR v Commissioner of Police(1989)
4 SCC 730; Rajalakshmi v ur of Pondicherry 1992 SCC (Cri) 524; Luithukla v Rishcang AIR
1989 NOC 182; Lalitha v DUP, Madras 1989 Cri. LJ 1732.
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crimes is the main cause of concern. If these powers are not exercised properly,
it leads to abuse. Therefore, proper accountability is to be built against the powers
of arrest in the police process.
Some of the following measures would be able to provide effective checks to
balance the exercise of police power like: (a) Intimation of arrest; (b) Documentation
of arrest; (c) Review of decision of arrest at police station; (d) Access to thirdparty like family, friends and legal counsel (e) Central checking team of vigilance
staff and (f) Lay-visiting of police stations.
2. Rights to Medical Examination at Police station: It should be made
manadatory upon the police in the first place to arrange for a medical examination
as soon as possible after a person is taken into custody. No interrogation should
take place till after the medical examination.
3. Burden of proof: It is very difficult to ascertain the person who is directly
responsible for the custodial death, because of lack of independent eye-witnesses
except policemen or co-prisoners. Recognising this difficulty in getting evidence,
the then Chief Justice,Cchandrachud pleaded for amendment of law relating to
burden of proof. In response to this Law Commission submitted a report recommending
for insertion of section 114-B into the Indian Evidence Act to place burden of
proof on policemen. It should be accepted and necessary amendments should be
brought in law of evidence.
4. Procedure for Investigation: The public have substantial interest and
suspicion in custodial deaths due to the fact that the death has occurred in the
facades of the police station and immense chances of the facts being suppressed.
Therefore, a heavy burden lies on investigative machinery to present an impartial,
fair and effective inquiry for determining the circumstances and persons responsible
for custodial death.
To install confidence in public mind in the inquiry process the following
measures can be adopted. (a) The inquest should be conducted by a Judicial
Magistrate rather than an Executi ve Magistrate. (b) There should be a manadatory
judicial inquiry into all incidents of custodial death by a District Sessions judge.
The relatives of victims, human rights groups be informed of inquiry and the
right to participate and represent.. The legal aid should be provided to relatives
of victims to present their evidence. The report of inquest is to be made public and
a copy should be provided to relatives of victim and human rights groups. (c) If
there is any manipulation in the post-mortem report by forensic expert a stringent
action should be taken against him. (d) The post-mortem report should be given
within 24 hours of death and a copy should be provided to relatives of victims and
human rights groups. The victims relatives and human rights groups right to be
present at the post-mortem examination is to be recognised. If the report is in
dispute, the right to Post-Mortem by independent panel of doctors should be
recognised.
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5. Seperate investigation machinery: There is a greater need to establish a
seperate, independent agency to conduct investigation into all custodial deaths.
This agency, immediately after a report of death should investigate and submit a
report within a month.
6. Immunity from prosecution: The sections 197 and 107 of Criminal Procedure
Code provides that any act committed by a public servant in discharge of his
official duty is protected from prosecution with sanction of government. If prima
facie case is made out in the judicial inquiry, there is no need for waiting to get
sanction from government. Therefore, sections 197 and 107 of Criminal Procedure
Code should be amended with an addition like 'except in cases of custodial
~rimes' .
7. Compensation: An interim compensation could be provided to relatives of
victims if prima facie case is made out. The amount of compensation should be
collected from the salary of the individual guilty but not from state exchequer. A
new and a comprehensive legislation should be enacted providing some guidelines
for award of compensation.
Conclusion
Custodial violence can be prevented only if we institutionalise human rights
standards in the police process and this can be achieved only when we change the
fundamental aspects of police culture. The most important factor for prevention
is organisational accountability. All other remedies will ultimately fail if it is not
accompanied by a system of training and supervision of use of force.
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PLEA FOR STATE LAW UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER
REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Justice M. Jagannadha Rao*

Today, it appears that there are 84 Indian Universities which award Bachelor's
degre~ in Law. It is said there are 464 Law Colleges in all. To the existing number
of lawyers who are about 6lakhs, we are adding roughly 2lakhs every year. There
are about 5,500 Bar Associations throughout the country. We have the second
largest number of lawyers in the world, next only to the U.S.A. There is,
therefore, every need to properly take care of the standards of legal education in
all these 464 Law Colleges and those which may come up in future.
Decline in Standards
The decline in standards of legal education in England was noted and
lamented by Lord Bryce as long ago as 1893 in his lectures.! In America too, the
standards declined after the Revolution in the teaching as well as in the profession.!"
Standards in Canada in legal education too declined from time to time in 'quality
and quantity'.2 Thanks to various reformatory steps taken in those countries, the
position there is much different today.
In our country, Dr. Radhakrishnan observed that 'our colleges of law do not
hold a place of high esteem either at home or abroad, nor has law become an area
of profound scholarship and enlightened research'.3 The Law Commission (1958)
presided by Sri M.C. Setalvad said:
"In the period of about ten years which has elapsed since the
publicatipn of the Radhakrishnan Commission, the position in regard
to legal education in this country has, it appears, definitely deteriorated. "4

In 1968, Prof. P.K. Tripathi said that 'no laborious investigation or profound
research is required to establish that things have been far from satisfactory here
in the field of legal education and research'.5 During the period since then, the
decline has been steeper. The Upendra Baxi Committee observed in 1989 that the
bulk of law colleges suffer from lack of full time teachers, virtual absence of
libraries, staggering emoluments, absentee students, mass copying at examinations,
..
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inadequate physical and financial resources and in most cases, law colleges are
neither recepients of Government grant-in-aid nor the UGC funding.6
It m~st, therefore, be accepted that before and after 1961, when the Advocates
Act, 1961 came in, there has been a clear downward trend in the quality of legal
education in our country. Perhaps, much argument or material is not required in
proof of what we have today. We can see the present with our own eyes.
A question is asked as to how, in spite ofthese adverse circumstances, the
country has been able to produce some of the greatest lawyers and Judges. The
Setalvad Law Commission answered referring to these great men that 'their
achievements probably arise from their own intellectual brilliance and capacity
rather than to the education received by them at the Universities'.7
Legal Education Commercialised
It is rather surprising that even in 1958 the Setalvad Law Commission
expressed that legal education had become a 'profit making industry', that there
is hardly even a pretence of teaching and the situation is 'chaotic'. 8 Between 1958
and 1993, one cannot but say that the chaos continues in its worst forms with all
the ills noticed in 1989 by the Upendra Baxi Committee9. Justice Ahmadi of the
Supreme Court too observed recently in 1992 that by and large, the law colleges
have no proper infrastructure, teaching and other facilities or specifications.
Today, students can live hundreds of miles away from colleges, get full attendance
and degrees too. In Unnikrishnan J.P. v State of A.P.ll the Supreme Court has
observed that imparting education cannot amount to 'trade' or 'business' within
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of lIidia. Education 'cannot be allowed to be
converted into commerce'. Nor can the persons who want to treat it as 'occupation'
be allowed to treat it as a business or commercial activity. Imparting education,
the Supreme Court held, cannot be a 'profession' within Article 19(1)(g).
Recent Proliferation

of Sub-standard Law Colleges

One wonders how recently there is a tremendous spurt in the number of new
sub-standard law c·olleges. I am told reliably that there are at least 22 colleges in
Hyderabad city alone. Law colleges in equally large number are established in
small local areas and and spread over the length and breadth of the country.
Colleges are established in small towns or some district headquarters and some
lawyers who have neither professional practice nor teaching experience are
employed just to satisfy the minimal requirements under the rules. Students
6
7

6

8

Report of Curriculum Development Committee. (UGC 1989) at 4 (1.13).
Supra n. 4.
Ibid.
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reside hundres of miles away and need not attend classes. In classes with, say, a
hundred students, sometimes hardly five or six remain. The spectacle of students
not attending classes and teachers not taking classes is the normal phenomenon.
Reasons for spurt in such Colleges
Establishment of law colleges is easy because no laboratories or workshops
are necessary as in the case of engineering colleges. There is at least a requirement
that medical colleges must be attached to hospitals with a standard number of
beds. Expenditure in establishing law colleges is comparatively less. Colleges
can be established in sheds and there can be a show of a temporary library to
satisfy an inspection team of the Bar Council of India. The Managements are
mainly interested in making their profit after meeting the expenses.
The last graduate can get admission
The Bar Council of India perhaps believes that there is nothing wrong in
permitting, in any local area, as many law colleges as may perhaps take in, the last
graduate in the rank list or the last successful candidate at the common entrance
examination, available in any local area. If 22 law colleges exist for Hyderabad
city alone, a large number having been sanctioned recently, the expectation of the
promoters is that they can take in even the last student who is successful in th.e
common entrance examination. In fact, some of them had admitted students who
had not appeared at or even pased the common entrance examination and then, the
students moved the Court, obviously at the instance of managements, saying that
such admissions were not violative of the law. In some instances, the successful
students at the examination have been ousted for by that time the college had its
admissions complete (see P. Venkateswara Rao v Osmania Univesity; Hyderabad).12
It may be that the State Governments of the Universities issue orders for the
mereasking of it, for starting new law colleges, but the Bar Council of India has
to apply its mind and exercise its powers independently as it has a duty to
maintain standards of legal education.
Standards of Education:

The Bar Council and the UGC

It will be noticed that the Bar Council of India as well UGC have the duty to
lay down and ilJlprove the standards of legal education. Botb tbe Bar Council of
India and tbe UGC have the powers of inspection.
Under the Advocates Act, 1961, one of tbe functions of tbe Bar Council of
India (see S.7(h)) is to 'promote legal education and to lay down standards of such
education'
in consultation witb tbe Universities in India imparting sucb education
and the State Bar Council. Section 27(1)(c)(iii) and (iiia) refer to the 3 year/S
year courses of study. The Bar Council of India may make rules under section
49(d) in regard to 'the standards of legal education to be observed by Universities
12

AIR 1990 AP 346.
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in India and the inspection of Universities for that purpose'. Rules have been made
in part IV of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1965, dealing with the 'standards of
legal education and recognition of degrees in law for admission as advocate', The
University Grants Commision Act, 1956 specifies in section 12 that it is the general
duty of the UGC ' in consultation with Universities or other bodies to take all such
steps for promotion and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and
research in Universities'. Under section 2(d), the UGC may recommend to any
University, the measures necessary for the improvement of University education
and advise the University upon the action to be taken for the purpose of implementing
such recommendations. Under section 12(e), the UGC may advise any authority,
if such advise is asked for, on the establishment of a new University or a proposal
connected with expansion of the activities of any University. Section 13 of the UGC
Act provides for inspection for ascertaining financial needs of a University or its
standards of leaching, examination and research and for causing an inspection of
any depanment and for recommending to the University the action that the UGC
requires it to take as a result of inspection.
The respectives roles of the Bar Council of India and the UGC
The respectives roles of the Bar Council of India and the UGC have to be
properly understood. The UGC Act 1956, is made by Parliament in exercise of
the legislative powers under Entry 66 of List I: 'Co-ordination and determination
of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and
technical inslitutions' (see Premchand Jain v R.K. ChabbraI3).
The Advocates
ACl, 1961 is also a law made by Parliamenl under Enlries 77,78 of List I which
deal with the 'persons enlitled to practise before the Supreme Court' and 'persons
entitled to practise before the High Courts'. The State Legislatures have passed
various statutes in relation to establishment of Universities or other bodies for the
purpose of regulating education, in exercise of their legislative powers (previously
under List II) under List III Entry 25 (after 1976) which deals with 'Education,
including lechnical educalion, medical education and Universities, subjecl to lhe
provisions of Enlries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I, vocational and technical training
of labour'. The State Legislature can also make laws under Entry 26 List III in
respect of 'legal, medical and other professions'.
As held by the Supreme Court in D.N. Mohindroo v Bar Council, Delhi 14, the
Advocates Act, 1961 is passed by virtue of the powers under Entries 77 and 78 of
LiSl I which efilries carve out lhe area relating to 'persons entitled lo practise
before lhe Supreme Court and the High Courls', oul of the legislalive powers of
the State in entries 25 and 26 of List III.
Adverting to the role of the UGC, the Supreme Court said in Dsmania
Teachers Association v State of A.P.15 as follows:

University
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"The UGC has, therefore a greater role to play in shaping academic
life of the country. It shall not falter or fail in its duty to maintain
a high standard in the Universities. Democracy depends for its very
life on a high standard of general, vocational and professional
education. It is hoped that the UGCwill duly discharge its responsibility
to the Nation and play an increasing role to bring about the needed
transformation
in the academic life of the Universities. "

Bar Council only prescribes minimal standards - Universities can prescribe
higher standards.
The Bar Council of India, while fixing standards of legal education under
S. 7(h) of the Advocates Act, 1961 can fix the minimal standards at the entry point
and also at the enrolment point. It can fix the requirements at the entry point and
say that a University degree is necessary (The Bar Council of India v Gundimeda
KesavaramayyaI6).
Such minimal requirements fixed by the Bar Council at the
entry point are binding on the Universities. But nothing prevents the University
from prescribing a higher condition of eligibility (Sobhana Kumar S. v The
Mangalore University).17 Similar view has been taken in regard to the corresponding
powers of the Medical ,Council of India under the Indian Medical Council Act,
1956. The Allahabad High Court has beld that the Ordinances of a University can
prescribe bigber standards wbile the Medical Council prescribes only the minimum
standards (Kum. Darsha Ahuja v University of Agra.)18
Judiciary and Bar must have a say, apart from Universities and Bar Council of
India
If therefore, the Bar Council and consequently its Legal Education Committee
have only to prescribe the minimal standards and the Universities can prescribe
higher standards, it is obvious that tbe Bar Council cannot be said to be exclusively
in charge of the standards of legal education, but is only in charge of prescribing
minimum standards. Even that it has to do in consultation with Universities.
In as mucb as the law student enters tbe legal profession and may also get into
the subordinate judiciary or the higher judiciary, it is necessary tbat the judiciary
and the legal profession must necessarily have a say in the standards of legal
education. The Setalvad Law Commission in 1958 quoted the words of a former
member of the UPSC to the effect that"'balf-baked lawyers. who do not know even
the elements of law and wbo are let loose upon society as drones and parasites'
are flooding the country.19 These students are now let loose on the courts. That
is why the judiciary and profession must bave a say wben tbe Legal Education
Committee of the Bar Council of India lays down the standards oflegal education.

•
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Bar Council of India Rules and the Committee
Rule 4 of Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Rules provides that there
shall be a Legal Education Committee. Rule 6 says that the procedure for election
thereto is by secret ballot as per rules. Others are co-opted members. Under Rule
8, the Committee shall have the following powers and duties:
a) to make its recommendations to the Council for laying down the standards
of legal education for the Universities, b) to visit and inspect Universities and
report the results to the Council,
, d)(i) to recommend to the Council
for recognition of any degree in law of any University in the territory of India
under S.24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act; and (ii) to recommend the discontinuance of any
recognition already made by the Council.
Rule 2(iv) of Chapter VI requires communication to all State Bar Councils the
'decisions of the Council relating to recognition of degrees referred to in Section
24(1) (c)(iii)(iiia)(iv) of the Act' and nothing else, so far as the standards, the
norms for recognition or the inspection reports, the periodic reports as to
compliance with directives in the reports.
Infirmities

of the. Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council of India

If the judiciary, the UGC and the Universities and the legal profession do not
take interest or are not consulted in the matter of laying down standards of legal
education and in the norms for granting recognition and as to the norms of the
inspection, it must be assumed that these bodies have abdicated their responsibilities
and surrendered themselves to the Bar Council of India, nay, its Legal Education
Committee. The responsibility for the continuous decline, at any rate, from 1961
must, therefore, be-borne by the Bar Council of India, as stated by Sri F.S.
Nariman in his valedictory speech on March 14, 1993.20 But, there is no purpose
in finding fault with the Bar Council of India. The fault also lies with the
judiciary, the UGC and the legal profession in abdicating their responsibilities
and in remaining wholly complacent or silent spectators to the decline of
standards in the colleges. These bodies must realise that by slow or rapid erosion,
the very foundations of the judiciary and the legal profession and, therefore, of
the rule of law and democracy will be in jeopardy.
Professor
Upendra Baxi and 11 other professors of great repute were
Chairman and members of a Committee constituted under the auspices of the
UGC in 1989. In their report (1989), they had this to say to the Legal Education
Committee of the BCI:
'Under the (Bar Council of India) BCI Rules, while existing affiliated
law colleges have to satisfy the minimum norms prescribed by it, no
new law college can obtain recognition unless the BCI inspection
20
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team certifies c011:lpliancewith standards. Neither the monitoring of
standards reports for existing colleges nor compliance reports in
case of new institutions are published; no one knows the constitution
of inspection committees (usually elected members of the BCl,
accompanied by a law-teacher member of the committee), the standards
actually 'applied for accreditation, the difficulties experienced by
the BCI in insistence on these standards or the bases of formulation
and reformulation of standards. There-is no five-year audit of the
success or failure of the BCI in securing compliance
"
"In crucial areas, the BCI has not emerged as a strong professional
organisation fully able to discharge its statutory responsibilities to
promote standards of legal education. Quite notably, it has not been
able to assume moral leadership over constituent units from which
it is composed; the State Bar Councils
"
"
The BCI, at any rate, does not perform its statutory role in
ways which distinctly promote forces of change and innovation in
legal education. "21
They have also stated:
"The community of law-teachers has usually no access to information
concerning who the academic members oft he (legal education) committee
and panel are, .what agenda are discussed, and the quality or
representative deliberation. The result is an overall alienation on the
part of large majority of law teachers with both these bodies, a result
that has substantially impeded action on recommendation of both
these bodies, even as they emanate, finally, in terms of the directives
of the Bel (Bar Council of India) or the UCc. "'22
This is indeed unfortunate. If the norms fixed, the names of the academicians,
their inspection reports etc. are not available for scrutiny, there is no knowing
how the committees are functioning.
Nature of defects in Law Colleges
Cases of colleges admitting students even before the formalities for establishing
the college are completed are many.23 Students who have not passed the common
entrance examination are admitted by several private law colleges. Colleges are
established in temporary buildings with tin or absestoes roof. There is no
adequate furniture. There is no library as required. Make-shift arrangements are
made with law book sellers for making a show of existence of a library. Books
21
22
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Ibid at 63-65.

23

P. Venkateswara Rao v Osmania University, Hyde rabad, AIR 1990 AP 346.

Vol. 6]

Plea for State Law Universities

67

are later returned to the book sellers for good. The students do not attend classes
regularly. Hardly 5 to 6 are present in a class. Several staff members do not take
up their .allotted quota of classes. Notes are given in cyclostyled sheets for the
students to have short cuts. Several students would have never known the names
of standard text-books even of Indian origin let alone of England. Students are
allowed to live hundreds of miles away, and sometimes in another state and get
their attendance. A student can secure a degree by attending· the college only
thrice - once at the time of admission, once when he gets the hall-tickets for the
examination and finally at the time of the examination. Then they are ready for
being ushered into' the law courts, not necessarily in the lowest court but even in
the highest court at Delhi. What is stated above is the normal situation. The good
colleges are the exceptions.
The National Law School, Bangalore
In the midst of this decline, it is heartening that the Bar Council of India Trust
with the help of the Karnataka State has established the National Law School of
India University with a 5 year course. Today, it almost the best institute in the
country comparable to other good institutions in other countries.
Reforms did not always start with Bar Council of India (2 year to 3 year Course)
Dr. C.D. Deshmukh, the then Vice Chancellor appointed on April 20, 1963,
a Committee' to study the problem of legal education in the University of Delhi
and recommend the lines of re-organisation' Y The Committee was headed by
Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar and included Members of Parliament, the Bar
and the ·teaching professions in India and in United States of America. The
Committee also obtained, at first in writing and later through oral discussion, the
views of 'fifteen representative persons' on the basis of a questionnaire and two
working papers circulated earlier for this purpose. After due deliberation, the
Committee made recommendations of far reaching import calculated to revolutionise
the methods of teaching and examination at the law school, and to set the school
on the road to achieving the dream of international excellence. Important steps
were then taken to implement the spirit and the recommendations of the Gajendragadkar
Report by the Law School in Delhi.25 The two-year course became a three-year.
course on semester basis with compulsory/optional papers.
Later Dr. D.S. Kothari, Chairman, UGC appointed in 1969 a sub-committee
on Legal Education headed by none else than Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkar, formerly
Chief Justice of India and the author of the 1964 Report (for Delhi University) for
reorganising the system in all law colleges. This Committee, which had a threeyear term, made important recommendations, which were later accepted and
24
25

See, P.K. Tripathi "In the quest for better legal education", Journal of the Indian Law Institute,
469 at 484 (1968).
Report of the Committee on the Reorganisation of Legal Education in the University of Delhi
(1964).
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adopted by the Bar Council of India.26 As a result, the number of required
subjects was reduced to ten (rather than eighteen in the Delhi University) and the
Universities were left free to add to the list of optionals listed by the Bar Council.
Also, rigid prescriptions in regard to minimum hours of class-room instruction,
working days in the year, maximum number of students in a class were made and
qualifications of teachers were relaxed and a workable degree of flexibility
introduced. The Committee of 1969 headed by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar was
composed entirely of law-teachers. It was during this period that the Bar Council
of India switched over from the two-year course to the three-year courseY
Reform I: Cases for a continuous body to monitor legal education and recommend
to Bar Council of India
The problem of taking the revolution to all the law schools in the country is
a staggering one. Yet a beginning has to be made somewhere. In a modest but
determined way it was started on April 5, 1968 when, at a meeting held under the
Chairmanship of Chief Justice Hidayatullah and attended by Judges, lawyers,
Ministers of the Union Government, representatives of the Ford Foundation and
the International Legal Centre, legal educators, government officials and legal
researchers, it was decided to found a society to be named the 'Council for
Advancement of Legal Education.
The details were to be worked out. The meeting was attended by Dr. Douglas
Ensminger, representative of the Ford Foundation in India, and Dr. John Howard
and Mr. Peider Konz of the International Legal Centre, New York.
But, today, the Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council which consists
of members of the Bar Council and a few academicians, does not have the
assistance or guidance of any committee of the stature of the Gajendragadkar
Committee or the Council for Advancement of Legal Education established, at
one time, by Chief Justice Hidayatullah, Judges, Senior Law Officers, Vice
Chancellors, UGC members and top-most academicians have to guide the Legal
Education Committee. The UGC too cannot absolve itself of its responsibility in
maintaining. the standards of legal education and it must give funds to the
Universities for the purpose of legal education. The Upendra Baxi Committee
(1989) has stated that so far no UGC funds are given for the purpose of legal
education. Simjlar societies or bodies to help and guide legal education were
repeatedly tried in all countries.28
Therefore, it will be for the Chief Justice of India, as the head of the Judiciary
to revive the 'Council for Advancement of Legal Education', appoint members
thereto from various fields and bring about sufficient outside control over the Bar

27

Supra n. 24. See also, Russel B. Sunshine & Arthur L. Berney'Basic Legal Education in India',
Journal of the Indian Law Institute, p. 39 at 40 (1970) .
Resolution of 1966.

28

See, L.c.n. Gower, "English Legal Training", 13 Modem Law Review 137 (1950).
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Council of India and its Legal Education Committees. The UGC is statutorily
authorised to consult other bodies for the purpose of maintaining the standards of
legal education. The Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council of India
should have proper and effective guidance for, as had been pointed out earlier, it
can only lay down minimum standards and there is no bar for the UGC or the
Universities to lay down higher standards on the basis of any recommendations
made by Committees appointed by the UGC, such as the two Committees chaired
by Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar.

,

Reform /I : Plea for a single Law Univ"ersity in each State
If there are today 84 Universities and 464 Law Colleges in the country, it will
be difficult to introduce reforms by amending various statutes made by the
Legislatures which have established the Universities and also to amend the
various statues of the Universities. It will be, in my humble view, easier to handle
a smaller number of universities in the country on the basis of one Law University
for each State. Introduction of new norms, procedures and management systems
will be easy if there is a single Law University in each State. Rationalisation and
harmonising of the system will also be easy . Weeding out or derecognising some
colleges (by resort to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act) can be resorted to
by the Bar Council of India which has power to grant recognition. It must, by
implication, have the power to de-recognise a single Law College. There is no
need to de-recognize the degrees granted to all law colleges in any particular
University fpr the sake of taking action against a single college.
Today, in several States, colleges imparting particular professional education,
have been brought under a single University. We have, in some States, a Medical
University, a Technological University, an Agricultural university and so on and
so forth. Having regard to the need for urgent and drastic reforms, it will be
convenient to bring all law colleges in a State under a single University. The
UGC, the Bar Council, the Judiciary, the Legal Profession and the Academicians
must examine this proposal. I do not find any difficulty in implementing the same
as in the case of medical, engineering or agriculture (and veterinary) sciences.
Reform

/II :

Common entrance examination

There must be a common entrance examination for entry into each law college
and this system has been legally upheld and is in vogue in several Universities
already. This will help in eliminating the differential standards in various
Uni versi ties.
Reform IV : 5 year/3 year course
The Bar Council of India had suggested a 5 year course and advised the
closure of 3 year study altogether. This was not fully implemented. Some
Universities have opted for 5 year and some for 3 year. The Rajasthan University
is, it appears, reverting back to 3 year course. Parents and students too are not all
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for abolition of 3 year course. Therefore, both courses could stay. Suitable
changes in the syllabi has to be made to conform to both types of courses.
Reform V : Method of teaching - Less marks for theory and more marks for
Practical questions
The Setalvad Law Commission in 1958 pointed out that students today cram
their memory with cheap guides and other small devices.29
The so-called
teaching imparted at institutions of this character is followed by law examinations
held by the Universities, many of which are mere tests of memory and poor ones
at that - which the students manage to pass by cramming short summaries or
catechisms published by enterprising publishers. Full time class study has been,
in point of fact, reduced to an unwholesome type of distance-education, students
living hundreds of miles away and yet getting required attendance. Teaching
standards and methods must change.
With a view to compel students to attend classes, no other system of compulsion
can succeed than one which makes the student feel that if he does not attend the
classes he will fail in the examination. Cramming the memory can be minimised
and copying totally excluded by adopting a practical oriented system of teaching
and examination. The marks at each semester available for each subject must be
such that the theory marks are limited to 40% and the practical part having the
remaining 60% with a separate minimum for the theory and practical in each
subject. This is the pattern in medicine and perhaps engineering too. There must
be a National Question Bank not only to cater to the case-method but also to the
problem-method and this system will not only improve attendance and thereby
the quality but may also soon eliminate sub-standard colleges which are not able
to impart this system of teaching.
That brings one to the case-method and the problem-method. Today, in the
field of legal education, all over the world, these two systems have come to stay
and it is unfortunate that except perhaps in Delhi, Bangalore, National Law
School of India University and a few other colleges, this system has not been
introduced.
Reform VI : (A) Case-method
The introduction of the case-method came with the publication in 1871 by
Prof. Christopher Columbus Langdell. 30 His principal achievement as professor
and later dean was the introduction of the case-method of instruction. There are
collection of judgemellts of the superfor courts, for use of students. He had
concluded that the shortest and best way of mastering the few basic principles on
which he thought the law to be based was by studying the opinions in which they
29
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were embodied. The students are to study the cases before the class starts and the
professors/students have discussions in the class. A class may contain even 100
students as in U.S.A. but this system is still adopted as suitable.
"So it is that the American Law student still finds the case method
the basic pattern in most large classes, which may number over a
hundred students, and is expected to spend two hours reading casebooks in preparationfor each hour of most of twelve to fifteen hours
of class per week. "31
The case-method system has undergone considerable modification since the
publication in 1914 of Redlich's famous Report on it for the Carnegie Institute.
Prof. Laski had also commended this method.32 In England, though the casemethod is followed, the case-books are not published as in USA in large numbers,
but it is a teacher's own individual collection. Dr. Kahn Freund has attributed the
differing outlooks of the Continental and English lawyer to the fact that the
former is trained in the University to rely on abstract principles of logic while the
latter is trained in the school of experience to treat each case on its merits.33 The
case-method is a system "forged between the hammer and anvil of opposing
counsel in the cause of the trial of actual controversies in court. "33-A
Prof. P.K. Tripathi has referred to this system in detail,34 as suitable in India
too. This method stirs up the thinking process.
(B) Problem-method
Critics of the case-method have suggested the problem-method also to be part
of the curriculum. The case-method involves decided cases whereas the problemmethod deals with hypothetical problems. This method has the advantage of
approximating and stimulating legal practice, presenting a realistic challenge to
the students' mind and mitigate the rigour of compartmentalisation.
The Notre
Dame School, Ohio Law University and several other schools have adopted it. Its
proponents are Prof. Carl Llevellyn and Judge Jerome Frank.35
(C) Other methods
Moot courts have now, of course, become part of programmes in most law
colleges and the tremendous interest shown by the students in these is a clear
indication of the real interests of the students. Mock trials are also conducted in
some Universities such as the National Law School of India University. Legal

31
32
33

See. E. Allan Farmsworlh, An inlroduction to the Leeal System of the United States (1988).
Supra n. 28 at 187.
Ibid at 188.
33-A Ibid.
34
35

This method has also been referred to by Justice Ahmadi of the Supreme Court in his Jodhpur
Lecture (1992) ..
See. supra n.24
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clinics, legal aid programmes involving law students will also generate genuine
interest in the subject and its practical applications.
Reform VII : Legal ethics etc. to be compulsory subjects
There can ~e no doubt that legal ethics, etiquette and judicial ethics must be
a compulsory subject in all Universities perhaps requiring higher minimum pass
marks than all other subjects.
Conclusion
The main conclusions are that the standards of legal education have declined
fast, there is undue proliferation oflaw colleges on account of the commercialisation
of legal education, that the Bar Council of India and its Legal Aid Committee lay
down only minimum standards and the UGC and the Universities can require
higher and better standards to be obtained. The other proposal is to have a single
Law University in each State bringing within its purview all the law colleges in
the State. Further, the examination system must be revamped by having a
common entrance examination. The semester system must prescribe more marks
for practical-oriented problems based on case-method and problem method and
lesser marks for theory. There should be a separate minimum for theory and
practical questions in each subject. The case-method and the problem-method
should be rigorously introduced so as to improve the quality. This would automatically
eliminate absenteeism and result in winding up of sub-standard colleges. The Bar
Council of India and the"UGC must conduct inspections, periodically monitor the
standards and publish their reports. The Bar Council of India and the UGC must
work in co-ordination. They must be guided by a 'National Council for Advancement
of Legal Education' presided over by the Chief Justice of India and other judges,
academicians, Jawyers, senior law officers, UGC members etc. and should
continously aid the Bar Council of India and the UGC to maintain superior
standards. The UGC must give substantial aid to law colleges and Law Universities.
The Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council must be suitably revamped by
taking in the nominees recommended by the Chief Justice of India and by the
UGC. It must not recommend recognition to a college merely because of orders
of the State Government or the University. It must de-recognise colleges (by
resort to S.21 of the General Clauses Act) which are sub-standard. Professional
ethics, etiquette and judicial ethics must form a compulsory subject in legal
education.
I hope and trust that the Bar Council of India, the UGC, the Bar Associations
and the Judiciary will come forward to revolutionise the present system of legal
education soon.
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SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY

APPROACH

Prof K. C. Gopalakrishnan *

"As a discipline, the Sociology of Law has for a long time been seen
to be marginal to both Law and Sociology. Whilst this was not
originally so in the case of Sociology, the Sociology of Law has for
far too long been seen, to use Talcott Parson's phrase as 'an
intellectual step-child".

1. Introduction
Multi-disciplinary approach to law has become part of the curriculum in the
study of law in many countries. It is realised that law in the text-books and its
external operations in the society (law in the field) are different, and unless the
influence and interaction of socio-economic forces in the society with law is
understood, the knowledge of law will not be complete. It is aptly observed by
Prof. Moore (of Harvard University), "Today social scientists approach law with
a distilled and selective recombination of many of the classical ideas of 19th and
early 20th century scholars. "2
Because of this multi-disciplinary approach, two trends have emerged in legal
studies. First, economic dimensions and consequences have loomed increasingly
large in the study and evaluation of legal norms. The 'costs of justice and nature of
access to justice' have become major issues. The high flown values that legal
principles expressed are examined by legal economists in the light of their efficiency
and their social effect and not just their self-defined moral content.3 Secondly, the
role of law in relation to discussions and conflict, cultural, pluralism and class
stratification is an increasingly urgent question to be studied.
The interface of Sociology and Law was greatly advanced by Max Weber in
his book on Sociology of Law. His was an universal approach linking law with
social, economic and political factors on a scale not attempted before. Based upon
a comparative survey of Roman, Islamic, English, German, Chinese, Buddhist,
Jewish and numerous other legal systems, it broke through the traditional boundaries
of legal studies and sought to analyse the transformation of law from its original
mystical or given state to the stage of rationalisation.4 Prof. Roscoe Pound,
.•.

1
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4

Professor of Legal Economics, NLSIU, Bangalore .
Weeramantry, An Invitation to Law 72 (1982).
Sally Falk Moore, The Socioloeical School: The Social Science Encyclopedia 448 (Adman
Jessics Kuper et al. eds., 1985)
Ibid. See also, K.C. Gopalakrishnan, "The Interaction and Interface of Economics and Law,"
I National Law School Journal 55 (1989)
Ibid.

74

National

Law School Journal

[1994

through his 'Sociological Jurisprudence', helped to link sociological and legal
studies by insisting on the study of the actual effects of legal principles in society,
by pointing the importance of sociological study as a prelude to legislation and
by emphasising the importance of studying the operation of legal principles and
institutions in the past.
As a result, the importance of socio-Iegal research to provide lawyers and
legislators with means of factual material on matters previously left to imaginative
surmise is felt in the academic circles and methods of socio-Iegal research form part
of the regular course of instruction of some law schools and are indispensable for
the researcher, especially in the area of law reform.s In this field of social-legal
research, two approaches have been identified. One is social problem-social engineering
approach that proceeds from the assumption that law is a consciously constrllcted
instrument of control which has the capacity to shape society and to solve problems,
an instrument which can itself be reformed and perfected towards the end. Research
is oriented to serve these practical purposes. The other is social context approach
which assumes that law is itself a manifestation of the existing structure (or past
history) of the society in which it is found and tries to know, understand or explain
its form, context, and institutions by showing contextual connections. Thus, instead
of just one 'social science approach' to law, there are many.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to analyse, much less to discuss
in detail the above research approaches, but to broadly review the importance of
sociology and its discipline: sociology of law. Only one aspect of sociological
problem, 'White Collar Crimes' will be discussed in detail.
2.

Social Problem and Approaches

The basic problem in any society is to satisfy their desire for consumption with
scarce resources. However, this process of allocation of scarce resources to competing
claims depends on the society - structure, beliefs, mores, etc. Therefore, the society
has to define the basic concepts like property rights, principles of production and
distribution, use of means of production and regulation of the above process. In
defining and interpreting the above, the social sciences differed because they looked
at it from a different angle and in a different way. An economist looks from the point
of view of individual, the sociologist from society's point of view, a lawyer from the
point of view of how laws (legal rules) are applied in the society. For example, "The
poor in India may be found dead of starvation besides perfectly healthy and edible
cattle ... A far eastern woman may have her head severed for going to bed with a man
before marriage ... Each of these instances involve norms - rules defining appropriate
and inappropriate ways of behaviour."6
There are broadly three types of norms: folkways, mores and laws. These
three types of norms vary in their importance within a society, and their violation
5
6
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is tolerated to different degrees.7 Folkways are informal and violations are not
taken seriously because· conformity to folkways is generally a matter of personal
choice, but conformity to mores is required of all members. of a society.s
As the society advances in economic prosperity, laws occupy a prominent
place because laws are norms that are formally defined and enforced by certain
designated persbns. Laws, through sanctions, regulate the activities in the society.
Sanctions are rewards and punishments used to encourage socially acceptable
behaviour. Formal sanctions are normally given by officially designated persons
(such as judges, quasi-judicial authorities, etc) and range widely in their forms
and severity. For example, "A Saudi Arabian man convicted of rape may be
buried upto his waist in sand and stoned to death with small rocks to prolong his
torment. A college professor may give failing grades to some students ... formal
sanctions may be positive. A soldier may be awarded a State medal fo!' heroism
in a battle and a professor may reward some students with A S."9
However, to be effective, laws must be in conformity with the prevailing
mores or else they are doomed to failure. An excellent example is the 18th
amendment in the U.S. (popularly known as prohibition law) which failed. As
observed by Prof. Samuel Koeing: "In a narrow minded or bigoted society, a
similar fate would overtake an attempt to eradicate anti-negro bias or antisemistism by merely passing a law. A lot of preparation of conditioning would
have to be done prior to their being effectively outlawed."!O
But if the mores are in the process of disintegration and a majority of the
people no longer hold to these mores or are ambivalent about them, then laws
against these mores will succeed since the governmental efforts will be mostly a
matter of forcing the reluctant ones to accept the new legal way, which in time
they do (e.g., U.S. Supreme Court outlawing racially segregated schools in the
U.S.A.)!!.
In this context, seven conditions have been identified which are necessary to
bring about social change through law:!2
The first condition is that the rationale of the new law should be authoritative
and prestigious. The second condition is that the rationale of the new law should
clarify its continuity and compatibility with existing institutionalized values. The
third necessary condition is the use of models or reference groups for compliance.
The fourth condition is that the law should make a conscious use of the element
of time in introducing a new pattern of behaviour. The fifth condition is that the
enforcement agents must themselves be committed to the behaviour required by
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Ibid.
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the law, even if not to the values implicit in it. The sixth condition is that
resistance to a new law increases positive sanctions are probably as important
negative ones. The seventh and final condition under which law performs
educational function is that effective protection be provided for the rights
those persons who would suffer if the laws were evaded or avoided.
3. Sociology

as
as
an
of

of Law

In order to study the phenomena of how laws through sanctions work in a
society, a new bra~ch of sociology, Sociology of Law, has developed. Sociology
of Law concerns itself with formalized social control or with the processes
whereby members of a group achieve uniformity in their behaviour through the
rules and regulations imposed upon them by the society. It enquires into the
factors that bring about the formation of regulatory systems as well as into
reasons for their adequacies and inadequacies as a means of contro1.13 Sociology
of law, therefore, examines the normal problems of society and how they are
solved through law. The first step in understanding this is to identify the social
problems. Broadly, they are: 14
i)

Scientific or societal - an analysis of the various phenomena of social
life; and

ii)

Ameliorative or social - a study of 'abnormal' or 'pathological'
situations or mal-adjustments with the aim of ameliorating or of eliminating
them(e.g., crime and delinquency, race conflict, poverty, divorce, etc.).

Prof. Harold Phelp classifies the social problems under four main categories
corresponding to the major sources: 15
i)

Economic sources: poverty, unemployment, dependency, etc.

ii)

Biological sources: physical diseases and defects.

iii) Psychological sources: neuroses, psychosis, feeble mindedness and
suicide, maladjustments, etc.
iv) Cultural sources: problems of the aged, the homeless widowers, desertion,
illegitimacy, racial and religious conflicts etc.
The above problems overlap and do not belong exclusively to anyone
category. However, Sociology of law is primarily concerned with deviance in the
society. Deviance is a behaviour which contravenes social norms. Conforming
behaviour is identifiable because it satisfies group expectations and does not
violate norms; but identifying deviant behaviour is difficult because societal
norms vary from group to group and with the passage of time. Deviance arises

13
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when some people violate legal rules (robbing banks, committing murder, rape,
etc), others violate informal rules (insulting others, not fulfilling promises, etc).
Crime has become the most important type of deviance and a major problem in
any society.
4.

Crimes with reference to White-Collar Crimes and Approach of Law

Why should some people commit crimes knowing that it is a deviance from
social norms? Most of .the people desire to reap society's rewards, if possible
through legal means, and if forced through illegal methods. Some criminals see
their deviance as simply a way of making a living, one that is much more
economically rewarding than other jobs they would get. Crime provides. the
money for living in the style they prefer. Dope dealers can get rich quickly and
most prostitutes know that nobody in the straight world will pay them as much an
hour as they make in their illegal trade. In other words, many criminals realise
that criminal activity is the means of obtaining a greater share of a society's
reward than they would otherwise earn. 16
There are broadly three major types of explanations of deviance: biological,
psychological and sociological factors. I will confine the discussion only to
sociological factors. Sociologists have identified three broad theories of deviance:
'Anomic theory', 'Differentiated Association theory' and 'Labelling theory'.
Each theory explains a particular aspect of deviance. According to Anomic
theory, deviance is mostly likely to occur when there is a discrepancy between
culturally prescribed goals and legitimate (socially approved) means of obtaining
themY
The "differentiated association theory" developed by the Chicago School,
states that crime and delinquency are most likely to occur among individuals who
have been exposed to more unfavourable attitudes towards the law than to
favourable ones.18
The "labelling theory" elaborates the relativity of deviance. In the words of
Howard Becker, who developed this theory, "Social groups create deviance by
making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and by applying these
rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point,
deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits but rather a consequence
of the application by others of rules and sanctions to 'offenders'. The deviant is
the one to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is
behaviour that people so label."19 This explains why unmarried pregnant girls are
labelled as deviant and the men who are responsible for pregnancy are not
labelled as deviant because our ideas about sexual behaviour and their responsibilities
16
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are different. This theory also explains why a rich class youth who steals a car
may go unpunished on the plea that he borrowed the vehicle, whereas, a poor boy
will be labelled as criminal and sentenced for stealing.
Therefore, the accepted view from the sociology of law perspective is that
crime is an indicator that something is wrong with society. Its social function is
to act as a notification of maladjustments, just as pain is a notification to an
organism that something is wrong, so crime is a notification of a social organisation.2o
The study of crime has attracted different intellectual and occupational
enterprises and for different reasons. Broadly five types of contributions to
criminology can be identified:
i)

Those persons who are directly involved in daily programmes of crime
control - Police Commissioner, Prison Administrator, etc.;

ii)

Those who train persons for professional roles in crime processing or
training or control faculty of schools of police, correctional administration,
etc.;
.

)

Hi) Those whose are involved in policy research with a correctional or crime
control system - the research staff of a State or Federal agency, etc.;
iv) Those whose primary allegiance is to a particular academic discipline
such as sociology but who typically apply the discipline to problems of
crime and its control; and
v)

Those whose, contribution to criminology comes essentially as side
products of their primary pursuits within an academic discipline psychologist who studies delinquents in order to learn about conscience
developments or aggression.

I will restrict the discussion only to sociological criminology, crime as a
social phenomenon, i.e., interrelationships between the three subject areas of
criminal law, criminally defined behaviour and social and control reaction. In the
modern world, there are broadly two types of white-collar crimes: Crime in
Business (Occupational crime) and the Business of Crime (Organized crime). In
both the cases, crimes include:21

20
21

i)

Illegal activities in the course of legal activities i.e., embezzelement,
fraudulent mis-appropriation of public funds, illegal tax evasion, patent
infringements, fraudulent damage claims, misrepresentation in the
labelling and packaging of foods and drugs, etc.

ii)

Business activities and enterprises organised for the explicit purpose of
making economic gain through criminal activity Le., extortion of money
and services from various businesses and organizations, gambling,

Edwin Sutherland and Donald R. Gresner, Principles of Criminolo~y 24 (7th ed., 1966)
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prostitution, narcotics, illegal control of legitimate businesses, loan
companies, real estates, labour unions, etc. However, in capitalist
oriented societies like the USA (and for that matter, India also) these
crimes are not treated in the same way as Blue Collar crimes (murder,
dacoity, etc) in comparison to other crimes of businessmen, because
these crimes are part of a competitive economic order and are so
prevalent that there is practically no business or profession which does
not have this racket and that frequently it is possible to obtain more
crime news from the financial newspapers than from their front pages. 22
Prof. Edwin Sutherland who studied systematically white collar crim,e defines
it as "Crime committed by persons of respectability and high social status in the
course of their occupations. Such crimes include bribery, corruption in business
and politics, misconduct by professionals such as doctors, lawyers, the breaking
of trade regulations, food and drug laws and safety regulations in factories, the
misuse of patents and trademarks and misrepresentation in advertising" .23White
collar crimes are part of the economic system. Even the law enforcement agencies
support this feature broadly in three ways:23
i)

By selecting members of the subject class and punishing them as
individuals, it protects the system which is primarily responsible for
their criminal deviance;

ii)

Imprisonment of selected members of the subject class legitimately
neutralises opposition to the system; and

iii) Defining criminals as animals and misfits and enemies of the state
providing a justification for incarcerating them in prisons.
Therefore, as observed by Prof. Sutherland, the sociological study of white
collar crime I1rovides support for the view that there is one law for the rich and
another for the poor and that there is a consistent bias involved in the administration
of criminal justice under laws which apply to business and the professions and
which therefore involve only the upper socio-economic groupY This situation
is summed up by Willey Gutton, a professional bank robber, who stated: "others
accused of defrauding the government of hundreds of thousands of dollars merely
get a letter from a committee in Washington asking them to come in and talk it
over. May be it is justice but it is puzzling to a guy like me". 25
The Law Commission of India, after noticing the soft justice syndrome for
white collar crimes recommended: "Suggestions are often made that in order that
the lower magistracy may reaiise the seriousness of some of the social and
23
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economic offences, some method should be evolved of making the judiciary
conscious of the grave damage caused to the country's economy and health by
such anti-social crimes ... Itis of utmost importance that all the state instrumentalities
involved in the investigation, prosecution and trial of these economic offences
must be oriented to the philosophy which treates these economic offences as a
source of grave challenge to the material wealth to the nation."26
The classic case decided by the Supreme Court regarding white collar crime
is the case of M.H. Hoskot v State of MaharastraY
The petitioner, a reader in
a University, was charged with the offence of attempting to concoct degree
certificates of the University and was found guilty of the grave offences under
Sections 417, 467, 468, 471 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the trial
court sentenced him to simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine
on the grounds that he belonged to a middle class family and the modern emphasis
is on the corrective aspect of punishment which cannot be ignored and the public
prosecution has no objection to the light sentence. On appeal, the High court
enhanced the punishment and imposed imprisonment for three years.
On reference to Supreme Court, the Court inter -alia observed: "The appellant
was beyond economic compulsion of making a living by criminal means. It is
therefore surprising that the public prosecutor should have on behalf of the state
considered that the administration should view sternly white collar offenders and
should not abet them by agreeing to a token punishment. In the present case, the
trial court has confused between correctional approach to prison treatment and
nominal punishment in serious social offences. Soft sentencing justice is gross
injustice where many innocents are the potential victims."28 The Court further
observed: "We are scandalised by the soft justice system vis-a-vis white collar
offenders. It stultifies social justice and camouflages needed severity with naive
leniency .••
Empirical studies on white collar crimes reveals that in the fiscal field soft
justice syndrome is widespread and has the blessings of the judiciary. Tax
evasion and tax avoidance results in loss of revenue, and the defeat of other fiscal
objectives. However, the judiciary, while condemning tax evasion has justified
tax avoidance on the ground that it is equal in as much as a tax payer takes
advantage of loopholes in the tax law. For example, Viscount Summor in the case
of Levene v CIR,29 has summed up the British view: "It is the trite law that His
Majesty's subjects are free, if they can, to make their own arrangements so that
their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing acts. They incur no legal
penalties, and strictly speaking, no moral censure in having considered the lines
drawn by the Legislature for the imposition of taxes. They make it their business

26
27
28
29

47th Report of Law Commission of India.
M.H. Hoskote v State Maharashtra_1978 SCC (Cri) 469.
. Ibid.
James Coppield, The Tax Gatherers 99 (1960).

Vol. 6]

Sociology

of Law

81

to walk out of them. The courts in the D.S .A. have taken a similar approach. It has
been categorically stated that "there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's
affair as to keep taxes as low as possible .... for nobody owes any public duty to
pay more than the law demands; taxes are enforced extractions not voluntary
contributions."3o Similar sentiments have been echoed in India also.
White collar crime continues unabated even though the socio-economic
consequences of tax avoidance have been catalogued by the experts and committes.
The Royal Commission on Taxation in Canada (Carter Commission) has given
the following reasons in condemning tax avoidance:
i)

Loss ofrevenue to the Government (the amount is difficult to estimate);

ii)

The fruitless expenditure of intellectual effort by some of the best
lawyers, accountants, and administrators in the economically unproductive
tax avoidance battle;

iii) The sense of injustice and inequality which tax avoidance raises in the
breasts of those unable or unwilling to profit by it;
iv) Deterioration of tax morality. If tax payers generally form the notion
that tax avoidance is accepted practice the system of self-assessment
may break down; and
v)
5.

Shifting of tax burden to honest tax payers.31

Conclusion

Inspite of the studies by various committees, social toleration of white collar
crimes (especially in the fiscal field ) continues in non-socialist countries
including Indi~. Therefore, it is not surprising that white collar crimes (or
privileged class deviance) have not received an in-depth examination and analysis
even in academic circles. However, in India, some studies on white collar crimes
and other forms of privileged class deviance have been made with reference to
actual crimes and their impact on socio-economic development in India. Prof.
Pande, after a detailed analysis of this problem concluded that:32

30
31
32

1.

In the post-independence era, there has been a marked increase on the
incidence of privileged class deviance of diverse kinds;

2.

This class of deviance differs from ordinary deviance in terms of
motivation and social manifestations;

3.

It is more harmful and socially more reprehensible;

4.

Normally beyond the reach of law;

Jeff A. Schneffer, How to Pay Zero Taxes 405 (1985)
·Government of Canada, Report of the Royal commission of Taxation (1966).
The Other Side of Development 157-158 (K.S. Shukla ed., 1987).
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5.

There is a need for proper identification of its multiple forms and their
social ramifications;

6.

Urgent need to explore the ways and means of effectively coping with,
through law and other forms of control, the existing and the emerging
patterns of pri vileged class deviance;

7.

There is need for designing the enforcement process with a view of
achieving fool-proof identification, apprehension, prosecution and trial
of deviants;

8.

Need to redefine the sentencing policy and refashion the sentencing
techniques in relation to the. privileged class deviants.

Each of tbe above observations can be the starting points of research at
conceptual level and thorough empirical investigations for the students of Sociology
of Law.
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INDIAN LEGAL RESEARCH: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
Gurjeet Singh*

Research is the most pressing need of the day for India as it has been regarded
as the basis for any developing country. It can make our society better and lead
to an all round advancement. But despite the fact that research institutions have
multiplied during a short span of time, the general standard of research,
especially that of legal research has not shown much noticeable improvement.
The requirement of a doctoral degree for recruitment or promotion to a teaching
post without an adequate emphasis on the quality of research and its proper
evaluation has led to large scale registrations for this degree. Most researchers
have neither the necessary equipment and infrastructure nor the required aptitude
and skill for research. 1 And many supervisors consider it a feather in their cap by
simply having a large number of students registered under them even when some
of them opt for registration just to stay on in the university for some more time.
In most cases, there is neither a fresh approach towards the subject nor
originality of interpretation, nor evidence of critical and sound judgement, nor
even a broad acquaintance with the field of research. Yet most of such dissertations
and thesis somehow get approved for a post-graduate and doctoral degree,
enabling the caildidate to acquire the requisite qualifications and licence to teach
even the senior most classes and to guide research themselves. Therefore, those
who are genuinely interested aud also do meaningful research are hardly given
the due credit for their endeavours, thanks to the prevailing ethics in our
universities and academic institutions. Thus the universities and law schools are
presently facing a crisis of confidence and character.2
The present paper highlights the drawbacks and inadequacies of Indian legal
research. An attempt has also been made to suggest remedial measures for
improving the quality and enhancing the status of legal research in our law
schools and university departments. The author got an opportunity to visit the
United Kingdom recently in connection with the selection for the Nehru-Centenary
British Commonwealth Fellowship in the field of law and is at present engaged
in socio-Iegal research at the University of London. Thus the relevant comparisons
between the state of legal research in India and the United Kingdom have also
been incorporated at appropriate places in the body of the present paper.
Every branch of knowledge has got its own particular language and technical
jargon. Law is no exception. As such, a scholar engaged in legal research is
..
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expected to follow that particular style and language. In this way his writing can
be followed by an average reader as well as the professionals in the field.
However, most of the researchers at the doctoral level and post-graduate level
simply ignore thi& fact. They resort to compilation in the name of research.
Taking verbatim note of paragraphs and sometimes even number of pages from
the books journals and articles and arranging them in accordance with their
convenience, without acknowledging even the sources and also without expressing
their own viewpoint, is, for these researchers, a research. And especially the so
called research carried out by the researchers engaged in inter-disciplinary
research who have citations from here and there without any uniformity in their
writing, is nothing but plagiarism.
In the United Kingdom, the first thing that a post-graduate or a doctoral
student may get is a list of useful reference works on guiding how to write good
English3 and also on effective writing.4 This being the preliminary step, a
research scholar may get confident of research writing once he goes through
these references. This step is essential, not only for the overseas students from
all over the world who join the British Universities every year, but is advisable
for any research scholar. This step is immensely useful and enables the research
scholars to write in a uniform, coherent'and effective style.
In India, it is difficult to find this practice even in the most advanced law
schools or the university law departments. Therefore, it is suggested that as and
when a candidate starts working for his LL.M dissertation or gets registered for
a Ph. D degree, he should be asked to follow this preliminary step. This will not
only bring uniformity into the research writings, but will help producing original
works in the field of legal research.
The type of methodology adopted for research work is not only important but
is most essential. Without adopting a proper methodology, reliable research work
is not possible. It is a matter of common observance that in our law schools, much
emphasis is not laid on following an appropriate methodology by the students at
least at the LL.M. level. Therefore a large number of LL.M. dissertations
submitted for evaluation in our universities are written without having followed
3
4

For example, H. Fowler, Modern Enelish Usaee (1986); B.A. Phythian, A Concise Dictionary
of Correct Enelish (1979).
For example, Joseph Gibaldi, & Walter S. Achtert, MLA Handbook For Writers of Research
~
(1988); 1. Bazun, & M. Graff, The Modern Researcher; P. Dunleavy, Studyine for A
Deeree On The Humanities And Social Sciences; D. Sternberg, How To Complete And Service
A Doctoral Dissertation; G. Watson, Writine A Thesis: A Guide To Lone Essays And
Dissertations; J. Bazun, "A Writers Discipline," On Writine Editine and Publishine; J.K.
Galbraith, Writine for Social scientists: How To Start And Finish Your Thesis Book or Article.
(1979) N. F. Ogburne "Writing & Typing" 52 American Journal of Sociology 383-388 (1947);
H.C. Selvin, & E.K. Wilson. "On Sharpening Sociologists' Prose", Sociological Quarterly
205-222 (1984); M.A. Stoch, Practical Guide To Graduate Research; S.F. Trelease, ~
Write Scientific Papers; K.. Turabian, A Manual For Writers of Research Papers Theses And
Dissertations (1982).
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any uniform methodology. The term papers at M.Phi!. and LL.M level are nothing
but specimen of articles written in a journalistic style. This is true sometimes in
the case of even Ph.D students. Even after having completed half of their
research, not many of tbese students are aware of the basic "research tools". The
fault lies not only with the students alone, but also with the supervisors, who do
not care to put the researchers on the right track at the right time, either because
of some vested interests or through lack of care: Thus a researcher is unable to do
justice to his work in the absence of his knowledge about appropriate research
methodology.
Unlike India, the second important step followed by research supervisors or
post-graduate tutors in British Universities is to give the research scholar a list
of references on research methodology.5 In numerous sittings with the postgraduate tutor or supervisor, a research scholar is asked to express his view
points and share his views with the supervisor on the question of methodology.
And then the student is asked to follow a particular method or change the
methodology in case he is unable to do justice to his project. There is a great
need in India to accept even this step at the right time. Th~ student working on
LL.M dissertation as weB as the Ph.D. scholar must be directed as regards
methodology. An assignment prepared by a researcher by using appropriate
methodology shall be definitely a better piece of research in comparison with
the one without using any methodology.
Identification and formulation of a problem constitutes the starting phase of
a research enterprise. Its importance cannot be over emphasised because the
success of a research enterprise depends on their selection of an appropriate
problem, and its proper formulation. While a faulty selection may fail to sustain
the researchers interest In the study, a deficient formulation may land him/her in
unanticipated difficulties at a later stage.6
But it is a challenging and time
consuming task. Before any research can be planned or data gathered, the
investigator must have a clear idea about the problem he intends to investigate.?
Our research scholars, in general, are willing to work on any topic given to them
by their supervisor, since they do not have ideas of their own relating to research.
In the absence of their not having read any of the books on research methodology,
they are also unaware of the guidelines suggested by the leading authors on how

5

6
7

For example, C.A. Moser, Survey Methods in Sociallnvestieation (1976); John T. Doby ,An
Introduction To Social Research (I967);H.W. Smith, Strateeies of Social Research (1975)
Gerald Hurnish, & Pradip Roy, Third World Survey: Survey Research In Developing Nations;
William J. Goode and Paul K. Halt. Methods In Social Research (1952); James A.Black,
Methods And Issues In Social Research (1976), John Galtung, Theory And Methods of Social
Research. (1967).
S.L. Sharma, "Identification and Formulation of Research Problem," Journal of Indian Law
Institute 488 (1982).
Fred N. Kerlinger, "Formulation of Problem and Hypothesis Generation". The Concept of
Political Enquiry (Louis D. Hayes and Roinald D. Hedlund ed., 1970).
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to select a research problem.8
Nor is there any constant pressure by the
supervisor to the required extent. Even if they are able to formulate a research
problem, they are not at all clear about the facets and dimensions of the problem
thus formulated. Many a time they do not have true confidence to discuss the
problem even with their supervisors.
In British Universities, and especially in certain leading institutions9
there
is a common practice that whenever a research scholar applies for registration,
he/she is asked to annex a brief resume of the proposed study. This is also a
condition precedent in almost all the universities in India. This resume necessarily
includes a brief mention of the following: (a) Nature of study; (b) Basic research
questions; (c) Objectives of the study; (d) Data base and methodology; (e) Sample
design and sample universe; (f) Significance of the study; (g) Time frame, and (h)
Likely contribution to the study to the existing knowledge. The major object of
asking the researcher to submit such a plan is to know about the research
potentials of the scholar and the scope for the intended project. Not only this,
once he has started work on his thesis, a post-graduate as well as doctoral level
student is asked to deliver a talk which in their terminology is called a "Seminar"
on the topic of the research, before the fellow researchers, faculty members and
guests. After about an hour's seminar, there is an interesting question answer
session wherein the researcher is expected to defend or justify the research
problem. By this interaction, a new researcher learns a lot. l-fe receives many
suggestions concerning his problem from the fellow scholars and faculty members.
In substance this is really a sound academic exercise, and indeed purposeful for
the researcher.
In Indian Universities, we do have almost similar formality, but at a different
stage and in different manner. In certain universities, the proposed problem is
8
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discussed among the faculty members only in meetings of Research Degree
Boards or similar bodies just before finalisation of permission to be given to the
candidate for working on that problem. The chief defect of this practice is that the
researcher is not permitted to even associate with the meeting of the Research
Degree Board. And he/she is thus unable to learn from the experience of the
seniors in the field. In some other universities, this exercise is done at the time
of viva voce examination of the candidate. That practice is called "Open viva
system".10 This is too late. Again, there is not much to reflect in the study what
a researcher learns in the viva. Of course, the view points expressed and
suggestions made at the time of viva voce can be incorporated, provided the thesis
is sent for publication.
Thus the suggestions to be offered in this regard is that the practice of
delivering a talk or seminar on the problem by the researcher before starting the
actual field work should be made an obligatory step. This should be a public
affair, that is even researchers from other social sciences should be informed of
this event. This shall not only enable the researcher delivering the talk to learn
from his listeners, but shall also infuse confidence in him/her. In addition, this
will be purposeful for researchers engaged in socio-Iegal and other forms of interdisciplinary research. Such a cross-interaction will be beneficial for all concerned
and there is definite scope for improvement, however gradual, in the quality of
legal research by such exposure to inter-disciplinary studies.
The level of research facilities available to a law teacher or any research
scholar is often not conducive to sustained research. An average law teacher gets
no typing, photocopying, or cyclostyling facilities at the institution. Often there
is no photocopying machine in the institution. In certain universities, there is a
single machine and that is over-worked, and often remains out of order. And if it
is in order, then before the actual work can be done, an average scholar has to go
through procedural and administrative difficulties including depositing money
with the cash department of the university which may be at a distance of more
than half a kilometer. And the researcher is also required to give each and every
detail of the book/journal/periodical. And above all each form must be signed by
the Head of the Department. In sum, too much time is wasted in useless and
tiresome formalities. In the United Kingdom, there are at least five to six
photocopy
machines in each and every library besides one or two machines
installed in each departIilent for the teachers and administrative staff. There is no
operator for these machines. Any person willing to use these machines has to
operate it by himself inserting a computerised photocopy card in the machine
which carries certain specific units and is renewable from another machine by
putting the reql)isite amount of money therein. Detailed instructions are printed
on all the machines. Once a person follows these instructions, these machines are
quite simple to use. Their self-use not only saves manpower but also precious
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time which a student or teacher has to simply waste in the process of gelling
things done in our country.
Most of the law teachers in India hardly know typing and those who know
typing are unable to afford a type writer. Using the services of a professional
typist remains for many of them a luxury.11 This fact also inhibits the ongoing
research in our law schools and university departments. The use of computers in
legal research has become a need in the advanced countries where almost every
facuIty member is provided with a personal computer in the institution. So much
so that in each department, there is computer room with a number of computers
installed in it. All these computers are ultimately connected with a master
computer installed in a computer terminal. There are two printers for each room.
All the research students can use these computers and get the required material
printed. The use of computers saves lot of stationary and also time. A full Ph.D.
thesis of about one thousand pages can be stored on a small pocket size floppy
disc. As and when the need arises any type of change can be made in the text
:vvithoutwriting or re-writing everything. Later on, at the time of publication also,
these are very useful because the whole substance is in the computer and any
latest changes can be made very easily. There are lots of other advantages of using
the computers, the most prominent being the saving of precious time of the
researchers.
In India, most legal scholars, researchers and law teachers are simply unaware
of the use of computers in legal research. This is one of the main reasons in the
modern times for our lagging behind the advanced countries in the field of legal
research. The constraint of resources to buy the computers cannot, however, be
ignored. But an important point to be noted is that even when the resource
allocation takes place, law departments in many Universities have often been
given the step-motherly treatment.
These are just a few simple instances of the lack of necessary infrastructure
and requisite facilities available to law teachers and other researchers. It is
therefore suggested that for legal research to be effective, original, and meaningful,
law teachers and researchers should be provided at least basic and minimum
facilities. Even if a single computer or an electronic type writer is installed in a
university law department or law school and free access is given to the teachers,
doctoral and post-graduate students after basic training, a significant achievement
in the field of legal research can be made in a short span of time.
Unlike other branches of social scien'ces, absence of collaborative research is
one of the chief ailments of Indian legal research. We rarely find a piece of
writing in any of the Indian legal journals contributed jointly by an Indian law
teacher or jurist and a foreign counterpart. This is, however, a common feature in
other social science and applied sciences journals. Collaborative research has its
11
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own advantages. Interaction between the researchers belonging to the same field
and even related fields from different countries can be very useful for them as
well as for others. This type of research can enrich the field and significantly add
to the existing knowledge. Due to the simple fact that the environment and the
research facilities as well as literature available vary between the countries, this
presents ample scope for researchers at least in the third world countries to be
acquainted with the latest trends in research and also with the latest publications
in the field in advanced nations.
It is, therefore, suggested that to raise the level of legal research in India, joint
ventures in the field should be undertaken. These joint research ventures will be
useful not only for individual researchers but should also be beneficial for the
overall development of the less developed countries of the third world.
In India we have University Grants Commission (l)GC) and Indian Council
of Social Science Research (lCSSR), New Delhi as the leading research funding
agencies for social science research. However, a very small number of researchers
including the legal researchers approach these agencies for financial support.
There are two categories of grants, that is (a) Grants for Major Research Projects,
and, (b) Grants for Minor Research Projects. For a Minor Research Project the
amount can be sanctioned to the tune of Rs. 20,000 and for a Major Research
Project the grant can be sanctioned for any amount more than Rs. 20,0000.00.
Proposals for research projects may involve writing a book/monograph based on
one's past research or principally analysis and interpretation of primary datal
material collected through survey research or based on secondary data. Grants
u,nder this category are made: (a) to an individual scholar, (b) to two or more
scholars submitting a joint proposal or co-ordinated group of research studies,
and (c) to an institution on specific request. There are also some awards for the
teachers. These awards, with a maximum value of Rs. 7500 are intended to assist
the social scientists: (I) to pursue their research interest on their own without any
research assistance, (2) to provide marginal support to scholars in terms of
secretarial assistance, research assistance, travel etc., (3) to write a book/
monograph based on their past research. Then there are research programmes
which are studies on a theme or in an area extending ordinarily from 3 to 5 years
and costing over Rs. 1 lakh. Besides these, the financial assistance is also
available to an individual scholar or two or more scholars and to social scientists
of eminence to enable them to pursue their study and research after retirement.
The maximum assistance available to the eminent scholars is Rs. 10,000.000 only
per annum and is given on year to year basis on receipt of the report of the work
done during the preceding year. The assistance is available at the maximum for
3 years.
The chief drawback is that our law teachers and scholars are probably not
aware of these funding facilities. And if some of them do know about these
agencies and facilities, they do not possess the adequate skill and expertise to
frame a suitable research proposal. For those who by their confidence and ability
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are able to face the numerous administrative problems in managing to send these
proposals in time to the funding agency, the sad story does not end here. The time
involved in the whole process is more than usual and anticipated. Many a times,
the projects are sanctioned formally only when the researcher has nearly completed
his research work and thus the amount spent by him before the project gets formal
approval is not reimbursable. This way sometimes three-fourths of the amount
thus sanctioned remains unutilised. All these hindrances go a long way in
discouraging a potential researcher from approaching the research funding agencies.
It is pointed out that there is no dearth of research grants for a dedicated
researcher who knows how to formulate an adequate and proper research proposal.
Even the booklets published by these agencies contain the required guidelines on
how to formulate a proper research problem. Therefore, more and more law
teachers and doctoral students should approach these agencies for getting funds
for the completion of their respective projects. This shall enable the researchers
to go in for meaningful field studies and empiriCal projects which are otherwise
shelved because of the shortage of funds at the disposal of the research scholar.
These agencies should also take minimum possible statutarily required time in
formally sanctioning purposeful research projects so as to enable the interested
law teachers and scholars to undertake some meaningful field studies and other
good projects. Besides this, the research funding agencies should also adopt some
suitable techniques by which more and more researchers should be in a position
to approach them and get the required financial assistance. All this will pave a
smooth way for some original, empirical, reliable, and publishable research work
in the field of law. However, to ensure that there is no misuse of the funds,
accountability on the part of the researcher should be fixed. It can be in the form
of submission of the periodical reports before the release of the financial
instalments. In the event of non-completion of the project within the specific
time, the grant can be stopped and in case of abuse of money, the researcher must
be made liable to reimburse the money thus obtained from the funding agency.
This shall ensure discipline among the grant seekers and keep away the disinterested
people.
Another important factor which needs immediate attention of the law teachers,
practitioners, and other scholars engaged in legal research is to identify and chalk
out a platform to meet arid share ~heir professional, academic, and research
experiences.
Almost all the social sciences people do have such common
platforms. These are, for example, the Indian Commerce Association, the Indian
Economic Association, the Indian Political Science Association, and the Indian
Academy of Social Sciences etc. The scholars belonging to these professions do
meet each other. Unfortunately, however, there is no such meeting place of the
law teachers andjurists. The Indian Society of Criminology is one such association
which does hold its annual conference or workshop. But that is normally a
meeting ground only for the people belonging to the criminal law field. There was
some time ago a Law Teachers Association, which, to the present author's best
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knowledge and belief, has almost become defunct. Almost 80% of it members
were part-time law teachers; The reason for its becoming defunct has been
allegedly the inherent conflict among the members on the issue of implementation
of the Five Years Integrated Course in Law (FYIC) on the lines suggested by the
Bar Council of India.
The role of the Indian Law Institute, contrary to expectations, has not been
absolutely satisfactory. More or less the law teachers in Delhi and its nearby
places seem to have been really benefited from its functioning. Its library is
perhaps one of Asia's best libraries from the literature point of view. However,
the facilities available to any scholar at such a big library, unlike those in social
sciences libraries are not available at the III library. Till recently, there have
been grossly inadequate photocopying facilities. It has been observed that some
really interesting seminars, talks by eminent jurists and Supreme Court judges
and discussions do often take place at the ILL However, the schedule is normally
known only to the III staff, the participant speakers, some leading advocates of
the Supreme Court and the passers by who happen to learn about the event from
the placards hanging outside the gate of the main building. Nobody else knows
about such events.12
Further, there is perhaps no mailing list of the III through which a law teacher
or researcher could learn about the latest activities at the III including that of the
recent research publications and also at least about the selective recent arrivals in
the III library. There is no Newsletter of the III which could impart information
to the members and to interested persons even from the related fields regarding the
forthcoming and even past events like conferences, seminars, workshops, talks,
discussions, symposia, and debates at the Ill. There are many national level events
which take place in the law departments of various universities for which there is
no information available to an average law teacher or post-graduate student. If by
chance the host University sends any information or invitation for the papers from
the neighbouring University, it gets locked up in the drawer of the Head of the
Department, who may not even be interested in going there but makes it a point not
to let it pass to any of his interested students much less of his colleagues. To begin
with, it is suggested that at least one or two pages in the III journal (which is
normally behind the publication schedule at least by a year or so) could be devoted
to the various events taking place in the near future, their dates, addresses of the
contact persons, themes, and other related details. First of all information could be
given only regarding national level activities, and later it could be experimented
with the regional level events. The Newsletter of the Indian Institute of Public
Administration could be taken as a specimen. In order to speed up research activity
in the field of law this is again a preliminary step.
12

One such debate was organised
in the year 1989 under the title "Role of a Iudge and Iu'rist in
law making'" between Professor Upendra Baxi, then Professor of Law Delhi University
(later
vice-chancellor
Delhi University) and Mr. Soli 1. Sorabji, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of
India (later Attorney General of India). In fact there were so many things which a researcher
could learn from such debates.
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Another major obstacle in the way of effective legal research is the lack of
knowledge and absence of proper information regarding the possible avenues of
publication. Sometimes an exceptionally good piece of research gathers dust in
the libraries in the form of a term paper or dissertation or thesis simply because
the author either does not know about publication avenues or he does not get
proper encouragement to send it for publication. Even if he sends it, it simply gets
rejected on the basis of the defective method used in citing foot notes and
bibliography, or because it needs a little editing and slight updating in case the
work involves an empirical study and collection of statistics. Many a times it has
been noted that if a graduate or a post-graduate student wants to·contribute to
some journal, he is discouraged and laughed at. A related fact is that whereas a
supervisor in the field of applied sciences feels it a pleasure to associate his
researcher in the matter of publication of the research, in the social sciences
nothing of this seems to happen. Either the supervisors do not associate the
research scholars in the matter of publication on the pretence that the latter are
still not mature to write and get the work published, or some opportunist
supervisors get the student's work published in the form of a book or in a standard
international journal by making slight changes in the language and substance
without even acknowledging the name of the researcher, much less joining him
as the co-author. This causes great discouragement to the candidate. These
malpractices are apparent everywhere in our universities and Post-graduate
Research Institutiqns, and need to be discouraged and condemned by one and all.
As regards the probable avenues of publication, there are some very good
legal journals besides that of the Journal of the Indian Law Institute. These
include: The Indian Bar Review (Delhi), The Indian Socio-Legal Journal (Jaipur),
The Cochin University Law Review (Cochin), The Kurukshetra Law Journal
(Kurukshetra), Punjab University Law Review (Chandigarh), Law Journal of
Guru Nanak Dev University (Amristar), Kerala Law Times etc. The latest in the
series is the National Law School ofIndia University (NLSIU) Journal (Bangalore).
It is suggested that Ph.D. scholars should be motivated and given encouragement
by the supervisors to come forward and at least get their findings published once
the thesis gets approved. And later the relevant portions of the thesis can also be
sent for publication in the different journals. This should cultivate the habit of
writing in the scholar and he will thus have to learn alternative methodologies and
ways of citations as per the requirements of the particular journal, and shall
ultimately learn the art of writing.
Some observations about the National Law School of India are also required
in the present context. "If Dar-Es-Salam was the law school of the 60's, Warwick
of the 70's and the early 80's, New South Wales of the 80's, then NLSIU is fair
to be the Law School of the 90's," says Professor LP.W.B. Mc Auslan of the
London School of Economics.13 The National Law School ofIndia University
(NLSIU) - a University for professional legal education, sponsored by the Bar
13

1 Law
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Council of India and established in 1987 has been a "dream come true" for many
people in the legal profession. Outside administration of justice, the NLSIU is
perhaps the best example of Bar-Bench co-operation in the field of legal thinking
in India today: The Chief Justice of India, as a visitor of the school and the
Chairman of the Bar Council of India as Chairman of General Council of the
School provide a stature and prestige to the Law School unparalleled in the
history of legal education in India. A large number of retired judges of the
Supreme Court of India and High Courts as well as the Senior Advocates have
been assisting the school in its teaching and research programmes making
education at NLSIU a rare and exciting experience to the teaching and student
community alike.14 The NLSIU is attaining heights day by day in the field of
legal education and research. It is gradually becoming a "Common Platform" for
meeting of law teachers and researchers. Academicians from all parts of the
country as well as from abroad have been visiting the school very often. The
Academic Staff College of the University Grants Commission (UGC) has also
been established at the NLSIU. The said ASC has organised four refresher
courses for law teachers. During these courses law teachers from all parts of the
country have been coming together and sharing their research and teaching
experiences with each other. Besides the refresher courses, the organisation of
Memorial lectures, Afro- Asian International Moot Court Competition, Introductory
Courses on Intellectual Property Law, Establishment of the Comparative Law
Institute, Organisation of Alumni Association, Continuing Education Programmes,
Exchange of the students with the leading law schools of the world, Practical
Internship Programme for the students, Legal Aid Clinic, and Centre for Women's
Studies15 have been a few prominent events among the large number of academic
and other achie.vements to the credit of this unique institution. However, there is
still much to be done for the advancement of legal education and research. One
of the suggestions is that the NLSIU should identify some priority virgin research
areas in the legal field and circulate the same in the University law departments
in India so that the interested scholars could concentrate on these. There has been
so much duplicacy in the research endeavours that not many original and new
research works have been coming forth. It is in this context that the NLSIU should
do the needful. Another suggestion is that the school should organise an "Annual
Event" to enable the members of the legal community to get together may be once
in a year to share their research experiences. Offering "Visiting Fellowships" to
law teachers of the various Indian Universities is another suggestion. Once it
becomes equipped with computer facilities, it can and should provide documentation
services like bibliographies for researchers engaged in inter-disciplinary research.
In fact a lot can be legitimately expected from the NLSIU as it is spearheading the
crusade for better legal education and research in India.

14
15

8

NLS/U Bulletin 5 (1990-91).
Supra n. 13 at 1.
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In summing up, it may be pointed out that for every discipline to be developed,
high quality of research is a paramount necessity. In the less developed countries,
the quality and reliability of research has not been up to the mark. There have
indeed been some good research endeavours in the law field in our country in the
recent past, but this is just a tip of the iceberg. There is no dearth of intelligent,
committed, hard working, and deep thinking researchers in India, but they lack all
the necessary facilities and required environment for research. It is a matter of
common observance that whenever our scientists, social scientists, technocrats,
professionals, and other intellectuals go abroad to the advanced countries on
research assignments, they outsmart their counterparts in their respective fields.
And when they get so many facilities there, they prefer to settle down there only
and the sender country is debarred from the possible contribution of these
intellectuals even though it has spent millions on their education and training.
This is the chief cause of the problem of "Brain Drain" that is, migration of the
professionals and technocrats from the less developed countries to the advanced
countries. Thus the major cause for our lagging behind those advanced nations is
not the dearth of thinkers, academicians and researchers, but the lack of necessary
infrastructure, inadequate facilities, absence of motivation, unfavourable academic
environment in our universities, and lack of proper encouragement to the teachers
and researchers. These are absolutely necessary for keeping the talented people
at home and for the production of the high quality research in any discipline. In
conclusion, therefore, it may be pointed out that if the suggestions offered in the
present work are implemented in earnest, there lies every scope for the improvemen t
of the situation and the possibility of coming across very high quality legal
research in India in the decades to come.
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LAWYERING AND LITIGATING IN INDIAN COURTS:
SOME LITIGANT PERSPECTIVES
Sasheej Hegde*
This paper is an extract from the author's doctoral dissertation in the Sociology
of law. It describes and represents perceptions and experiences of litigants with
our courts and with lawyers and judges. It focusses on issues devolving on
questions of the law's legitimacy and the nature and effects of dispute processing.
The data, drawn from interviews with only 65 litigants at various levels of the
court system, even if not facilitative of generalizations,
does throw light on
aspects of what may be termed the phenomenology
of lawyering and litigating in
Indian courts or, more precisely, everyday legal practices. The data indexes, as
it were, the context in which the everyday activities of such legal functionaries
as lawyers and judges could be interpreted.l

Studying courts in context: Beyond the dispute-focused

approach

The focus on the litigants vis-a-vis the legal system encounters a range of
theoretical perspectives. Indeed some of the most significant developments
in the
contemporary
Sociology of law have been facilitated by the 'dispute-focused'
approach, which sees courts as but one of the large variety of methods of dealing
with disputes in society.2 One approach to disputes may be to avoid making legal
claims at all. As Macaulay has shown, businessmen are often reluctant to litigate
their grievances with each other, especially if they value the continuing relationship
which they have.3
Of the various strategies open to disputants,
apart from going to court,
Hirschman has characterised three types of strategies in terms of 'exit', where the
disputant simply
decides to leave without making any claim; 'voice' which
involves publicly expressing the nature of the dispute and can involve calling in
a third party; and 'loyalty'
which involves simply putting up with the dispute
because the costs of doing otherwise may just be too high.4 Likewise Felstiner,
Abel and Sarat have focused on the process of the transformation
of disputes, a
..

2.
3.
4.

Department of Sociology, Goa University .
The litigants interviewed comprised of "one-shotters" and "repeat players". The former refers
to those who have infrequently used the legal system, and the latter includes those who have
been its frequent users. See, M. Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Corne out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change",9 Law and Society Review 95(1974).
See generally, R. Tomasic, The SocioloH of Law 55-56 (1985).
S. Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business", 28 American Sociological Review, 5567 (1963).
See A . O. Hirschman, Exit. Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms. Or~anisations
and States (1970).
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process which they refer to as 'naming, blaming and claiming', that is, the
transformation of an unperceived injurious experience into a perceived injurious
experience.5 They .point out that the Sociology of law should pay more attention
to the early stages of disputes and to the factors that determine whether 'naming,
blaming and claiming' will occur.
In keeping with the basic orientation of the dispute-focused approach, it has
been recognized that there are a multitude of non-judicial dispute processing
mechanisms within the community.6 The presence of formal institutions like
courts coexisting with larger informal mechanisms has led researchers to argue
that formal justice exists in the shadow of informal justice.7 Studies have also
focused on the various types of third-party dispute processing forums, which
range from .being conciliatory to adjudicative.s
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that courts emphasize greater procedural
regularity than other types of forums and also base their decisions upon the
marshalling of reasons by an impartial third party, namely, the judge. Tbe
limitations of court processing are that, unlike the legislature 'or administrative
agency, it has to focus on the individual case at band and tends to be reactive
rather than proactive, in that it cannot seek out disputes. Also, courts are slow in
responding to social and economic changes and are unable to account for the
repercussions of their decisions since the affected parties cannot participate
meaningfully in the court's decision making process.9
This study, although incorporating perspectives broadly congruent with tbe
dispute-focused approach, does not flow from this approacb. The focus is not
disputes per se or t:he structure of a law suit, but, with a broader phenomenology
which animates the context of our courts. Given the assumptions of individualism
and rule-boundedness and the stress on the balance restoring features of disputing,
the dispute focused approach ignores the key role of dispute-differentials and
conflict strategies in the pursuit of dispute 'settlement' through courts and other
mechanisms.lO More importantly, this approach does not adequately address the
5
6

7.

8.
9
10

W. L. F. Felstiner, R. L. Abel and A. Sarat, "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming and Claiming", 15 Law and Society Review 631-54 (1981).
See, D. M. Engel, "Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives in a Civil Trial
Court", 3 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 425-54 (1980). See also, ~
Modern India and Other Essays (1962); B.S. Cohn, "Anthropological Notes on Disputes and
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Boyum & L. Mather eds., 1983); Fitzgerald and R. Dickins, "Disputing in Legal and Non-Legal
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See, American Court Systems; Readines in Judicial Process and Behaviour (S. Goldman and
A. Sarat eds., 1978).
See, R.L. Kidder, "The End of the Road? Problems in the Analysis of Disputes", 15 Law and
Society Review 717 (1981).

Vol. 6]

Lawyering and Litigating in Indian Courts

97

varying definitions of lawyering and litigating that the court as an instrumentality
is subjected to by human agents.
Nature of recourse to court
An analysis of the conditions in which disputants seek the assistance of courts
would involve an inquiry into the early stages of the dispute, the strategies open
to the disputants in dealing with their disputes, their decision to mobilize the legal
system and the kind of demands they make on the courts. The information
collected on the study focused on the nature of the issues on which the litigants
in our sample went to court, the reasons adduced by them for going to court, their
impressions about the uses to which courts are being put and, in the next section,
their choice of lawyers and their expectations of them.
The nature of the issues on which the litigants interviewed went to court
revealed that the court is mobilized to protect one's property or to secure an
eviction, to recover money or to ensure the obligations of a contract, to wind up
a partnership firm or to decide on the ownership of a factory, to restrain authority
or to check arbitrariness, to secure an increment or to fight against-a suspension,
to obtain a divorce and so on.
For most of the litigants, the court is there to settle their disputes in an
impartial manner and to protect and enforce their rights expeditiously. All of
them said that they had been left with no alternative but to go to court, either as
plaintiff, appellant or petitioner or as defendant or respondent.
Many of the litigants emphasised litigation as the most legitimate, though not
necessarily the most effecti ve, way of redressing their grievances and lor enforcing
their rights guaranteed by law. "Justice", for them, corresponds to a social
situation or condition where their disputes are settled (preferably in their favour)
or where the rights between the disputing parties are established. Some held that
they sought legitimacy through litigation, in the sense of vindicating their status
as independent legal subjects or the legitimacy of official policy. The following
statement of a retired University teacher who had fought a variety of litigations
relating to service matters, eviction and property, is typical of many of the
litigants:
Justice consists in the vindication of my legal right. Whenever my
rights, that is my interests have been affected, I have gone to court
- not merely to protect them but also to legitimise them through a
court verdict. To have taken law into my own hands may have been
an easier way out. But this is illegitimate.
Narrating her experiences, a woman seeking a decree of divorce observed tbat
she had taken recourse to the court chiefly in order to get a legal endorsement
to her independent status. Likewise, a lawyer-litigant asserted that he had been
forced to go to court since his property interests were threatened. The Law Officer
of a leading nationalised Bank observed that, "In most of the disputes involving
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the Bank, what seems to be primarily at stake is the official policy or decision of
the Bank. This is sought to be defended at all cost".
Some of the litigants felt that they had been forced to defend themselves in
court against the unlawful acts or claims of their adversaries, be it private
individuals, groups, organisations or even the Government. The Legal Adviser of
a state-owned public utility service maintained:
We have a lot of cases pending against us, not all of them legitimate.
Mistakes have been committed by our staff, and the aggrieved go to
court. But, what about the many instances where defaulters take
advantage of the interim orders given by courts? This tendency has
to be checked by the courts themselves.
A business executive who had been drawn to court over a money dispute
alleged that it was primarily meant to harass him. An industrialist expressed a
similar sentiment:
Today, the bureaucracy which runs the Government has grown
highly inefficient and corrupt, and often seeks to harass and cheat
people of their rightful claims. The courts, as embodiments of the
rule of law, seem to be the only check on bureaucratic arbitrariness
and corruption.
A few of the litigants maintained that their recourse to the court was to force
the public authorities to a decision. They argued that it was primarily the attitude
of avoiding obligations on the part of authority that was responsible for their
going to court. Through the court, they hoped to force the authorities to assume
responsibility.
Some of the litigants revealed that they instituted cases in court because it
provided them a lever to bargain with others, be it individuals, groups, organisations
or even the Government, or to delay the inevitable. The President of a nationalised
Bank's Officer's Union disclosed that in those instances where the Union could
not sit in judgement, such as, fraud by one of their colleagues, they would go to
court for its decision. He also added that "stays" obtained from courts provide
them an opportunity to bargain with the management or to gain time to mobilize
the work-force. A private transport operator admitted that he had been able to
secure relatively advantageous results from the concerned authorities merely by
instituting cases in court.
Further, while attesting to the integrity and the legitimacy of their claims
made in/through the court, most of the litigants criticized their opponents in the
court for being dishonest in their claims or attempting to make an unlawful gain.
As an elderly industrialist put it:
Litigation is a double-edged weapon. It can be preferred in order
to assert and enforce rights or to set right a wrong. It can also be
preferred as a means of harassing an adversary or to stall the
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inevitable. In most cases, while one party is justified in asserting the
claims that are its legitimate due, the other party is unjustified in
presenting its case. The latter, either as petitioner or as respondent,
often seeks to deny theformer its rightful due. The outcome ofa case
need not necessarily be the triumph of truth.
This and such other assertions of the litigants bear ample testimony to the
adversary spirit that underlies the conduct of the court's business.
It is therefore evident that the fulfillment of individual interests forms the
basis for the litigants allegiance to the court system and a necessary condition for
the mobilisation of law.
Lawyer choice and expectations about lawyers
Most of the litigants said that they had been primarily influenced by the
professional standing of the lawyer. By this they meant not only the seniority and
experience of a lawyer, but also his integrity, behavior in court and court
performance. Since court proceedings are open to the public, many of the litigants
were in a position to evaluate the relative performance of lawyers in court and
thus gauge their professional standing. Closely associated with a lawyers's
professional standing is his professional competency, chiefly defined in terms of
his capacity to Willcases. The litigants pointed out that the professional standing
and the competency of a lawyer are often a matter of public opinion, both among
professional colleagues and the public at large.
The choice of lawyers by many of the litigants was based on personal relation
factors, such as being introduced to a lawyer by a friend or acquaintance, or
approaching a lawyer who is part of their family or caste or religion.
Some litigants pointed out that the choice of a lawyer is often influenced by the
lawyer representing the other side. For instance, a woman fighting a maintenance
case affirmed that since the opposite side was represented by a woman advocate, she
had also decided to take on a woman advocate to fight her case. Another litigant, a
businessman involved in a money dispute, observed that since the other side had
employed the services of a "senior" lawyer, he had to choose a "senior" lawyer.
Sometimes the choice of a lawyer, would also depend on the judge before whom
the case would come up. If a judge was known to encourage junior lawyers, the
litigants expressed the opinion that it would be better to seek the services of a
"junior" lawyer, even though the opposite side may have a "senior" lawyer. It was
reiterated that the choice of a lawyer could be quite critical to the outcome of a case.
A "negative criterion" is also alluded to by some of the litigants. According
to them, the services of those lawyers who had either lost an earlier case of their's
or had fought against them in a case were avoided. Some of the litigants reiterated
that the qualifications possessed by a lawyer, as well as his specialization, also
influenced their choice. In some cases, the litigants felt that the requirement of
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specialized treatment, renders the services of some lawyers indispensable. As an
industrialist pointed out, in matters pertaining to a highly specialized area of law,
like taxation, a few law offices monopolised the work available.
The fees charged by the lawyer often affects the litigant's choice. The service
orientation of a lawyer, that is, his earnestness to get justice to his client, was
another criterion alluded to by few of the litigants.
The litigant perceptions further bear reference to the following criteria:
complexity of the issue (for instance, partition suits were held to be fairly
complicated and required the services of an experienced lawyer); confidence (for
instance, the conviction of an aggrieved litigant in our sample that a woman's
cause could only be sympathetically considered by women advocates); and
ideological affinity (for instance, a litigant, involved in a labour dispute, maintained
that his choice of a lawyer had been founded on the latter's commitment to the
cause of labour).
These perceptions of the litigants interviewed seem to imply a certain preknowledge of the court's functioning which informs their choice of lawyers.
Understandably, the "repeat players" have a wider knowledge of the system than
the "one-shotters". This is also reflected in the criteria that they generally
emphasise. While the "one-shotters" emphasise such criteria as personal relationship,
public opinion, qualification, fees charged, complexity of the issue etc., the
"repeat players" stress such criteria as professional competency, professional
standing, lawyer representing the other side, negative criterion etc. It must also
be pointed out that there were instances of some of the litigants interviewed
employing different lawyers in different cases and of changing lawyers if they do
not come up to their expectation.
Most of the litigants expected a high level of professional competency from
their lawyer(s). This covers the quality of the representation made in the court and
such other skills as capacity to anticipate developments during the conduct of a
case, briefing witnesses and assisting in deposition, promptness in replying to all
the queries made in the court, and not allowing the opponent to drag on the case.
It also means that their lawyer must be able to counter)he "machinations" of the
other side. Closely aligned with the competency expected of a lawyer is the
demand that is made of him to protect the client's interests. Most of the litigants
expected their lawyers to. "deliver the goods". The following response of a
litigant, a hotelier, is fairly typical:
I want results from my lawyer. Why should I waste money on a
lawyer who cannot ensure the results I want? It is not as though we
engage in litigation for its own'sake. Litigation is always directed
towards specific ends and that it is the duty of the lawyer to secure
these ends.
Many of the litigants also insisted that a lawyer must tender correct and
prompt advice, explain the legal position to them and appraise them on their
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chances in court. Often qualities such as loyalty, punctuality, a sense of duty,
discipline and sincerity are also expected of lawyers by some of the litigants.
Lastly, some litigants held that a lawyer must be reasonable in respect of his fees,
have a service orientation and an inclination to promote settlement.
The litigants in our sample on the whole expressed satisfaction with the
performance of their lawyer(s). Many of them were categorical that performance
of their lawyer(s) was better than that of their opponents' lawyer(s). However, a
few of the litigants were dissatisfied, and felt otherwise. The rest were undecided,
having been satisfied at certain stages of a case and disappointed at others or
satisfied in some cases and dissatisfied in some others.
It must be emphasised that a positive assessment of a lawyer's performance
need not necessarily follow from a verdict favourable to the client. A litigant who
was successful in obtaining an order of eviction against his tenant from a court
contended that it was not the performance of his lawyer that won him the case,
rather it was the clear deposition of his daughter (who he had himself briefed)
which "clinched the issue". Similarly, a negative assessment of a lawyer's
performance need not necessarily follow from a verdict unfavourable to the
client. A litigant, who unsuccessfully fought an eviction suit, maintained:
My lawyer argued well, and yet could not ensure the success of my
case. The partiality of the judge and the influence wielded by the
opposite .side were chiefly responsible for my defeat.
The foregoing information serves to amplify two broad points. First, an
examination of these as "conceptive ideologists"ll who translate client-problems
and reconstitute them in terms of legal discourse, that is, rights' claims. It is the
client (the litigant of our sample) who announces his need and sets the objective
for the lawyer. The lawyer translates the objectives of the client, expressed in
everyday discourse, into legal language and strives to achieve for the client the
objective sought by him. For the lawyers and the litigants whom they represent,
the legal system seems to be basically a system of rules and resources facilitating
or obstructing the actions of individuals and groups in various situations. The
mobilisation of law can thus be seen as the outcome of a coalition of interest
between lawyers and litigants, an alliance which seeks to ensure the interests of
both.
The litigants also implied that litigation is a form of social interaction
involving the a~sertion of claims and counter-claims by parties represented by
their lawyers, which is mediated by a judge.
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Dispute processing vis-a-vis courts
It is important to ask what is the context in which these interests are and can
be obtained. This leads us to look closely at the experiences that the litigants in
our sample have with courts.
It may be argued that a concern with the nature and effects of dispute
processing suggests a view of the court system as a mere dispute processing
institution and disputes as the affirmation and focus of court work. Without
sidetracking from the significance of these arguments, it must be pointed out that
the court performs other tasks such as the affirmation and interpretation of legal
doctrine, specification of the requirements of "collective" existence, courts as
agencies of government and social control and associated ideological functions.12
Two main strands of opinion can be discerned in the response of our litigants
to the questions that were put to them. These broadly reflect on (a) the condition
within the courts, and (b) the effects of dispute processing.
(a) The conditions within the courts
As mentioned earlier, for most of the litigants, the court, at least in an ideal sense,
is there to settle their disputes in an impartial manner and to protect and enforce their
rights expeditiously. The qualifications, "at least in an ideal sense", has been
necessitated by the fact that many of the litigants were aware of the situation
prevailing in the courts even before they were directly exposed to it. Nevertheless,
they were of the opinion that they had been forced to go to court as there was no other
alternative and because the court was supposed to be an officially sanctioned system
designed to settle disputes and uphold their legitimate claims.
However, in respect of those litigants who were unaware of the situation
prevailing in the courts and who viewed the court as an impartial agency - (a
"temple of justice", as a litigant expressed) - which settled the claims of people
justly and expeditiously, the immediate consequence of an exposure to court was
to shake the foundations of this confidence. Thus, in response to a question
whether they saw the court as an impartial and principled decision-maker, many
of the litigants replied "no" or "not sure". Some of them, who viewed the court
as an impartial decision-maker were also quite dissatisfied with the delays and
high costs associated with the legal process. As a litigant who had been successful
in an eviction case·after a protracted period of litigation, put it, "while there may
be delays and high costs in court, justice is still done, as it was in my case. Only,
the former may nullify the benefits conferred by the latter". Echoing the sentiments
of many others, a litigant who had been involved in property dispute observed in
exasperation, "I now understand the significance of the Kannada saying 'Geddavanu
sota; Sotavanu satta' (The winner has lost; the loser is dead)".
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The sources of dissatisfaction with the courts centre around what the litigants
saw as the exorbitant costs, the excruciating delays and the risk of uncertain
outcomes. As a woman engaged in a suit for maintenance observed:
I had come to court expecting quick disposal of my case. I now
realize that justice is a never ending process. With each passing
day, I am growing more sure of not getting justice. With the passage
of time, costs mount, my witnesses are lost. there is greater scope
for manipulation, and mental anxiety increases.
The President of a nationalized Bank's Officers' Union mentioned:
. Asfar as possible, we try to avoid courts. This is primarily due to the
delay and uncertainty of outcome. Once we get stuck in court, we
cannot proceed. Basically we have no faith in the court's ability to
do justice. If we have resorted to court, it is chiefly as 'bargaining
counter' with the management.
The Legal Advisor of a state-owned public utility service observed, "there is
no sense of urgency about issues. Every delay hampers our work. Public revenues
are blocked and there is great loss to the exchequer".
Noting that the opportunities for delay were presented by the system itself, a
litigant whose divorce application had been pending, observed:
When approaching the court, I did not expect this delay. Apartfrom the
normal adjournments and the fact of the judge who had been hearing
my case being transferred and having no replacement for some time,
the opposite side also kept avoiding the receipt of the court notice and
delayedfiling its affidavit. Also, since the very nature of litigation is
such that one side wins and the other loses there is bound to be a lot
of delaying tactics by the side which is likely °to lose.
In many cases, the litigants in our sample also complained about what they
termed as the "blatant injustice" of the judicial process. Thus, an industrialist
who had just received an adverse High Court verdict in a dispute over ownership
and possession of a factory, retorted:
Justice is not the aim of the courts. What is important is how the lawyer or
the party concerned is to thejudge. Take care of thejudge andyou will win.
Narrating his experiences, a student, who had been co-accused in a criminal
case of assault before the Magistrate observed:
Truth caTJnever prevail in courts. A case cannot succeed if the truth
is exposed. Both sides have to exaggerate. Apartfrom the unnecessary
delay, lies are taken as valued sratements. Even the judge seems to
know that the arguments being presented by the lawyers are not
factual, and yet he takes them as 'facts'. Criminal proceedings,
indeed, are a big farce with each side lying about the other.
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Another litigant, a business executive, who had been successfully involved in
a property litigation for over twenty years, observed:
Truth is the first casualty in court. Lawyers tutor their clients and
witnesses to tell lies and 'facts' are twisted before the court. Justice
is reduced to evidence 'prepared' by lawyers. In such a situation,
can there be justice in courts or through courts?
It must be pointed out that while most of the litigants were critical of the
delays and "injustice" associated with the legal process, a few of the litigants
noted the "beneficial" consequences of delay within the judicial process. As a
litigant fighting an eviction case noted:
Uncertainties in the judicial process are so many. The outcome of a
case is beyond me or my lawyer. Sometimes it becomes necessary to
delay. For instance, if the judge is corrupt, rather than having no
chance before him, it would be better to delay and wait for a more
honest judge.
Another litigant, engaged in a service case in the High Court observed:
Delay couldfacilitate a more detailed consideration of the law and
facts of a case. Expedition in itselfis no virtue, just as delay in itself
is no vice. What is ideal is a balance between expedition and delay.
Especially today, with the perceptible decline in the standards of the
Bar and the Bench, the proverbial delays of the judicial process may
turn out to be a boon.
The consequences of increasing workload on the courts are also highlighted
by a few litigants. As one of the litigants, a hotelier, succinctly put it, "administrative
efficiency in terms of disposing off cases, rather than judicial rigour or justice of
outcome, constitutes the dominant virtue in our courts today". The industrialist,
referred to earlier, narrating his impressions about the Supreme Court where he
had filed an appeal against an adverse High Court verdict, revealed that
Fifty-eight cases were disposed off in under two hours. The Supreme
Court seems to be better than the High Court or the Trial Court in
respect of this preoccupation with disposals. The judges of the
Supreme Court do not want you there. They seem to be completely
indifferent to the anxiety of parties. In my case, I had engaged the
services of a top lawyer. The judge could not set him aside and
therefore agreed to issue notice. If even the Supreme Courtfails us,
where can a law-abiding citizen go?
Describing further the conditions of practice within the court, a litigant
described a lawyer as "the fulcrum around whom the judicial process revolves".
According to most litigants, lawyer~ were chiefly responsible for the outcome of
cases within the judicial process. The judge is viewed as a "mere spectator",
refraining from being strict with lawyers and often helpless with respect to the
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way in which, as also the pace at which, the cases proceeded. A woman fighting
a divorce case said:
My case has been taking a long time. The judge cannot be blamedfor
this. Frequent adjournments have been sought, even though the
judge has been keen on taking up the issue. Even my lawyer does not
object when the other party asks for adjournments.
The President of a College Teachers' Association, recollecting his impressions,
was categorical in stating that:
The court process is more conducive to lawyers than to judges. The
latter cannot anticipate what the case is. He (judge) is dependent on
the lawyer who only sells his case and does not present it. It would
not be an exaggeration to assert that courts are often (mis)led by
lawyers.
A transport operator, claimed:
Justice depends on the capacity of a lawyer. The outcome of a case
is often determined by the lawyer. If he is tactful, he can turn the
mind of the judge, or can confuse the latter. Judges only go by the
evidence before them. while the production and presentation of the
evidence is the exclusive preserve of the lawyer and his client.
These assertions amply testify to the primacy attributed to the lawyer in the
judicial process. Dilating on the primacy of lawyers in the judicial process, some
of the litigants .were highly critical of lawyers as a professional community.
It is obvious that this criticism of lawyers by the litigants is a reaction having
its roots in their exposure to the court, and more specifically, in their encounter
with the lawyers engaged by the opposite side. On this basis, some may argue that
these views of the litigants are tantamount to contradicting the point earlier made,
namely, that the mobilisation of law can be seen as an outcome of a coalition of
interest between lawyers and their client, an alliance which seeks to ensure the
interest of both. The assertion that lawyers delay cases and exploit their clients
may be taken to imply that the former have interests which run contrary to the
interests of the latter. But such an argument would bea gross over-simplification.
This study evidenced that many of the litigants interviewed were relatively
satisfied with the performance of their lawyer(s). Even in those instances where
the litigants expressed dissatisfaction with their lawyer(s), they asserted that, in
the event of their approaching the court again, they would avoid these lawyers and
engage others. More importantly, the litigants seemed to realize that lawyers, being
the agents of their clients, would strive to achieve the objectives set by them.
Considered in this perspective, the perceptions of the litigants, far from repudiating
the view of lawyer-client relations as mutually reinforcing, reiterate it.
On the other hand, these litigants seemed to be quite caustic in their comments
on, as also disapprobation of, the position and role of judges in the legal process.
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While emphasising the primacy of lawyers in the judicial process, many of the
litigants were quite critical of judges for choosing to remain passive. According
to the litigants, even in those situations where they could intervene, judges
refrained from doing so. They are of the view that, as expressed by a businessman
"most judges are predisposed to give in to the demands of lawyers, such as, for
adjournments, interim applications etc., mainly in order to keep the Bar in good
humour". Another litigant, a retired chemist, who had been drawn to court mostly
as a defendant in a property dispute and several money recovery suits, claimed,
"things move fast only where senior lawyers are handling matters. Judges are
afraid of senior lawyers, and the influence the latter may wield".
Many of the litigants expected the judges to take more active and firm
management of cases, and thus markedly reduce the lawyer's ability to set the
flow and timing of business. A few of the litigants wanted judges to use their
authority to lead the evidence, limit the scope of questions put to witnesses, rather
than leaving all this to the lawyers and also to make an effort to settle cases.
However, the suggestion that judges should make an effort to settle cases or
conciliate between the parties is not acceptable to many of the litigants. Reacting
to the efforts of the court to effect a compromise with the government, the
President of a College Teachers' Association referred to earlier, maintained:
It is not the role of the High Court to bring about a compromise by
requesting the Government to accommodate. Courts must take a
stand. Judges sit to interpret the law, not to balance the two parties.
They must give benefit to one party quickly. By and large, courts
postpone decisions, especially in service matters, saying that it is an
administrative matter.
The industrialist referred to earlier observed:
The High Court judge tells me: "Why don't you settle the matter in
the Sindhi Panchayat?" Is this what a judge has to tell? He is to do
justice between the parties. If the matter could have been settled, we
would not have come to the court.
The litigants also alluded to what they described as the "declining standards"
on the Bench. Instances of judges being influenced by the standing of the lawyers
and the disputing parties were also provided by the litigants. A businessman,
involved in a lot of money suits, argued that "judges being economically deprived,
they were not above certain needs and influences."
The President of a nationalised Banks' Officers' Union referred to earlier,
affirmed:
Itis not so much the sanctity of law that decides an issue. Rather, it
is the thinking ofajudge that is crucial. How else do you explain two
courts deciding on the same issue but contradictory verdicts?
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The experiences of the litigants are illustrative of certain aspects of the nature
of dispute processing within the court system. Apart from asserting the primacy
of lawyers in the judicial process, the views of the litigants elucidate certain other
dimensions of the lawyer-client relationship. There is also a recognition of the
limited role that judges play in the legal process.
b) The effects of dispute processing

The effects of dispute processing are revealed not only after the proceedings
in court have been completed and the verdict pronounced, but also during the
court proceedings, when the case is being decided. From the point of view of the
litigants, the effects of dispute processing are many and include the various
problems they had to face in court, the economic and psychological costs which
they had to bear, and the inevitable distancing of the disputants, with the possible
termination of any pre-existing relationship.
Some of the sources of the litigants' dissatisfaction with the courts are due to
the following reasons: the scope that delays in court provide for the manipulation
of a case; the humiliation in court, especially during cross-examination when
irrelevant and embarrassing questions are put; the difficulty of getting and
retaining witnesses and relevant documents; the dependence on the goodwill of
witnesses; perjury in courts; the personal inconvenience of waiting in court; the
threats from desperate defendants; corrupt and inefficient court staff; the overall
mental tension and anxiety about the outcome of one's case; and the stigma
attached to appearance in court, especially where women are concerned. Some of
the litigants also referred to, as one of them put it, the "adversary culture" that
pervades the court where everything is disputed and nothing conceded, the
confrontationist styles and argumentative rhetoric of lawyers, and so on.
Some litigants referred to the distancing of the litigants from the legal
process. That is, the realisation that once a dispute is handed over to be processed
by the legal system, it is in effect taken away from (them) and is transformed into
a case by lawyers and judges. In so doing, a translation of the terms of the dispute
takes place as it is made to fit legal categories for easier processing through the
courts. 13 This is not to imply that the litigants found this to be a major source of
dissatisfaction. A college teacher expressed that there is , "a need to make legal
rules simple and accessible to all, and to educate the people about their rights and
duties, about how to approach courts, which court to go to and so on".
The litigants also alluded to the problems of implementing a court decree. As
a litigant put it, "the fruits of a litigation lie in execution. However, an effective
machinery to execute court orders is absent. The existing machinery is very
corrupt and inadequate". Many of the litigants gave instances of the efforts made
by the losers, in some cases even the government, to circumvent the court verdict.
As a retired government official, who has fought successfully against his dismissal
from service, maintained,
13.

Supra n. 2 at 59.
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Court verdicts are sought to be circumvented by the government. In
my case, the court ordered reinstatement. To circumvent the order,
the government ordered a gradation list to be prepared, which took
time, and the benefit of the court order was deferred.
Likewise, orders of eviction given by the court are held to be flouted by
tenants. As a landlord who had obtained an order of eviction from a court
observed, "the court may give a favourable verdict. But that does not end our
problem. There is the problem of implementing the decree, which often forces us
to go to court again".
In the light of these problems, many of the litigants claimed that the "court is
a trap - it is easy to get in but difficult to come out". Understandably, some of the
litigants disclosed that they were forced to negotiate and settle matters out of
court or had taken recourse to more "drastic" courses of action, such as threats,
intimidation through goondas, harassment, etc., to secure their legitimate due.
Many of the litigants also noted that litigation often leads to a distancing of
the disputants and terminates existing relationships. Particularly, the businessmen
among the litigants interviewed were categorical that they sought to avoid courts
as far as possible and settle their disputes among themselves or through wellwishers.
They felt that the retention of business contacts and relationships is more
important than a particular grievance that they may have, from the point of view
of their long-term business success.
In essence, these problems alluded to by the litigants are suggestive of what
individuals and organisations are exposed to or can expect when they come to
court. Again, these problems are not something that the li:igants were unaware of
before going to court. The exposure to the court only bolstered their impressions.
More importantly, however, a necessary consequence of these problems associated
with the courts is, what some of the litigants identified as, an increasing tendency
to show "disrespect" for the judiciary and an "I -couldn't-care-Iess" attitude to
the courts. As an official of a nationalised Bank remarked, "the moment an issue
goes to court, the defendant is in a better position. Many of our defaulting
customers tell us: 'You can go to court'''.
Indeed, some of the litigants in our sample maintained that they were no
longer afraid of the courts nor respected it. The following response of a litigant,
one who had been involved in a criminal case, is quite illustrative:
Before going to court, I was afraid of them. I thought that it was a
holy place and that any wrong committed would be punished. Having
been exposed to the court, however, I am no longer afraid of them.
I now know that the court has no teeth-it is like any other place,
corrupt and crowded. Get yourself a good lawyer and you can relax,
rest assured that nothing untoward will happen.
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The more embittered among the litigants in our sample maintained that they
would either seek "short-cuts", such as, influencing the judge, and even bribing
him, or intimidating the other side, or avoiding courts altogether and settling
matters outside, even though they may lose in the bargain. From the point of view
of a litigant,
People are already seeking shortcuts to redress their grievances.
Civil disputes are becoming criminal offences. The failure of the
legal system to deliver justice can have dangerous consequences.
These perspectives notwithstanding, the litigants in our sample, in response
to a question whether they would go to court again, maintained that there is no
other alternati ve but to mobilize the court in order to secure their pri vate interest.
Only a few of the litigants were categorical that they would not go to court again.
Conclusion
The point of this discussion has not been to mount a critique of the Indian
courts from the point of.view of litigants. Apart from highlighting aspects of the
operative logic of courts, the responses of the litigants amply testify to the
instrumentalism that underlies the practice of law and court recourse, the primacy
of lawyers in the drama of courts, and the conception of lawyer-client relations
as primarily collaborative rather than exploitative. The dimensions of lawyering
and litigating o'utlined here seem to suggest that the court is often viewed as an
"ineffective instrumentality".
The problem is how to conceptualize a condition, an institution, a practice
which seems to have found itself on a denial of the very axes and premises on
which it claims to have been based. Is it the "gap" we often speak about, between
the promise of law on the one hand, and its performance on the other? Or, do we
affirm, with Balbus that the legitimation of the legal order is not primarily a
function of its ability to live up to its claims or 'redeem its pledges' but rather of
the fact that its claims or pledges are valued in the first place.14

14.

I. D. Balbus. "Commodity Form and the Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of
the Law". llLDw and Society Review 581 (1977).
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WHA T AILS THE JUDICIARY?
Dr. Justice David Annoussami*

1. Threat to independence from the Executive
(a) Disciplinary

measures

Even though by and large the judiciary appears to behave independently
from
the other limbs of power, there are many cases in which that independence
is
fettered because the judiciary is in a position of dependence on many matters vital
for it. lL is true that regarding the tenure of the post, there is a constitutional
guarantee that no disciplinary
action except removal is possible in respect of
judges of the Supreme Court and High Court. The removal from office cannot be
effected except by an order of the President passed after an address, by each
House of the Parliament supported by the majority of the total members and a
majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, has been
presented to the President, in the same &ession, for such removal on the ground
of proved misbehaviour
or incapacity. The process is so cumbersome that so far
ho removal has taken place even though there has been in the press serious
allegations
regarding the conduct of a few Judges and complaint about their
practical impunity. This tarnishes the image of the judiciary and affects the
confidence of the public. If there is a serious allegation, it should be cleared
forthwith through a proper enquiry and consequential action.
On the other, .side the situation may undergo change and it may become
possible for the Government
to find the necessary majority for resorting to
removal and such removal may perhaps take place in case when it is not
warranted, in a vindictive manner jeopardizing
thereby the independence of the
judiciary. In fact the Government has got the Constitution amended 67 times witb
the same requirements regarding majority and it may find them for the removal
of a Judge as well. So far the political will was missing, it may come into
existence. Therefore, the power of punishment of judges should not be left to the
pleasure of the Government and the decision of the Parliament. That may become
a real danger for democracy. The power of removal should lie in the hands of a
high level independent disciplinary body. That body should be able to act swiftly
and efficiently in case of misbehaviour,
maintaining intact the right of defence,
so that the impression of impunity is totally removed. The same body or the same
kind of body should also deal with other judicial officers for whom also there
should be no punishment other than removal with or without pension. A judge on
whom any other punishment is inflicted· loses his prestige and cannot enjoy the
confidence of the litigants which is so essential in the dispensation of justice. A
..
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confidential
censure may be address~d by the Chief Justice of India in case of
High Court Judges, by the Cbief Justice of tbe State in case of District Judges,
by the District Judge to tbose below him. No public stricture should be passed by
any appellate court in the body of the judgement itself. But there should not be
any hesitation in inflicting the punishment of removal whenever it is warranted.
This will be part of the conditions of service which should otherwise be improved.
Removed judges can always return to the profession of advocates and will not be
in the street. Judges have proved too soft in dealing with their erring brothers. So
the disciplinary body should not consist only of judges. It should also consist of
responsible representatives
of the society of high reputation.
A situation analogous to removal consists in the non-regularisation
of additional
Judges. Their status is most precarious. They can be made permanent only at tbe
pleasure of the Government. How can they act independently during their tenure
as additional Judges? Practically there is no need to have posts of additional
Judges. If they exist, the incumbents
should be made permanent as a matter of
course, preferably to outsiders, unless tbere is a disciplinary
action pending
against them.
Another form of disguised punishment impairing the independence of Judges
of the High Court is the possibility of their transfer. Transfer for a Judge who is
in his fifties to another State where language, climatic conditions, food products
may be extremely different, will put the transferred Judge to a considerable
hardship and inconvenience.
Therefore Judges are scared at the very idea of
transfer. Some have even preferred to resign instead of joining their new posts in
another State. It is true that except during the period of emergency not many
transfers have been effected except in respect of Chief Justices. But the policy of
having one-third of the Judges in each State from outside is brandished now and
then. Who will be picked up under the guise of the implementation
of the policy?
This Damocles' Sword is a serious danger to independence of Judges. It is also
to be noted that Judges transferred
against their wish are likely to become
aggressive, whh all the evil consequences
that such an attitude entails. Nontransferability
is considered in France as an essential guarantee of independence.
Sucb a guarantee sbould be given not only to High Court Judges but also to all
judicial officers, transfer being made possible only upon tbe request of the
Judges, or, upon tbe recommendation
of the Disciplinary Body.

(b) Appointments
The ways open to the Government to influence Judges by way of threat are
of course important. B'ut the pernicious ways of earning them are much more
dangerous. In the first place comes the appointment which rests ultimately in the
hand of the Government. By a tacit convention, tbe seniormost Supreme Court
Judge was made the Chief Justice, ChiefJustices
of the States were made Judges
of the Supreme Court and the senior most Judges of eacb High Court were made
the Chief Justices of the same High Court. But this convention bas been given a

112

National Law School Journal

[1994

gobye when the confrontation between the Executive and the Judiciary reached
its zenith. It has been even publicly stated several times that what the nation
required were committed Judges; 'committed' meaning presumably, committed to
the course of action pursued by the Government. The word now floated is
'common perception'. This situation creates for Judges a conflict between their
conscience and their legitimate ambition for promotion. They have recourse to
several methods, escapism by way of avoiding to decide a ticklish case having
political repercussion, accepting the pressure without giving the game away by
an exercise of trick-riding. But those courses are not always possible. A choice
has to be made. Some remain jealously independent and impervious to pressures;
otbers succumb to the tempt~tion of promotion at the expense of independence.
The aspirants to the posts may have to canvass the support of some political
bosses or at least·take care of not displeasing them. After promotion, some
ungrateful Judges recover their independence, and assert clamourously their
independence, some others nurture a feeling of gratitude' for those who have
favoured them in their getting promotion. Before and to some extent after
promotion, the Judge mortgages in one way or another his independence.
Regarding the appointment of Judges from the Bar, let us first consider the
appointment to the High Court. The bulk of the appointees to the High Court come
from among Government Pleaders appointed by the party in power, from among
advocates belonging to the party. There is in that way a pre~election. Those who
become Government pleaders and High Court Judges thereafter have wellanchored political convictions and they will have difficulty of getting rid of their
allegiance to the chiefs of the party or at least to the ideology of the party. If the
party remains in power for a sufficiently long period, the Court may very well
reflect its political colouration. It is true that the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court and Chid Justices of High Cour~s have a role to play in the process of
appointments. But the Government has the final word. Chief Justices may at best
reach a compromise in the matter in order to avoid a deadlock. In fact here has
been a considerable delay in making appointments. Further the process of
selection appears to have deteriorated over the years. Now we witness the warrant
of appointment by the President being successfully challenged. One wonders
whether the Intelligence work is done properly or whether the report is called for
or is ignored. At any rate the whole process of appointment is shrouded from the
public eye, the appointing authority losing thereby the possibility of obtaining
the fullest information regarding the person proposed to be elevated to a High
office. If for being appointed as a Judge one has to secure the blessing of the
Government, the litigant would be justified in entertaining a doubt about his
independence vis-a-vis the Government.
The Government has got at its disposal another reward in favour of 'deserving'
Judges. The remuneration of High-Court Judges is more than half in kind or in the
form of various allowances which will cease at the time of superannuation at the
age of 62 whilst judges have still daughters to marry. The pension which cannot
exceed 50% of the remuneration by way of salary alone will thus represent less
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than 25% of their total remuneration while in serviCe. This makes Judges highly
vulnerable. The Government has got the power to offer Chairmanship of some
Commission, or of a Tribunal to retired Judges. Therefore Judges on the eve of
their retirement at least are tempted to look for appointment to such posts and will
have much difficulty to keep intact their independence.
Appointment ofDistriCtMunsifs or Junior Civil Judges go practically unnotiCed,
even though they are holder of posts with vast powers. They are ordinarily chosen
by a Commission. There is no accurate job description and determination of
qualities required and ways to assess their qualities. The usual way of selection
is by way of interview aimed at ascertaining their knowledge of law and capacity
of expression. In this system of selection by way of interview, there is possibility
of candidates successfully bringing pressure on the members by all possible
ways. So a Judge comes into existence with an original sin, which will necessarily
perpetuate itself during his career. Law Ministers sincerely would like to have
Judges enjoying a good reputation of integrity and impartiality, but they would
like them to yield occasionally to their 'small' requests, forgetting that it is
incompatible. Qne who is ready to accommodate the wish of the Minister would
be prone to yield to other pressures as well.

(c) Other matters
The salary and ,other conditions of serviCe of the Judges of the higher
judiciary are to be determined by the Parliament and by rules framed by the
Government. Those of the lower judiciary are completely governed by rules made
by the Government. There.can only be recommendations by the Chief Justice of
India. The Government is free to accept them or not. So Judges as a corps should
not displease the Government. In fact during a certain period of time the
remuneration of Judges has been allowed to deteriorate by way of not raising it
periodically so as to neutralize the rise of the cost of living.
Another trumpcard at the disposal of the Government, which is not apparent
but very powerful, is the matter of finance .. The judiCiary depends on the
Government for budget allocation and sanction for expenditure. It is bound to
address the Government for creation of new courts, sanction of posts, construction
and maintenance of Court buildings, purchase of equipments, etc. In all cases
there is no direct act of hostility by way of action or omission by the Gove"rnment,
but officers in charge follow closely the opinion of their superiors on the
judiciary. Judges, or at least Chief JustiCes and Principal DistriCt Judges cannot
remain totally indifferent to the desiderate of the Government.
In our country the administration is tentacular; for getting anything done
within normal time and according to law, one has to approach a number of offices.
A judge for the maintenance of his official residence, or his own house and the
exploitation of his properties or of those of his friends and relatives, cannot allow
the application to the Government to take its own course through which it may not
reach its end. He has necessarily to approach some highly placed officials or even
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a Minister to get things done. This predicament places the Judge in a very uneasy
position, because those things are not granted without a quid pro quo immediately
or later. On account of the dependence of the judiciary on so many matters, there
is a vicious circle of influences to escape from which one needs a lot of courage
and spirit of sacrifice.
The attitude of the Government towards Judges and courts has been somewhat
ambiguous. Sometimes one gets the impression that the Government wants to
manifest its discontent in not yielding even to very modest and legitimate
demands. Sometimes it appears that they want to win over the judiciary and are
very generous. The attitude of the judiciary also discloses the same fluctuation at
close scrutiny. The Government and the judiciary have to live side by side. The
acts of the former are subject to the review of the latter. But the latter depends on
the former in so many ways. Now their relations are subject to the whims of
individuals and justice may become a casualty. A permanent arrangement has to
be found allowing the Government to run smoothly and ensuring to judges dignity
and independence.

II. Threats from other sources
a) Aggression by Advocates
The Governmeut is not the only threat to the independence of judges, there are
also influences from other quarters against which judges need to be shielded.
Since Judges of all ranks have been in the Bar for more or less a long period; the
Bench and the Bar always considered themselves as belonging to the same
fraternity. There has'been a great courtesy mutually. The Bar has always supported
the Bench in times of confrontation with Parliament or the Executive. But,
unfortunately, in the fine edifice, cracks have started appearing. This is due to the
general deterioration of all institutions in the country and also to the large influx
of young advocates without briefs. Manifestations are more and more numerous;
gherao of judges and systematic boycott of courts of some judges are not rare. The
Bar also succeeded in obtaining the transfer of judges from one place to another
or they practically forced some Judges to resign. An incident which made
sensation was the throwing of a chair by a lawyer on the Judge after he finished
pronouncing ajudgment. In another more recent incident a thousand of protesting
advocates from Tis Hazari District Court led by their office bearers penetrated
into the court rooms of the Delhi High Court, shouted slogans against the sitting
judges and compelled them to leave for their chambers. The Full Bench of the
Delhi High Court had to initiate contempt proceedings against seven lawyers of
Tis Hazari including four office bearers of Tis Hazari Bar Association. At first
they did not relent and were inclined to ignore the contempt notices and were
heading for a show-down; the Delhi Bar Association resolved that more than 5000
lawyers will go to the High Court and ask the Judges to initiate contempt
proceedings against them as well. Then ultimately reason prevailed and contemners
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expressed their regret and tendered unconditional apology. This was not to the
taste of the some of the lawyers who asked for a meeting of the General Body of
the Bar Association and demanded the removal of the office bearers, who
apologised. The seven lawyers were convicted and they would be called upon to
appear in courrand receive the sentence in case of repetition of the same kind of
act. The new attitude of the Bar towards Judges is an unhealthy development
undermining the independence of judiciary. Judges should enjoy the confidence
and the esteem of the litigant public, otherwise the faith in justice will fade away
and the wliOle system will crumble. Advocates are the main architects in building
up the reputation of judges. If advocates sit in judgment over the conduct of
judges and pass resolutions against them and also give publicity to it, judges are
without any protection, and the prestige of judges so essential for the dispensation
of justice is jeopardized. The proper course of action for the Bar would be to send
a detailed complaint to the Higher Authority which should take prompt and
efficient action. No publicity should be given by way of resolution or otherwise.
If lawyers themselves take law in their hands, that is the death knell of the rule
of law and those who will suffer ultimately are the lawyers themselves.
b) Non-eo-operation

by the Poliee

Police has been always faithfully subordinate to the judiciary. Stricture even
by a Magistrate against a lapse in the investigation affected the career of the
concerned police officer. With the new role the police has assumed in the
evolving of democratic form of Government and the deprivation of Magistrates
of their administrative powers on the process of separation of the judiciary from
the executive, the situation has changed. Fear of the judiciary has given place to
a mere formal respect. As a result they no longer take diligent action for the
production of witnesses and execution of warrants, causing thus waste of time for
criminal courts. The incident which occurred in Gujarat on 25th September 1989
reveals the depth of the evil. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad, (Gujarat)
was upset by the non co-operation of the police in the matter of trial. He
complained against the local police to the higher police officials. The Police
Inspector annoyed by the action taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate withdrew
constables posted in his court. The CJM filed two complaints against the Police
Inspector and other police officials for their delaying the process of courts. The
Police Inspector displeased by the actions taken by the CJM, made a complaint
to the Registrar of the High Court through proper channel. While hostility
between the two had reached that point, the Police Inspector met the CJM in his
chamber, assuaged him and invited him to visit the police station to see registers
by himself and further added that such a visit would have a mollifying effect on
the sentiments of the police officials. The CJM accepted. What happened exactly
in the chamber of the Police Inspector is not yet clear, but the CJM was arrested,
handcuffed, tied with ropes. The photograph in such a state was given wide
publicity. The CJM was sent for medical examination and at the hospital he was
made to sit in the bench. in the verandah exposing him to public gaze in the state
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described above. Criminal action against the CJM was also started for offences
of violation of the prohibition Act and acts of violence. This had created a great
commotion in the Bench and the Bar. The Supreme Court was asked to step in. Six
police officers, namely the District Superintendent of Police, the Inspector of
Police, the Sub-Inspector of Police, one Head Constable, one Constable, one
Mamlatdar were found guilty of contempt of Court, convicted thereunder and
sentenced to imprisonment varying from one month to six months and fine
varying from Rs.500/- to Rs. 2,000/- . The Supreme Court in this case has given
some guidelines to be followed for preserving the independence of judiciary and
ensuring that offences are properly investigated. But the police officials in
Gujarat have taken a serious exception to the Supreme Court decision and
submitted to the Governor a two page memorandum in which they asked the
Government to move an application for the revision of the Supreme Court order
by a Constitution Bench. This incident should be an eye opener and lead to
redefining clearly the relationship between the judiciary and the police and to
restoring the authority of the former enabling it to act in full independence, and
authority unhampered by the police.
c) Intervention

of Superiors

In India unlike in European co"ntries, the judiciary is divided into two
separate corps: the "higher judiciary" and the "subordinate judiciary". Judges
belonging to the first category do not consider those of the second category as
belonging to the same species. Even in the manner of addressing judges those of
the higher judiciary are addressed as 'Your Lordship' whereas those of the lower
judiciary are addressed as 'Your Honour'. But in countries like France for
instance all judges from top to bottom are addressed as 'Mr. President'. One can
also wonder why in a Republic like ours the word 'Lordship' is still used. If there
was only a difference of vocabulary the evil will not be so grave, but the career
of the Members of the 'subordinate judiciary' depends entirely on the pleasure of
the 'higher judiciary'. Promotion, disciplinary action and transfer are in the hand
of the higher judiciary. What is worse is that there are no established norms for
transfer in all States. So the members of the 'subordinate judiciary' are prone to
always earn the blessings of the members of the 'higher judiciary' and in that
process when a member of the 'higher judiciary' wants a favour for himself or his
friends, he can easily influence the judges of the 'subordinate judiciary' . The very
word of 'subordinate judiciary' seems to suggest the possibility of the fact.
d) Solicitatipn

of the Proximate

Circle

It is easy to imagine that a judge will be subject to the influence of his
relatives, of members of his caste, religion and of the circle of friends. As far as
the 'subordinate judiciary' is concerned, in order to keep judicial officers away
from such an influence they are posted outside their district. This solution is not
a very bappy one. First, it smacks of colonial administration. In a democracy any
group should be able to govern itself and also justice should be rendered by its
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own members. Secondly, this practice is not conducive to the dispensation of
good justice. In order to deal with cases, one should have not only the knowledge
of law, but also the knowledge of the environment in which problems arise. He
should have some insight of the local mentality. In big States there are vast
differences in behaviour between urban and rural areas, hills and plains, fertile
and densely populated areas, and arid and scarcely populated areas. Sometimes
even the colloquial language used in the locality is different and when one does
not know it, he may be led to misunderstand the evidence tendered before him. Of
course everyone is influenced by the image of justice found in the Old Bailey, the
Central Criminal Court in London, where justice is represented blindfolded with
a sword in one hand and a pair of scales in another. The blind foldedness means
only that no consideration should be given to the persons before the judge. One
thing is to take into account the persons appearing before the judge; another thing
is to know the real situation in which the parties are placed. To the latter, judges
should not be blind, they should rather have their eyes wide open. They should be
familiar with the social realities of the locality.
On the other side, the practice adopted is not also very efficient, because very
often the family circle follows the judge. Members of the caste and religion will
also be in the new place and a new circle of friends and touts will get soon formed
in the new post. Transfer of a judge is not a solution for the problem, it is only
transferring the problem from one place to another. The fact that judges of the
subordinate judiciary are never appointed in their own district compels them to
frequent visits to their home town entailing unnecessary additional expenditure
for them and less days of work for the State. They are also automatically
transferred from one post to another every three years without any possibility for
their wives to devise ways of earning honestly additional income by their
activities. On the contrary, if a judge is given an opportunity to serve in his own
town he will enjoy more prestige and public recognition than in another place. He
will attempt to preserve that prestige and consideration and in order to avoid
transfer, he will try to behave as best as possible. He will give the best of himself
to the task. Working in his own place requires more restraint than working in an
unknown place where one can afford to go out of the way without losing much.
At any rate, impartiality cannot be achieved by this artificial mean of posting
outside the district. Only semblance of impartiality will be there. So a judge
should be allowed to work in a place of his choice, if vacancies are available and
conditions favourable to reduce the influence of the proximate circle should be
created.

Uf. Factors Aggravating Judicial Maladies
~) Insufficient

Income

Remuneration of judicial officers is quite inadequate especially for those in
the lower ranks. The salary did not follow the variation of cost of living index. For
instance, the average salary of the District Judge was Rs. 1500/-p.m. at the time
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of independence. The present day Rupee is equivalent to 6.57 paise of that time.
Therefore to maintain the salary the same level in terms of real value, his average
salary should be in terms of present day rupees, Rs. 22830/-, but it is only Rs.
5400/-. In other words, the real salary is only approximately 1/4 of the previous
salary. Officers of the corresponding rank in the administration and the police
haVe suffered the same fate in matter of salary, but they have been successful to
tide over the difficulty to some extent in creating for themselves several benefits
in kind which are not official but which are quite sizable like vehicles, telephone
charges, etc. which the officers of the judiciary do not enjoy. Some Magistrates
find it convenient to get from the police· the procurement of some advantages in
kind which they cannot get by themselves. In the process,they close their eyes on
the irregularities committed by the police in the investigation work which the
Magistrate is expected to supervise. So the police is no longer scared by the
magistracy. The advocates have been able to attune their fees to the rise of cost
of living, so much so the income of a judicial officer in a month may be inferior
to the fee of an advocate arguing before him in a day. Further his pension will not
be more than 50% ,of his last pay and he will retire at the age of 58 with a meagre
pension, when he has got still many family responsibilities, having sons and
daughters pursuing higher studies at a high cost. If he is provident enough, he
thinks of accumulating wealth during his tenure for the expenditure for the rest
of his life.
Formerly judges used to come from affluent families and salary constituted
a supplement of income. Now people from various strata of the society without
personal property are able to accede to the post of Judges and they have no other
income than their salary. On the other side occasions of expenditure are becoming
more and more important like Telephone, T.V., Photo, Video and all sorts of
machines and gadgets. Those in the business have a sizable income which they
can also protect to some extent from the Income tax net. This class of people
nurture in the country the cult of wealth and of a high level of ostentatory
expenditure, making Government servants to envy them and if possible to imitate
them. In this predicament, judges are driven to find a supplement of income in one
way or the other and thus the gate way is open for corruption. There are frequent
and persistentrumours of corruption by judges. Quite recently the Bar Association
ofTirunelveli has constituted a special five member committee to inquire into the
corrupt practicies of judges in some civil courts in the district and to report to the
High Court. Giving judges enormous powers and not providing with an income
which is in consonance with that power, would irresistibly lead to malpractices.
It is also true that corruption of judges is magnified in the imagination of the
public. The judiciary on the whole resists the temptations but in some cases here
and there they yield to them. This leads people to generalize and to proclaim that
all judges are corrupt. Any society has the judiciary it deserves. The values
prevailing in the society will necessarily percolate in the judiciary. However,
corruption of judges is not tolerated by the people who have reconciled themselves
with corruption in other quarters. It is so because judiciary is the last recourse
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against attacks of different kinds by individuals or public bodies and also on
account of the tradition handed over by centuries of literary works placing judges
on high pedastal; they are considered almost as God. It is significant to note that
even in the preamble of the Constitution,
'justice' appears in the first place. In
the reaction of the society against corruption of judges, lies a ray of hope, if the
society is up in arms against corruption of judges and is able to put an end to'it,
not by resorting to punitive measures which will not work, but by removing the
causes of corruption, that may trigger corrective steps in the whole administration
and also the society as well.
ii) Institutional

Factors

What facilitates
judges succumbing to influences is the uncertainty of law
and the vast power enjoyed by judges in the application of law. Even though the
doctrine of stare decisis
is applicable in India and Judges are bound by
precedents,
the existence at present of a vast number of lengthy judgments of
higher courts sometime contradicting each other, gives the liberty to the judge to
take his own course. Further, one of the characteristics
of the common law itself
is that when the set of facts is different, the previous decision would not apply and
can be modified to suit the new set of facts. So by way of distinction the judge can
easily apply the law as he thinks fit. Thus we have reached a point which is quite
similar to the pee-Macaulay period when judges were asked to deli ver judgements
according
to "Justice, equity and good conscience".
The exercise of influence is made easier also by the facility with which the
interested party can get his case brought before the judge of his choice, by way of
creation of special courts, of withdrawal of cases, and of transfer of cases.
Withdrawal of cases from a judge is common feature. The distribution of cases is
not made systematically and is modified quite often. Parties get the case adjourned
till a favourable Bench is seized of the matter. So it is enough that in each court
there are a few judges amenable to influence, and the whole system gets vitiated and
the independence of judiciary as a whole is affected. The transfer of cases has
become a matter of routine. In a country like France it is not so. Separate Benches
for the year are constituted for each kind of cases. Withdrawal of cases should be
justified. The Press and the Association of Judges react sharply when it is done for
an oblique motive. For having a case transferred, one has to take exception to the
judge concerned. That is possible only in circumstances prescribed by law. The
procedure is rather complex. The Bench which decides on transfer sits in a solemn
manner, the judges wearing red robes as in a Sessions case. When the prayer for
transfer is rejected, the party who prayed for transfer is sentenced to fine and in
addition to pay compensation for damages for the judge, if he applies for it.
Thirdly, most of the cases are decided in India by a Single Judge or Two Judges.
In some circumstances, in a Bench of judges there is only one deciding judge. It is
so for instance when a new judge happens to have been ajunior under the other judge
or when a District Judge promoted as a High Court Judge has been living for years
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under the fear of the other judge. The senior judge by mere rapidity in conducting
the business may render a newly appointed junior judge ineffective. In order to
reduce the effect of outside influences, one should have always a collegium of three
judges, at least at the level of judgement, the trial being left to be conducted by a
single judge. Thus influence to which a judge is subjected will get neutralized to
a large extent and also the judge could more easily ignore external influences and
say that the decision was taken by the other two judges. This would mean that the
expenditure on judiciary will increase, but a society which wants impartiality in
judgements has the obligation to create conditions congenial for it. Justice is like
any other commodity, if one wants quality he should pay the price.
Lastly, judgements of lower courts are not at all taken for hearing on appeal
or revision in time on account of huge arrears in higher courts, so that judges are
less and less apprehensi ve of the opinion of the higher courts. They are in this way
tempted to act as they wish and they can easily yield to several influences.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Martin L. Friedland, Q.c. *
In 1982, Canada enacted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.! Its
interpretation should be of interest to jurists in India, just as the interpretation of
the Indian Constitution, adopted in 1949, should be of interest to Canadian
lawyers and judges. Unfortunately, however, neither country makes very much
use of the legal judgments and scholarship of the other.2
One of the main reasons for this is the inaccessibility of the law reports of the
other country. The only' Canadian law reports available to the Supreme Court of
India in New Delhi are the Canadian Supreme Court Reports, which only contain
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada. There are no Canadian provincial
reports in either the Supreme Court Library or the impressive library of the Indian
Law Institute. The Indian Law Institute does not have the Canada-wide series, the
Dominion Law Reports, and the library of the Supreme Court of India stopped
subscribing to that series ofreports in 1967. Neither the Canada-wide Canadian
Criminal Cases or Criminal Repo'rts are available in New Delhi.
The position in Canada is even worse. The Supreme Court of Canada stopped
subscribing to the All India Reporter in 1984. The reports are still available at
Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, but this is obviously not convenient for
somebody wishing to use the reports in Ottawa. It appears to me to be very odd
that the highest court in Canada does not have easy access to the reports of the
highest court of an important sister member of the Commonwealth.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has now been in operation for
10 years. It had a major impact on many areas of the law. In this paper I will
concentrate on the criminal law . First let me provide some background into the
criminal law in Canada.
..

1

2

Professor of Law, University of Toronto, Canada. This paper is based on a lecture given in
April, 1991 at the National Law School of India University. The author is grateful to Professor
N.R. Madhava Menon and his colleagues for their hospitality and stimulating discussions.
Set out in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, as enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), c. II.
But see, H.M. Seervai, Constitutional LaW of India, (3rd ed., 1984), Appendix I, "Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedom". See also, for example, the work of the Canadian scholar, Jamie
Cassels, "Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?"
37 American J. of Camp. Law 495,(1989) and "Bitter Knowledge, Vibrant Action: Reflections
on Law and S.ociety in Modern India" Wisconsin L. Rev. 109,[1991] reviewing Marc Galanter's,
Law and Society in Modern India (1989). For another excellent review of Galanter' s book, see
Cunningham, "Why American Lawyers Should Go to India: Retracing Galanter's Intellectual
Odyssey" 16 Law and Social Inquiry 777 (1991). Cassell, The Uncertain Promise of Law:
Lessons from Bhopal. Other Canadian legal scholars interested in India are Craig Scott and
Patrick Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Judicial Guaranties?" 141 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, (1992) forthcoming, and Brenda Cossmam and Ratna Kapur,
"Trespass, Impasse, Collaboration: Doing Research on Women's Rights in India" 2 Journal of
Human Justice 99 (1991).
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Unlike the Indian Constitution, which places Criminal Law and Procedure on
the concurrent list of powers,3 the British North America Act of 1867, now called
the Constitution
Act, 1867, placed Criminal Law and Procedure on the list of
exclusive federal legislative authority.4 The Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon,
expressly gave his approval of the arrangement in his speech on the British North
America Act in the House of Lords:5
To the Central Parliament will also be assigned the enactment of
criminal law . The administration
of it, indeed, is vested in the local
authorities;
but the power of general legislation is very properly
reserved for the Central Parliament. And in this I cannot but note a
wise departure from the system pursued in the United States, where
each State is competent to deal as it may please with its criminal
code, and where an offence may be visited with one penalty in the
State of New York, and with another in the State of Virginia. The
system here proposed is, I believe, a better and safer one.
The administration
of the Criminal Law is, however, givento the provinces.
Section 92 (14) of the B.N.A.
Act gives the provinces authority over "the
administration
of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance,
and organization
o.f provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction".
Moreover, the provinces were given the legislative power under section 92 (15)
of the Act to impose "punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing
any law of the province ... " There have been many instances where provincial
legislation has been struck down by the courts because it was essentially criminal
law. For example, in one case a city by-law dealing with prostitution was declared
void by the Supreme Court of Canada as" a colourable attempt to deal, not with
a public lluisance but with the evil of prostitution".~"Nevertheless,
the Supreme
Court of Canada has shown some reluctance to strike down provincial laws on the
ground that there is existing federal legislation unless there is a real conflict
between the two laws "in the sense that compliance with one law involves breach
of the other". 7 The end result, therefore, is perhaps not dissimilar to the Indian
Constitution
which provides in Article 254 that "If any provision of a law made
by the Legislature
of a S tate is repugnant to any provision of a law made by
Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provisions of an
existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List,
then, ... the law made by Parliament, ... shall prevail and the law made by the
Legislature of the'State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void", In both
countries, therefore; federal law prevails in the case of a conflict.

3
4
5
6
7

Seventh Schedule, List 111.
S. 91 (27), 30 and 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No.5.
Quoted in M. Friedland, "Criminal Justice and the Constitutional Division of Power in Canada"
A Century of Criminal Justice 48 (1984).
Westondorp v The Queen (1983) 2 C.C.c. (3rd) 330 at 338 (S.c.c.)
Per Martland 1. in Smith v The Queen (1960) 128 C.C.c. 145 at 168 (S.C.C.).
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Both countries also have a federal Criminal Code. Canada's Code was
enacted about .100 years ago -in 1892. It was based on the English Royal
Commissioners' Draft Code of 1879, whkh in turn was based on James Fitzjames
Stephen's Draft Code of 1878.8 Stephen is, of course, well known to an Indian
audience as the drafter of the Indian Evidence Act. The Canadian Code has been
subject to numerous revisions, including a major revision in the 1950s, but it is
still basically Stephen's Criminal Code, just as yours is basically still Thomas
Babington Macaulay's Indian Penal Code, produced in 1837, but not adopted
until 1860.9
In 1971 the Federal Government in Canada established the Law Reform
Commission of Canada. 10 The Minister of Justice stated in the House at the time
that "the Commission should have a complete rewriting of the criminal law as one
of its' first projects"Y For the next twenty years the Law Reform Commission
worked on this task. It produced over 30 highly regarded Reports to Parliament
and over 60 widely cited Working Papers. It was hoped that Canada would have
a new Criminal Code in 1992 or possibly in 1993, the centenary of the implementation
of the 1892 Code. A major report entitled "Recodifying Criminal Law" was
issued in 198812 and an initial report on criminal procedure, "Recodifying
Criminal Procedure", was released in 1991. 13
Unfortunately, in late February, 1992 the federal Minister of Finance
announced in his budget speech that the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
along with a number of other federal agencies, would be eliminated. The reason
given was the ~igh federal deficit and the state of the economy. They must be
serious because several weeks ago I received a parcel in the mail from the Law
Reform Commission in Ottawa which contained my picture - I was a former
Commissioner - - that had been hanging on the wall of the Commission's office.
Nobody is sure what will happen to the criminal law reform efforts. A
Parliamentary Subcommittee had started hearings on the General Part of the Code
several months before the axe fell on the Commission and it is said that they will
be continuing the hearings. But whether the present Government is still committed
to a new Criminal Code is uncertain.
The pattern in Canada is typical of other efforts to bring in new Codes.
England, for example, started producing a new Criminal Code in 1968; it has not
yet been enacted.14 The United States Government appointed a National Commission
8
9
10
II
12
13
14

See generally, Friedland, "Codification in the Commonwealth: Earlier Efforts" 2 Criminal
Law Forum 145 (1990).
See, S. Kadish, "Codifiers of the Criminal Law" 78 Columbia L. Rev. 1098 (1978).
R.S.C. 1970, c. 23, 1st Supp.
Hansard, February 23, "1970, at 3963.
Report 31 (a revised and enlarged edition of Report 30 (1986».
Report 33, volume I, Police Powers.
Law Commission Report No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989).
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on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws in 1966, and the Commissions's 1971 report
still has not been implemented.15
Criminal Codes inevitably touch on many
controversial issues: abortion, capital punishment, gun control, euthanasia, drugs,
wiretapping, and minimum sentences, to name just a few. Pressure groups,
dissatisfied witb particular provisions, often let tbeir views be known. As a result,
tbe package as a wbole usually lacks the enthusiastic endorsement that would
push a Government to find the will and the legislative time for its enactment.
Perhaps, in part, because of this lack of movement on the legislative front, the
courts in Canada h~ve taken on a major role in reforming the criminal law - both
the substantive law and the procedural law. They have done tbis tbrough the
vehicle of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Charter was enacted as part of the move to repatriate the Canadian
Constitution from England. One reason for its adoption was to fulfill Canada's
international obligations under the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rigbts, which had come into force in 1966 and to whicb
Canada became a signatory in 1976.16 Article 2.2 of the Covenant obligates eacb
signatory state "to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant".
The Charter has played a very important role in tbe development of the
criminal law - much greater than most observers would bave thought wben tbe
Charter was enacted. In the first few years after its enactment, over 25% of tbe
reported criminal cases in one series of reports, the Canadian Criminal Cases,
discussed tbe Cbarter.17 More recently, the number of reported criminal cases
discussing the Charter has risen to about 50%.18 Amongst tbe reported Supreme
Court of Canada criminal cases, the percentage is even higher.
Moreover, the Charter has brought us closer to American law - and further
removed from English law. One can see this in the increasing frequency in which
U.S. cases are dted in reported judgments. About 30% of the Supreme Court of
Canada criminal cases now cite U.S. cases, and in both civil and criminal cases
in all courts tbe percentage is increasing. Before the introduction of the Cbarter,
less than 3 % of all the cases in the Dominion Law Reports cited U.S. cases; 19 now
over 10% do SO.2D

15

19

See generally, Gainer, "Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Law Reform", I
Criminal L. Forum 99 (1989).
See Fisher, "The Human Rights Covenants and Canadian Law", Can. Yearbook of International
Law 42 (1977).
Friedland, "Criminal Justice and the Charter", A Century of Criminal Justice 205 (1984).
E.g .• 280 out of 535 reported cases in volumes 51-62 of the Canadian Criminal Cases. I am
indebted to Alan Baldachin, a second year student in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto,
for compiling this figure.
Supra n.17 at 206.
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In 1960, Canada had enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights,21 but it did not have
a major impact on the legal system. It was simply a Federal statute, not a
consti tutional document, and it applied only to the Federal government. Moreover,
it was not clear whether the Bill of Rights was merely a guide to interpretation or
whether it could be used to strike down legislation.
Until the enactment of the Charter, only one piece of legislation was ever
struck down under the Bill of Rights by the Supreme Court of Canada. That was
in the Drybones case22 in 1970, in which the Court struck down under an equality
section a provision of the Act making it an offence for a native person to be drunk
offa reserve. The Bill of Rights was not repealed when the Charter was introduced;
it is still operative. "Equality Rights" under the Charter did not come into force
for three years after the Charter came into effect and so the Bill of Rights was still
needed with rl(spect to Federal laws on equality issues during this period.
Moreover, the Charter does not specifically protect "property" in its "fundamental
justice" clause, whereas, the Canadian Bill of Rights includes "the right of the
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property".23
Like the Indian Constitution,24 the Charter now makes it clear that legislation
that violates the Charter can be struck down. Section 52 (1) of the Constitution
Act states that "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force or effect". Under that provision, the Supreme Court
of Canada has struck down a number of important criminal laws, such as the
Criminal Code sections dealing with constructive murder25 and abortion.26
One perhaps unique feature of the Canadian Charter is the ability of the
Federal Parliament or the legislature of a province under section 33 of the Charter
to "expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or the legislature, as the case may
be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding" a violation
of certain sections of the Charter. This declaration lasts up to five years and must
be subsequently reenacted every five years. Although it has been used by the
provinces on a few occasions, it has not yet been employed by the Federal
government.
Unlike the earlier Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter applies to the "Parliament
and government of Canada" as well as to the "legislature and government of each

21
22
23
24
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26
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R.S.C. 1970, Appendix 111.
Regina v Drybones [1970] 3 C.C.c. 335 (S.c.c.).
S. 1 (a).
Article 13(2).
Vaillancourt v The Queen (1987) 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (S.C.C.). Regina v Martineau (1990) 58
c.C.C (3d) 353 (S.C.c.); Sit v The Queen (1991) 66 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.c.c.).
Morgentaler et. al. v The Queen (1988) 37 C.C.C (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
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province".27 An interesting comparison can be made between the interpretation
of our section and Article 12 of the Constitution of India which provides that "the
State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and
Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities". In one case
deal ing with mandatory retirement in Universities, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that state funded Universities do not come within the provisions of the
Charter.28 My impression is that the Indian Constitution would in such cases
encompass more than ours.
One very important provision in our C'harter is section 1, which provides that
thc "Canadian Charter of Rights and, Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The section has
been utilized in a great many cases. The Courts have tended to give specific rights
a very expansive meaning and then have turned to section 1 to see if the impugned
legislation is such a "reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society". The Supreme Court has held that the
onus of proof is up.on the party seeking to uphold the limitation and the standard
is proof by a preponderance of probability. Not only must the legislative object
be a matter that is of substantial and pressing concern, but the means chosen have
to pass a proportionality test.29 An interesting comparison could be made
between section 1 of the Charter and Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, which
allows "reasonable restrictions" on the exercise of certain rights. My own view
is that the courts in Canada have relied too heavily on section 1. It would have
been better if more of the balancing of interests had been done under the specific
provisions of the Charter.
The Charter also contains a provision providing a remedy for the infringement
of a Charler right. Section 24 (1) provides that "Anyone whose rights or freedoms,
as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances".3o Then in subsection (2) there is a specific
provision with respect to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. The
common law in Canada is that evidence is admissible even if it is illegally
obtained.31 The American rule excludes illegally obtained evidence. The Charter
takes a position midway between the two and provides in section 24 (2) that if
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied rights guaranteed by
the Charter, "the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard
to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute". The test adopted by the Supreme Court
27
28
29

S. 32 (I).
McKinney v University of Guelph (1990) 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545 (S.C.C.).
See Regina v Oakes (1986) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S;C.C.)

30
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Compare Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, which only applies to the Supreme Court.
See, The Queen v Wray [197014 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.)
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of Canada in the Collins case in 1987 was: "Would the admission of the evidence
bring the administration of justice .into disrepute in the eyes of the reasonable
[person], dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances of the case?"32
Again, a comparison with the law in India would be interesting.
No doubt the most fascinating comparison that could be made between the
Canadian Charter and the Indian Constitution is in comparing the Canadian
section 7 and the Indian Article 21. (And a comparison with the American "due
process" provisions would make the study even more interesting). Each has
turned out to be a very expansive, important provision. Section 7 of the Charter
provides that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice". Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides that "No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law". "Article 21, if read literally". states one Indian
Commentator,33 is a colourless article and would be satisfied, the moment it is
established by the State that there is a law which provides a procedure which has
been followed by the impugned action". But, as the cases decided under Article
21 show, the Indian courts have used the article to require reasonable, fair and just
procedures. The article has been important in such areas as bail, delay, legal aid
and speedy trial.
The Canadian "fundamentaljustice" provision has also been given a surprisingly
- - surprising t<?me- - wide interpretation. In particular, the Supreme Court of
Canada has interpreted "fundamental justice" as including substantive, not just
procedural justice. In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act case,34 decided in 1985, the
Supreme Court dealt with the question whether it was a denial of fundamental
justice for the province of British Columbia to make it an absolute liability
offence punishable by a minimum seven days in jail to drive when one's license
is suspended. The Court said that it was, holding that fundamental justice is not
limited to procedure. "Whether any given principle may be said to be a principle
of fundamental justice within the meaning of section 7", the Court stated, "will
rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, rationale and essential role of that
principle within the judicial process and in our legal system, as it evolves". Mr.
Justice Lamer, now the Chief Justice, also stated in that case that "the principles
of fundamentaljustice are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system. They
do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the
judiciary as guardian of the justice system". The result of the case was that it was
held to be a denial of fundamental justice for an absolute liability offence to
provide for even the possibility of a person going to jail. So, the section was
32

33
34

Collins v The Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), adopting the test suggested by Professor
Yves-Marie Morissette in "The Exclusion of Evidence Under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do" (1984) 29 McGill LJ. 521 at 533.
P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India 26-27 (1991).
Reference Re Section 94 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985) 23 C.C.c. (3d) 2·89 (S.C.C.)
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struck down. In my opinion, the R.C. Motor Vehicle Act case will turn out to be
perhaps the most important case decided under the Charter in this century.35
The section was later used to strike down the Canadian constructive murder
The SU.preme Court held that a conviction for murder cannot rest on
anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight. "To
label and punish a person as a murderer who did not intend or foresee death",
Chief Justice Lamer stated in Regina v Martineau in 1990, "unnecessarily
stigmatizes and punishes those whose moral blameworthiness is not that of a
murderer" .
sections.36

10 the Morgentaler case,37 decided in 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the Canadian abortion provisions in the Criminal Code requiring approval of
a "therapeutic abortion committee" on a finding that the mother's "life or health"
would be endangered violated section 7 of the Charter in that the woman was
deprived of "security of the person" without being in accordance with tbe
"principles of fundamental justice". Tbe Court beld tbat tbe delay resulting from
the intervention of the therapeutic abortion committee brought about unnecessary
hardship and danger to the pregnant woman. The provision, the Court said, could
not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter.
Let us look at some of the other provisions of the Charter. Section 2 specifies
a number of fundamental freedoms:
2.

Everyone bas the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom
of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
This section is very similar to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution and comes
up in cases involving such issues as hate literature.38 I should also mention our
section 15, dealing with equality. Again, I will not say much about section 15
because it has not arisen in many criminal cases.
Section 15 provides as follows:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
35

'}7
38

Note that the Supreme Court has held that section 7 does not apply to corporations: Irwin Toy
Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney-General) (1989) 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.); other sections, such as
the right to a speedy trial under s. I I(b) do apply to corporations.See CIP Inc. v The Queen,
April, 1992 (S.C.C.) 36See cases cited supra n. 25.
Regina v Morgentaler et al (1988) 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.)
In Regina v Keegstra (1990) 61 C.C.C. (3d) I the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Criminal
Code hate literature section (section 319(2) and 3 (a)) under section 1 of the Charter.
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the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because
of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.
Note the similarity between this section and Articles 14-17 of the Indian
Constitution. I know from the discussion following my lecture at the National
Law School of India University that the equality provisions and particularly the
affirmative action provisions of the Indian Constitution are very controversial.
Once again, a fascinating comparison could be made between these aspects of the
Canadian and Indian Constitutions.
Let us now turn to the specific criminal law provisions in the Charter.
Needless to say, I will only touch on some of the highlights of the court decisions
under sections 8 to 14, the sections that relate specifically to the criminal law .
Section 8 provides that "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure". In Hunter v Southam, 39 decided in 1984, the Court adopted
the U.S. technique of requiring prior judicial authorization of searches. As Chief
Justice Dickson stated: "Where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, I would
hold that such authorization is a pre-condition for a valid search and seizure".
Later cases have carved exceptions from the general rule. For example, frisk
searches can be conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest. 40 I would have made
another exception when an electronically recorded conversation had the prior
consent of one of the participants, but the Supreme Court of Canada has held that
prior judicial authorization is required in such a case,41 and struck down
legislation exempting such conduct from the wiretapping requirements.
Sectior; 10 of the Charter contains a provision which expands the former law.
It provides that "Everyone has the right on arrest or detention .... to retain and
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right". This means that
upon detention the police have to specifically tell the accused that they are
entitled to counsel, and a recent case42 has held that the police must go further
and tell the accused about the legal aid system. Article 22 of the Indian Constitution
also gives a right to counsel, but does not require that the accused be informed of
the right. If the accused is not told about the right to counsel, then any statement
39
40
41
42

(1984) 14 c.c.c. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
Cloutier v Langlois (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S..C.C.)
Duarte v The Queen (1990) 53 C.C.C., (3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
Regina v Brydges (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.c.c.)
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made or evidence taken is likely to be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.
So, for example, a driver cannot be taken to police station for a breathalyser test
without being told about the right to counsel. Roadside screening tests for
impaired driving can be obtained, however, without referring to the right to
counsel. The Supreme Court upheld the latter practice under section 1 of the
Charter.43

In the recent case relating to legal aid that I just mentioned the Supreme Court
of Canada gave the police 30 days to conform with the ruling. This is a form of
prospective lawmaking, often engaged in by American courts, but very rarely by
English or Canadian courts.44 The S.upreme Court also adopted the technique in
a case where they struck down as a violation of fundamental justice under section
8 and an arbitrary detention under section 9 the Canadian practice of holding in
custody for indefinite periods persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
court gave the Federal Government six months to introduce a new scheme.45 In
the meantime, the existing legislation would be deemed to be valid.
Section 11 provides nine clauses relating to the criminal law . The section is
introduced with the words "Any person charged with an offence has the right.. .."
The meaning of these words comes up in the double jeopardy cases in which a
person is charged with a criminal offence after having been convicted of a
disciplinary offence, such as an internal police disciplinary charge46 or a prison
disciplinary offence.47 The Supreme Court of Canada has permitted the later
criminal charge on the ground that the earlier charge did nof come within the
meaning of the phrase "any person charged with an offence".
Subsection (b) of section 11 provides that a person has the right "to be tried
within a reasonable time". Following the American jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has held that the only remedy for unreasonable delay is to stay the charge.48
One would have thought, however, that other remedies should also be possible.49
Then in a much-criticized decision in 1990, Regina v Askov,50 the Supreme Court
appeared to many to say that a delay of 6 to 8 months after a committal for trial
was per se unreasonable. The Courts stated that "a period of delay in a range of
some six to eight months between committal and trial might be deemed to be the
outside limit of what is reasonable". As a result, perhaps 50,000 charges were

43
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Thomsen v The Queen (1988) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 411 (S.C.c.)
See, Friedland, "Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking" 24 U. of Toronto L.J. 170
(1974).
Regina v Swain (1991) 63 C.C.c. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.)
Wigglesworth v The Queen (1987) 37 C.C.c. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
Shubley v The Queen (1990) 52 C.C.c. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
Rahey v The Queen (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.c.J.
See generally, Friedland, "ControIling the Administrators of Criminal Justice" 31 Criminal
Law. Q. 280 (1988-90).
Regina v Askov (1990) 59 C.C.CZ.(3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
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dismissed or withdrawn in the province of Ontario alone. In the latest Supreme Court
of Canada judgment, however, the Supreme Court permitted a 141/2 month delay
between an accused's arrest and trial on an impaired driving charge and held that the
period of time mentioned in Askov was a guideline only and not a fixed limitation
period. 51 I note that the Indian courts have brought in speedy triai concepts under
Article 21 of the Constitution. An interesting comparison could be made between the
Indian and Canadian law on speedy trial, both as to the law and the practice.
Section II(c) of the Charter provides that a person charged with an offence
has the right "not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence". There is no surprise in this subsection. Article
20(3) of the Indian Constitution provides a similar safeguard. The Supreme Court
of Canada has gone further, however, and held that the right to remain silent at
any stage is a basic tenet of the law and thus comes within the concept of
fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter.52
Perhaps the subsection that has resulted in the greatest number of sections of
statutes being struck down is section 11(d) which gives an accused person the right
"to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal". The concept of "fair hearing"
gives great scope for the development of the law. In a recent decision, for example,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right of the Crown to have an unlimited
number of jurors stand aside was a violation of the "fair hearing" provision of the
Charter. Again, the Court gave Parliament 6 months to correct the process by new
legislation. 53 There are also numerous cases dealing with the meaning of a "public
hearing" and whether the hearing is "by an independent and impartial tribunal".
It is the first part of the section "to be presumed innocent", that has been the most
fertile, however. The courts have generally held that any shifting of the burden of
proof onto the accused will be a violation of the Charter.54 The real issue is whether
the reverse onlls can be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. In two recent cases
- - one dealing with the traditional reverse onus when an accused uses the defence
of insanity55 and another dealing with shifting the onus for regulatory offences 56 - the Supreme Court upheld the reverse onus provisions under section 1.
Other subsections deal with the right "not to be denied reasonable bail
without just cause" (s.ll(e)), the right to "trial by jury" where the offence has
a potential punishment of imprisonment for five years or more (s.11 (f) ), and the
right not to be convicted under a retroactive law (s.11 (g) ).57 The latter contains
an exception which permits retroactive legislation for offences tpat are "criminal
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Morin v The Queen, March, 1992 (S.C.c.).
Regina v Herbert (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
Rain v The Queen, January, 1992 (S.C.C.).
See e.g., Regina v. Oakes (1986) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321.
Chaulk v The Queen (1990) 62 C.C.c. (3d) 193 (S.c.c.).
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according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations". This allowed retroactive legislation relating to war criminals to be
introduced in Canada.
A further subsection deals with double jeopardy. Section 11(h) 58 provides
that a person has the right "if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for
it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried
or punished for it again". The word "finally" in the subsection has meant that
Crown appeals from acquittals continue to be legal in Canada. 59 The Supreme
Court has decided many double jeopardy cases in the past ten years, but it has
decided them under common law principles and has, for the most part, not
resorted to the Charter. In my view, cases should, if possible, be decided under
ordinary criminal law principles and not the Charter. The danger in constitutionalizing
the criminal law is that Parliament's ability to change the law and experiment
with new ideas becomes limited.
A further potentially important section is section 12 dealing with "cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment". The section has been used by the Supreme
Court of Canada to strike down a provision in the Narcotics Control Act mandating
a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment for importing narcotics.6o
Canada eliminated capital punishment for Criminal Code offences before the
enactment of the Charter and so there have not been cases directly dealing with
the issue. The question did come up, however, when a fugitive facing the death
penalty in the United States tried to block his extradition from Canada. By a 4 3 majority he was ordered extradited without requiring the Canadian Government
to seek an assuran<:e from the U.S. that the death penalty would not be imposed.61
This review of the Canadian Charter shows that the Charter has had a
profound and for the most part a beneficial effect on criminal law and procedure
in Canada. It has taken some of the harshness out of the criminal law and
introduced a number of new procedural rules. One drawback in so much activism
by the courts is that Parliament has taken a back-seat in the development of the
criminal law. The recent demise of the Law Reform Commission of Canada
attests to this shift in focus. Let us hope, however, that it does not signal the
abandonment of the pursuit of a new Criminal Code. Parliament is the body that
should have the primary role in the development of the criminal law . The recent
decisions by the Supreme Court in which they shift the ball back to Parliament to
come up in six months time with a solution to particular area of law is an
interesting sharing of responsibility between the two bodies.
I believe that the Canadian experience over the last 10 years under the
Charter should be of interest to Indian lawyers and jurists, just as the interpretation
of the Constitution of India should be of interest in Canada.
58
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60
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HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN COLONIAL INDIA

An Historical Perspective
Sitharamam Kakarala*

Introduction
The term 'human rights' is ofrecent origin. A small committee appointed by
the United Nation's to discuss and draft a Bill of Rights for the people of all
nations coined the term in 1947 after deliberations of more than two years. 1
However, as a concept human rights has more deeper historical roots. It is
basically a Western concept and traversed through a variety of trajectories in the
last millennium or so. The dynamics of the concept could be discerned from
different theories of 'Natural Rights' of medieval and modern times, declarations
of various revolutions and mass upheavals and in the contemporary sociopolitical discourse.2
The struggle or movement for human rights, as a conscious political activity,
has nearly a century of pedigree.3 The movement was born in France at the end
of nineteenth century with the formation of the French League of Rights of Man
and Citizens and spread to the other parts of Europe and America during the early
.•.
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decades of twentieth century.4 These movements emerged in the background of
an uneasy quiver of the credentials of the liberal democratic State in honouring
the democratic norms and process. For the State's violation of constitutional
norms was flagrant and a proper constitutional check to which the State could be
accountable was absent.5 The basic thrust of this movement was to monitor the
functioning of the State, or playing, i~ other words, a watch-dog role, with a view
to protect the democratic norms which the State promised to honour.
These Western organizations provided the necessary impetus for the birth of
similar organizations elsewhere. The Indian experience is no exception.6 The
present paper seeks to provide a broad historical outline of the emergence and
growth of human rights consciousness and movement in colonial India.
The Early Mid(lle Class Organizations
Rights consciousness in India was a corollary to the development of colonialism.
On the one hand, colonialism pauperized Indian people and plundered ruthlessly
the natural and human resources. Its policies helped sharpening the social
stratification. A middle class had emerged.? On the other hand, the 'Indian mind'
was introduced to the vibrant movements and discourses of the West. The liberal
discourse, American and French revolutions and other democratic movements
inspired a whole new generation of Indian intelligentsia.s
Both the entrenched aristocracy and the emerging middle class saw the idea
of rights more or less as a means to their own amelioration than fundamental
democratic values. Few individual reformers like Raja Rammohan Roy perceived
civil liberties as a democratic value, but could not overcome the limitations.
imposed by colonialism. Thus his struggle was primarily against the 'undemocratic'
Hindu (upper caste) society. He felt colonialism was afait accompli and sought
to perfect its rule in India.9 It was not liberty from the colonial state intervention
but equality with the colonial masters. It was not resistance to colonial plunder
but an appeal to absorb them into the process.
4
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The ambiguous legacy of Rammohan Roy subsequently acquired a striking
class character in the articulations of organized aristocracy and middle class. The
landed organizations raised the issues of civil rights but their emphasis was more
towards their interest. The Zamindars Association (1837), for instance, intended
to claim for the Indian people the same rights that Englishmen enjoy in England.
However its primary motive was to "agitate against the resumption of rent-free
lands".l0
The Bengal British India Society, established in 1843, also had a
similar objective. Its aim was to collect information about the true conditions of
the people of India and strive in a constitutional and peaceful manner for the
improvement of different classes and sections. The central thrust of the organization,
however, was "securing favourable land legislation."11
The British Indian Association (1851) which proclaimed its aim as advancing
the common interests of Great Britain and India, and ameliorating the condition
of the natives, opposed the extension of tenancy rights which the Government
sought to provide under the Bengal Tenancy Bill of 1882,12
The Indian Association articulated the demands of the advanced sections. For
instance, one of its major agitations, was against the age limit reduction for Civil
Service by the British. It opposed in 1878, the Arms Act and the Vernacular Press
Act - the former proscribed possession of arms by Indians, while the latter
imposed various restrictions including censorship on the native newspapers.13
The Poona Saravajanik Sabha also agitated against the Vernacular Press Act,
and the Bombay Forest Regulations. It had set up arbitration courts to settle
agrarian disputes. However, the Sabha' s special interest in the agrarian problem
of the Deccan appears to be aimed at winning a 'permanent settlement' of the land
revenue which would give Bombay "a version of the great European advantage
of forward looking and prosperous landlords, recruited from the professional
classes and higher castes."14
The rights consciousness was thus concomitant to the emergence of organized
landed gentry and middle class. They tended to perceive 'civil liberties' as
something that only advanced sections of the natives can enjoy and appreciate. In
other words, 'rights' became 'advantages' conferred by the colonial rule on the
advanced sections of India. This attitude was further consolidated by the leaders
of the Indian National Congress (INC) during the first three decades of its
practice.
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The Congress and Human Rights
The Indian National Congress (INC) had continued the ambiguous legacy of
rights consciousness. For the convenience of argument we analyze its approach under
two sub-headings: civil liberties and democratic rights. Civil liberties are those issues
which liberalism recognized as essential for any democratic order and democratic
rights are those issues related to human dignity, survival and exploitation etc.
Civil Liberties
In the realm of civil liberties, the INC had by and large unambiguous
approach. The INC demanded, for instance, introduction of representati ve institutions,
trial by jury, separation of powers of the executive and the judiciary, and
amending Criminal Procedure Code to separate the criminaljudicial powers from
the district magistrate etc. It had also raised the issue of repressive laws. It
opposed the Arms Act of 1878, which proscribed bearing of arms by any Indian
the Censorship Bill against the Press the Sedition Act of 1897 and the Indian
Penal Code Amendment Act IV of 1898 - a replica of the Vernacular Act of 1878.
It had also opposed the Regulation of Meetings Ordinance of 1907 Y However,
in certain issues moderates in INC adopted ambivalent strategy. They always had
a dilemma between civil liberties and the problem of 'law and order', and at times
did not hesitate to choose the latter. The striking examples are an Act passed in
190816 and the indian Press Act 1910.17
Democratic Rights
Unlike in the case of civil liberties, the INC had a relatively more ambiguous
approach with regard to the issues of democratic rights, often leaving room for conflicting
interpretations. Here we focus on two types of issues: agrarian and industrial legislations.
The INC had shown concern in the problems of the agrarian poor from the
beginning. IS It had opposed a legislation in Bengal which sought to empower the
15

This ordinance

16

This Act was enacted to proscribe seditious writings in newspapers, pamphlets and books, and
'incitement'
against the British rule. It empowered the authority to take judicial action against
the editor of any paper that published material which, in their view, was an incitement
to
rebellion. A district magistrate was empowered as the ultimate authority. The moderates hoping
that the Act was a 'temporary measure' to ensure 'law and order' had lent their support to it.
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Zamindars to collect and enhance rents. It was also critical of forest laws of the
British. The root cause, of backward agriculture and the destitution of the
agrarian poor according to INC, was the land revenue policy of the British.19
But the INC also unequivocally opposed certain legislations that sought to
ameliorate the conditions of the marginal and middle peasantry. An interesting
case was the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1899. Its aim was to close to urban
classes their opportunity and freedom to acquire rural estates in satisfaction of
their mortgage decrees. In a strict sense the Bill was intended to hit the 'interests
of both money lenders and their lawyer-supporters'. 20 The Congress vehemently
opposed the BIll and held that any restriction on the freedom of sale or mortgage·
of land is a reactionary step, although such freedom in past caused absentee
landlordism and indebtedness which ruined tenants.21
The INC's approach to the rights of the workers was equally ambiguous. In
1901, for instance, it passed a resolution expressing serious concern about the
conditions and wages of Assam tea plantation 'coolies'.n On the other hand, it
also opposed, despite the miserable state of the working class, certain pro-labour
legislations enacted by the colonial government. Leading members of INC
vehemently opposed the Factory Act of 1891, which sought to proscribe the·
employment of children below 7 years and restrict the working hours of children
of 7-12 years to 9 hours a day, as an unnecessary interference in the industrial
affairs and harmful to the production.23 It also opposed the Indian Mines Bill in
1900 which sought to restrict the employment of children and women in coal
mines.24

These contradicting views are explained in terms of competing interests in the
INC. That is, while the Factories Act and the Mines Bill adversely affected the
Indian industrialists, who were also members of INC, the owners of Assam tea
plantations were Europeans and it had no hesitation to express concern over
coolies' conditions. The following citation from a Presidential speech ofBadruddin
Tayabji is a succinct illustration of how deeply the interest of 'wealth and
education' perceived civil liberties and democratic rights as an effective means
to their self amelioration.
"Gentlemen, to be a true and sincere friend of the British Government,
it is necessary that one should be in a position to appreciate the great
blessings which that Government has conferred upon us, and I
should like to know who is in a better position to appreciate these
19
20
21
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blessings - the ignorant peasants or the educated natives? Who, for
instance, will better appreciate the advantage of good roads, railways,
telegraphs, good laws and impartial courts of justice? - The educated
nati ves or the ignorant peasants of this country? .... it is the educated
natives that are best qualified to judge, because it is we, who know
and are best able to appreciate, for instance, the blessings of the
right of public meeting, the liberty of action and of speech, and high
education which we enjoy under Grea! Briton ... "25

Rowlau Satyagraha
Rowlatt Satyagraha, the struggle against the Rowlatt Act,26 was a watershed
development in the history of human rights movement in India. It was significant
owing to the following reasons. First, it was the first mass campaign against ~he
colonial state on the issues of rights. The earlier approach of the INC was
primarily passing resolutions and writing petitions. Secondly, the masses who,
with few exceptions, were not mobilized in the national movement, took part in
big numbers. Thirdly, the focus of the civil liberties changed from 'equality' with
the British to opposition to the colonial state. And, finally. the Satyagraha and its
coercive suppression
by the government
ushered a new era of civil liberty
consciousness.
The INC not only had expressed its apprehension on the Rowlatt Act, but also
adopted the Declaration of Indian Rights in its Bombay special session in 1818.
S. Satyamurthy,
a Congress leader from Madras, wrote a treatise, Rights of
Citizens, in 1919. Ever since the INC appointed a sub-committee
to inquire into
the 'Amritsar
Massacre'27 and repression in Punjab, voluntary initiative
in
understanding truth regarding civil liberties violations acquired greater legitimacy.
Nevertheless
the ambiguous legacy by and large continued. Satyamurthy's
Rights of Citizens sought to provide an elaborate discussion and theoretical
justification
to the demands originally articulated in the Declaration of Rights
adopted by the INC. But his definition of 'repressive'
laws was rather absurd. He,
for instance, opposed the Sarada Act, which sought to proscribe
the child
marriages, as it was an 'infringement'
on the liberties of Indians. He went further
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in order to defy the law.28

Similarly, Gandhi's response to the Rowlatt Act was firm opposition.
He
declared in unequivocal terms that "I consider the Bill to be the unmistakable
symptom of the deep-seated disease in the governing body. It needs, therefore, to
be drastically treated." He further said that "arming the Government with power
out of all proportion to the situation sought to be dealt with, is a greater danger"
than the 'subterranean
violence', which is confined to "isolated and very small
parts of India and to a microscopic body of the people."29 Gandhi, however, had
a predominantly
moralistic viewpoint and did not hesitate to take a stand that
could go against the spirit of rights on the issues which he felt were amoral or not
in accordance
with the principles of non-violence.
For instance, during the
Rowlatt Satyagraha he preferred to be silent on the army atrocities in Gujarat and
tended to blame the people responsible for the incidents. He said that, "[I] placed
myself unreservedly
at the service of the authorities ... I deliberately
refrained
from narrating the acts done by the military under martial law. "30 After a few
days he reiterated that, "about 250 persons were wounded and more than 50
people killed. For this, I do not blame the Government.
We ourselves are to
blame. I want you all to learn this lesson."31
At a philosophical level, Gandhi was against the notion of 'rights' and emphasized
on 'duties', a concept closely related to the ancient and medieval Hindu notion of
Dharma. In his cable to H.G. Wells, who sought Gandhi's opinion on the charter
of 'Rights of Man' prepared by him, Gandhi unequivocally held that,
"Have carefully read your five ar.ticles, you will permit me to say
you are on the wrong track. I feel sure that I can draw up a better
charter ofrights than you have drawn up. But of what good will it be?
Who will become its guardian? If you mean propaganda or popular
education you have begun at the wrong end. I suggest theright way.
Begin with a charter of Duties of Man (both D and M capitals) and
I promise the rights will follow as spring follows winter. I write from
experience .. As a young man I began life by seeking to assert my
rights and I soon discovered I had none, not even over my wife, my
children, friends, companions and society and I find today that I
have greater rights, perhaps than any living man I know. If this is too
tall a claim then I say I do not know anyone who possesses greater
rights than 1."32
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Gandhi's ambivalent attitude towards untouchability perhaps could be understood
better in this background. He held that treating the untouchables as a "separate
class is a blot on India's forehead". He condemned it in an emotionally appealing
tone as "a sin, a great crime, and if Hinduism does not destroy this serpent when
there is yet time, it will be devoured by it". He however argued that the root of
this 'serpent' was not the caste system as it is only 'a hindrance, not a sin' .33 He
could not firmly hold even his limited appeal for a long time. For instance, when
the oppression against the untouchables continued, even in Gujarat, the stronghold
of the Mahatma, he could do little. In fact he toned down his appeal to the caste
Hindus as the fund flow from them had shrunk. 34 Gandhi perceived untouchability
as a problem that needs 'service', but not as a problem of social justice or civil
rights.35

The increasing mass orientation of the National Movement, significant
growth in the militant activities, and the emergence of new broadly left oriented
leadership in the INC brought a new focus on the issues of rights. Increasing
suppression of peaceful movements of INC, particularly the ruthless suppression
of the Civil Disobedience Movement, provided the necessary impetus for a fresh
look at the concept of civilliberties.36 Jayaprakash Narayan succinctly articulated
this spirit.
"The whole country is in a manner subject to it [arbitrary rule]; and
acts of high-handedness and unlawful victimization are not uncommon
elsewhere even in normal times. Most of these acts would not be
committed if the public were a little vigilant and if there were some
organization, the task of which was to bring such acts to light and
put up a fight against them, through the law-courts, the legislature,
the press and the platform". 37

Indian Civil Liberties Union
The idea of an organized public opinion against civil liberties violations was
mooted somewhere in 1935. The left-wing of the INC led by Jawaharlal Nehru,
Jayaprakash Narayan arid Rammanohar Lohia vigorously propagated for such an
33
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organized civil liberties movement. Soon after his journey to Europe in 1936,
Nehru prepared a circular proposing the formation of Indian Civil Liberties Union
and addressed it to about 150 'prominent individuals' of all political parties and
leading professionals. He proposed a non-party and non-sectarian union which
would be open to all individuals who believe in the value of civil liberty. The
foremost objective of the Union would be 'to collect data and give publicity to it' .38
While the overall response to the circular was encouraging, vehement criticism
came up from the Liberals. They opposed Nehru's proposition on two important
grounds. First, the methods of the Congress were responsible, according to the
Liberals, for the worsening scene of <;ivil liberties and with a change in its
methods, the restrictions on civil liberties were likely to be easily removed.39
Secondly, the Liberals were skeptical about the realization of a non-party, nonpartisan civil liberties union, for they felt that it might function as a 'second string
to the Congress bow' 40
.
The Indian Civil Liberties Union (ICLU) was formally inaugurated by Nehru
in Bombay on 24 August 1936. It was also the inaugural meeting of the Bombay
Civil Liberties Union (BCLU). A National Council was appointed but all the
office bearers were not elected. Rabindranath Tagore and Sarojini Naidu agreed
to be the Honorary President and President respectively on the request of Nehru.
Nehru tried for a suitable person for the General Secretary post. After some trials,
he appointed K.B. Menon, a Congress Socialist from Madras Presidency (part
belonging to the present-day Kerala). Subsequently branches were inaugurated
in Madras (MCLU), Calcutta (CCLU) and in Punjab.
Organization
There were two levels of organizationa~ structures. At one level, there was a
national body, viz. ICLU, and at the other level, there were regional bodies
broadly representing the then Presidencies, viz., Bombay, Madras and Bengal.
The ICLU had a 'National Council', consisting of 'prominent men', from all
corners of India representing various shades of political opinion. The National
Council was the supreme body of the organization and was virtually created by
Jawaharlal Nehru, for it was he who invited these 'prominent men' to come and
join the National Council.4t The immediate purposes of the National Council
were two. First, it was a body vested with the authority to elect an Executive
Committee and the office bearers for the day-to-day functioning of the organization.
Secondly, to br~ng more legitimacy to the idea and activity of·civilliberties,
to
strengthen the authenticity of its inquiries and data, and to effectively raise the
national and international public opinion.
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There was a 21 member Executive Committee, which included Jawaharlal
Nehru, Abdul Kaiam Azad, Sharat Bose, Ramananda Chattopadhyay,
Bhulabhai
Desai, Zakir Hussain, Amrit Kaur, Jayaprakash Narayan, Sardar Patel and Rajendra
Prasad.42 The Executive Committee was headed by an Honourable President, a
Chairperson
and a General Secretary.
The regional organizations also had Executive Committees, largely comprised
of individuals voluntarily joined. But we do not know much about the relations
between the regional and the national organizations,
and the National Council
and the Executive of the ICLU. It is not clear as to whether the regional
organizations
functioned under the umbrella of the ICLU or independently.
But
what seems to be certain is that there was some communications
between the
regional

organizations

and the national

body about their activities.

Ideology
As such there are no 'documents' that can authentically support the perspective
of the ICLU or the regional organizations.
There is no data about the constitution
or declaration of objectives or a manifesto of ICLU. Nevertheless
it could be
discerned from the available data that it was a non-party organization,
sought to
monitor civil liberties violations and mobilize the enlightened public opinion
through the Press, public meetings etc. The following citation from Nehru may
suggest the bra.ad conceptual understandings
of the ICLU.
"Every government tends to resent forcible criticism and opposition,
and a democracy can only function properly if public opinion
constantly checks government and prevents it from becoming too
autocratic. In India where there is no democracy, the government is
essentially autocratic and the need for preventing it from indulging
in the worst excesses is thus all the greater. Obviously this does not
and must not mean approval of the methods of any political party.
Nor does it mean that the Congress or any group should be allowed
by government to carryon revolutionary activities by civil disobedience
without check or hindrance.
But there are certain fundamental
principles governing civil liberties which apply whatever the activities
of political parties might be .... "43

Leadership
In a formal sense, the ICLU had many senior national leaders, prominent
individuals
as its activists. Rabindranath
Tagore was its Honorary President.
Sarojini Naidu was the Chairperson. The Executive Committee had such prominent
individuals as Moulana Azad, Sardar Patel, Jayaprakash Narayan and Rajendra
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Prasad. K.B. Menon, a Congress member and associated with the All India
States' Peoples Movement, was the General Secretary. But little is known about
their efforts in building the ICLU or the civil liberties movement.
Rabindranath Tagore, at the dusk of his life, fought for the causes of civil
liberties in his own style. He was one of the first persons to respond to the suicides
of Bengal Detenus44. He wrote poetry on civilliberties.45 Going much ahead of
many of his contemporaries, he actively supported the rights of the working
class.46
Writing about the role of ICLU and his association with it, Tagore observed
that,
"by accepting Presidentship of the Indian Council of Civil Liberties,
I have publicly associated myself with organized effort to further
democratic ideals. for our people. The European and the Far Eastern
Wars, as well as the complications in the Indian situation, have
made our task more imperative."47
However, J awaharlal Nehru was the true creator of the organizational structures
and perspective of the ICLU. Nehru was'a charismatic leader. Both his charisma
and conviction in the value of civil liberties were responsible for the emergence
of the ICLU. From mooting the idea to the creation of organizational structures,
he played a significant role.48 He was instrumental in convincing Rabindranath
Tagore and Sarojini Naidu to join the ICLU. He tried to find a 'suitable' General
Secretary, tried to convince Krishna Menon, but eventually appointed K.B.
Menon. He repeatedly struggled to raise funds to save ICLU from the 'closure' .49
In addition to this organizational work, he has fille articulation of the concept
of civil liberties.
"The existence of civil liberties is generally considered to be essential
for the development of every kind of national activity - political,
cultural, social and economic. With their suppression all these
activities suffer. In countries with a democratic background the
greatest value is therefore attached to civil liberty and people of the
most diverse and mutually hostile opinions join together in a common
attempt to protect this foundation of all liberty and activity".5o
Nehru, however, retained the characteristic ambivalence of his times on the
44
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issues of civil liberties. In the times of conflicting situations between tbe interests,
ofINC and civil liberties, he was often overwhelmed by the 'needs' of the former.
The weak organizational structures of the ICLU, and its virtual dependence upon
him and his popularity for 'survival', brought certain deeper implications, for
whose details we shall return to shortly. He thus became a principal reason for
both the emergence and decline of the ICLU.
Mobilization
Despite its formal inauguration in August 1936, the ICLU had begun its true
functioning in the early 1937, i.e. more or less simultaneously with the new
Provincial Governments.51 This in a way imposed certain limitations in tbe
functioning of the organization. For it had to focus, on tbe one band, on the
violations of civil liberties under the colonial state in general, and, on the other
hand, to be equally vigilant in the provinces, including tbe ones ruled by the
Congress.
The primary activity of ICLU was gathering of information about violations
of civil liberties particularly regarding the condition of prisoners and detenus,
proscriptions of literature, police brutalities and restrictions on tbe Press. It is not
very clear as to whether it was done through investigations, although some
scholars claimed. 52 But it seems to have depended to a great extent on the reports
of the vernacular press and the support of local party network. Based on such
'compiled facts', it prepared appeals'and sent them to prominent people and the
national and international Press in order to mobilize favourable opinion. It is
difficult, and probably, wrong, to assume that the ICLU had done anything
significant other than this. It had organized, in the later days, certain public
meetings and processions. 53 This was one reason probably that certain contemporary
activists were not enthusiastic in their assessment of its activities.54
The poor m9bilization programmes however should not relegate the historical
significance of the ICLU, i.e., the larger consciousness it created. The formation
of ICLU provided the necessary impetus for a discourse on the concept and
inspired many intellectuals to take up the issue. The following are certain
examples. Rammanohar Lohia wrote Struggle for Civil Liberties, the most
popular hand-book on the topic during the late thirties. The popularity of the book
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could be gauged from the intention of the British Government to proscribe it.55
Setalvad, a prominent activist of the Bombay Civil Liberties Union, wrote War
and Civil Liberties. The impact was, however, not confined to the individuals
associated with the organization alone., The treatise of M. Venkatarangaiah, a
professor of political science in Andhra University, The Fundamental Rights of
Man and Citizens, is the case in point. Suravaram Pratapa Reddy, the editor of
Golkonda, a Telugu fortnightly from Hyderabad, enthusiastically responded to
the iss ue of ci villiberties in his paper. 56 He also wrote a small booklet, The Rig hts
of Citizens, in Telugu.
Decline of the ICLU
The INC participated in the elections to the Provincial governments in 1937.
It emphatically promised protection of civil liberties in the election manifesto.
Despite high claims of its leaders, the situation remained grim in the early period
of the Provincial Governments. The 'High Command', therefore, passed resolutions
throughout the year asking the Congress Governments to implement the election
manifesto. 57 The Congress Ministries subsequently released many of the political
prisoners, relaxed ban orders on books, press securities were returned and certain
repressive laws were repealed.58
These changes however did not account to the extent of Nehru's tall claims,
when he observed that, "A fundamental change has been that now the poorest
peasant feels great burden removed, and knows that the police cannot harass him,
and, generally, he can say and do what he likes."59 Although the Congress
Governments had shown relatively better respect for civil liberties, it did not
fundamentally change the situation. The Civil and democratic rights of the
working masses, for instance, remained'a far cry. The Congress Socialist Party
warned against the persecution of workers and the Trade Union Movement by the
Congress Ministries which, it exhorted, was a "sure method of inviting disaster" .60
Me. Annapurnaiah, himselr"a Congress member, and an MLA in Madras province,
severely criticized Rajagopalachari's Government, for it treated the election
manifesto as a 'scrap of paper' ,6t
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The practical problems of state management, particularly under the supervision
of a colonial state, force.d the INC to make many compromises. As the popular
protest increased, the attitude of the Congress leaders towards civil liberties had
also undergone conspicuous change.
For instance Nehru himself was deeply unhappy with the approach of ICLU
towards Bombay Government, where Congress was in power. When the ICLU
passed a resolution against the arrest of some labour leaders, Sarojini Naidu
resigned from the Chairpersons hip of the union. Responding to this Nehru, in a
private letter to K.B. Menon, exhorted him not to be 'anti-Congress'.
"It seems to me that certain individuals and groups who are notoriously
anti-Congress are trying to exploit the situation to their own advantage.
Under these circumstances it is not desirable for you to associate
yourself .with these elements in public demonstrations. This would
have been so at any time but, in view of the crisis that has developed,
this is peculiarly necessary" .62
Similarly, K.M. Munshi, the then Home Minister of Bombay clearly stated
that, "You cannot have civil liberty in an atmosphere surcharged with violence
and excitement such as a breach of the peace."63 The changing tone and emphasis
of Congress on civil liberties is evident. Before the election, the tone and concept
were 'radical'. With the formation of ministries its approach had become rather
willy nilly. It had taken up certain important measures to restore civil liberties but
implemented them half-heartedly.
This transformation in the attitude of the INC leaders threatened the very
s~rvival of the ICLU. Most of the INC leaders, on whose help tQe ICLU was
deeply dependent, either gradually withdrew, as in the case of Sarojini Naidu, or
became uninterested like Nehru. Some of the Congress Socialists and Liberals
said to have functioned with ICLU .. We however know very little about their
efforts. By the time of Quit India Movement in 1942, the Human Rights Movement
in Colonial India reached its moribund state. It was only after the independence,
when the Indian government had shown a coercive approach to social turbulence64
that there were efforts of revival of the movement.

62

10 SWJN at 445.

63
64

Supra n.48 at 292.
In the wake of widespread communal tensions and riots, the Government banned both the
rightist and leftist organizations including the CPI and RSS and arrested hundreds of activists
and sympathizers. A number of concerned individuals tried to revive the Human Rights
Mov~ment. An All-India convention was held in Bombay in 1948 and all the three metropolitan
civil liberties committees in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were revived. They too however
could function for only a few years.

(1994) 6 NLSJ lOon

CRISIS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF TERMINATION
DISPUTES: A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURES AND WORKING

OF LABOUR COURTS AT BANGALORE
V. Nagaraj*

In a laissez-faire State, where freedom of contract prevailed in the area of
employment relations, employers could employ workmen according. to their
terms and conditions, and dispense with their services arbitrarily. Workmen had
no rights beyond the terms of contract. The change in the philosophy of the State
and the development of Labour Jurisprudence have eroded most of the prerogatives
of the employer in hiring and firing workmen. The terminated workmen now have
the right to challenge the termination. The Labour Courts established under the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 as specialised bodies are conferred with wide
powers unknown to the common law system. They have the duty to see whether
~heprinciples of Natural Justice are followed while taking disciplinary action and
whether the punishment inflicted is in proportion to the misconduct. They can
also look into the bonafides of the employer's action in inflicting the punishment.
The Labour Courts have powers to reinstate the terminated workman, if necessary
with back wages and other consequential benefits.
The Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals are kept out of the rigid procedural
laws like Civil Ptocedure Code and Evidence Act, except for the purpose of
conferring some powers of Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code.! Further
the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal are required to evolve their own
procedures for deciding an Industrial dispute. The purpose is to mitigate the
rig our and technicalities of procedural law for achieving expeditious settlement
of disputes.
But the substantive safeguards evolved over a period of time to protect the
workmen from arbitrary acts of the employer are being eroded because of
inordinate delay and crisis in the working of Labour Courts. Even a patently
illegal order of termination could be litigated upon for a decade before it is set
aside.
Among the disputes over which labour court has jurisdiction, termination
dispute is an important one.2 Majority of the disputes registered before the Labour
Court are termination disputes. The Industrial Disputes Act, expects that these
disputes should be disposed off within a maximum period of three months.3 The
*
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rules made under the Act also supplement this expectation. But, in reality,
termination disputes have been pending for periods exceeding eight years. Only
very marginal number of cases are disposed off within the stipulated period of three
months and such disposals are either out of court settlements or ex-parte decisions.
The charts 1, lA, 1B indicate the type of cases registered before the three
Labour Courts at Bangalore and also the percentage of termination disputes to the
total disputes.
The charts 2, 2A, 2B reflect the time taken for disposal of 'Termination
Disputes' in the selected three labour courts. More than 80% of the cases have
taken beyond one year and often extend upto a decade or more. The writ petitions
filed before the High Courts against the awards of the Labour Courts take another
of about 8-10 years for disposa1.4 If a special leave petition is admitted by the
Supreme Court there is further delay.
Delay is a common feature of our judicial system. Pendency of labour disputes
in general and termination disputes in particular for long period of time leads to
frustration among workers and indiscipline in Industry. While a termination dispute
is pending before labour court for 8-10 years a number of disturbing questions arise:
How will such a workman and his faII).ilysurvive in the present day of large scale
unemployment? Will it not lead to social deviance of that workman and his family?
If a Labour Court orders re-instatement after about eight years, which happens in a
good number of cases, how should the employer accomodate him? Will it not lead
to multiplicity ofIndustrial disputes? When a workman is re-instated generally back
wages from the date of illegal termination are awarded. This is wages for no work,
which adds to the cost of production and inflation.
The above .may be the reasons as to why the legislators in their wisdom
intended that termination disputes should be disposed off within a maximum
period of three months. The expectations of the law must be wholly fulfilled
otherwise, law itself becomes an instrument of further exploitation. Keeping
these in mind, this study is intended to find out the reasons for delay and suggest
the necessary reforms for efficient disposal of termination disputes. The involuntary
determination of the workman's contract of employment is called 'termination
dispute' for the purpose of this article.

The Termination dispute
Prior to 1965 a termination dispute in order to be an Industrial Dispute was
to be espoused by a Trade union or a substantial number of workmen of the
industrial establishment. In 1965 the Central amendment to the Industrial Disputes
Act made a termination dispute as deemed Industrial dispute. Like any industrial
dispute ithas to go through conciliation. On failure of conciliation the appropriate
government may refer the dispute fot adjudication.5
4

5

122 lAw Commission Report.
Sec. 10 (I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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The Government of Karnataka having taken note of the futile exercise of
conciliation process in termination disputes has amended the Industrial Disputes
Act and made provision for workman to approach the Labour Court directly in case
of termination dispute. 6 The Central Government has not made any such amendment.
In the study out of the 2008 termination disputes disposed during the period
1981-90 in the three Labour Courts of Bangalore, 10% of the cases were selected
through stratified random sampling. Out of these 200 cases only 142 case files
could be retrieved. From these files the following aspects were studied - stages
where delay has been occurring, the procedure followed, adjournments, time
taken at different stages of the case, etc.
In the study sample of 142 disposed cases, 36 were compromise settlements,
32 were decided ex-parte (15 workmen and 17 Management), and 74 cases were
actually contested. In the 74 contested cases oral evidence was led in 39 cases,
others were decided based on the documents available and arguments.
The stages where delay has been occurring are classified as follows:
1. Filing of Pleadings: The rules under Industrial Disputes Act expect that
the. filing of pleadings must be completed within one month from the date of
reference of the termination dispute. After the Karnataka State amendment, the
time must be even less in Karnataka. The rule is observed more in breach than in
practice. The table provided speaks of the time taken for filing pleadings:

--

29
16cases
Between
2-4
4-6
8-10
10-12
1-2
9.2%
20.4%
22.5%
5.6%
11.3%
1-4%
15.5%
14.1%
months
months
8213
22
32
cases
20
More
than6~8
month
Time
onemonths
year
taken for filing pleadings
- categorisation:
142Upto
casesone

1

2. Filing documents: The parties are expected to file relevant documents
along with their pleadings.s Unfortunately in termination disputes, this has
become a confused process.
6
7
8

Sec. 10 (40-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Karnataka Act No.5 of 1988, the l.D.
(Karnataka Amendment) Act 1987, notified in the Karnataka Gazette on 7.4. I988.
Rule 10-B (I) and (2) of the Mysore rules and Rule 10-B 1-5 of the Central rules.
Rule 10-B 1-5 of the Central Rules, Order 7 rule 4 and Order 8 rule I of the Civil Procedure Code.

6-8
10-12
months
4-6
2-4
1-2
8-10
months
months
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In the study sample, in 40 cases documents were filed along with pleadings,
in 35 cases time was sought for production of documents, in 29 cases there were
no documents and in 38 cases there were no pleadings of one or the other party.
In the cases where time was sought for productioll of documents, time taken is as
follows:

1

Upto one month

Nil
2610
112cases
case
cases

Beyond one year

3 cases

2
3
4
5

6
7

8

In a particular case the time taken was 2 years 4 months and 7 days. During
this period there were 44 adjournments.
3. Validity of Domestic Enquiry: When a workman challenges the termination
he invariably challenges the fairness of domestic enquiry conducted. The Labour
Court tries this question as a preliminary issue. If the domestic enquiry is held to
be bad, it is as if the employer has not conducted any domestic enquiry.
In the study sample of 142 cases, domestic enquiry was conducted in 56 cases.
In all these, the validity of domestic enquiry was questioned. In 24 cases the
domestic enquiry was conceded as fair. This was done at different stages in
different cases. In some cases it was at the stage of arguments on the fairness of
domestic enquiry. In 25 cases the domestic enquiry was set aside. Only in five
cases domestic enquiry was held to be fair.
Average time spent at the stage of adjudicating the validity of domestic
enquiry:
1
56
41.3
(0-187)
481
(0-1535 days)
adjournments
disposal
215
1213days
days(438-2926days)
(0-1218
days)
Average
No.
of cases
total
totalwhere
time
time
evidence
for
for
domestic
disposal
adjudicating
onfor
enquiry
the
conducted
validity
Average
time
for
arguments
on
266
(0-702
of
domestic
enquiry
domestic
enquiry
and chall~nged.
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Distribution of adjournments on
adjudicating the validity of domestic enquiry
7.6
P.O.
0.98

Evidence

W

M

1.6

5.11

Arguments

6.4

W

M

1.57

3.86

P.O.
0.98

4. Adjudication on Merits: This stage could be called as the final stage of a
termination dispute before Labour Court. The question of victimization is adjudicated
at this stage. In the study sample, five cases were disposed off within 90 days and
none of them were adjudicated, they were compromised even before evidence was
recorded.ll cases were disposed between 91-180 days, out of which evidence
was led only in one case, another eleven cases were disposed between 181-365
days. The remaining 115 cases have taken more than one year.
Average time at the stage of Adjudication on Merits:

1. Total time for disposal

1183.7 days (0-3385 days)

2.

Total time for adjudication

492.7 days (0-2579 days)

3.

Time for evidence

386.8 days (0-2316 days)

4

Time for arguments

105.9 days (0-1336 days)

5

Average total adjournments for disposal

41.21 days (0-187 days)

6.

Average adjournments for adjudication on merits 21.24 days (0-163 days)

7.
Distribution of adjournments on merits
Evidence
15.7
Arguments
W
M
P.O
W
3.17
10.91
1.70
1.57

5. Miscellaneous
the Case:

Applications

5.47

M

P.O.

3.19

0.70

for recalling the Awards and Rehearing

This is yet another stage not contemplated in the Statute but evolved in the
process of adjudication. This is indiscriminately applied to perpetuate delay and
duplication of work in the Labour Courts. When a Labour Court decides an
Industrial dispute ex-parte, the party absent earlier now files miscellaneous
application for recalling the award and re-hearing the dispute. Such applications
are generally allowed. In the study sample there were six such instances. The
awards are re-called even after sending them to the appropriate government.
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1985
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1984
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11
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N.A. Not Available.

industrial

of awards

The next stage where delay occurs in disposal of termination disputes is the
stage of publication of awards by the appropriate government. The Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 casts a duty on the appropriate government to publish the
awards within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate
government.9 Though this stage of delay is not directly connected with the Labour
Court procedures, it is nevertheless very much related to the overall delay in the
disposal of a termination dispute. The proceedings before a Labour Court are
deemed to be concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable.lo
An award becomes
publication. 11

enforceable

on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its

The awards are normally published in the Official Gazette of the government
concerned. In Karnataka till the year .1986 awards were published in the Official
Gazette. This was causing inordinate delay, ranging upto few years. In order to
expedite the publication of awards, in the year 1986, the government of Karnataka
through a notification has changed the mode of publication of awards.12 After this
the awards are published on the notice board of the Labour Commissioner's
office
at Bangalore. It may be noted that the Labour Commissioner's
office publishes
only the reference number of the award and names of parties to the award. The
9
10
11
12

Sec. 17 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Sec. 20 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Sec. 17· A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
No. SWL 205 LLA 84, dt. 2.1.1986.
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parties to the dispute will have to approach the concerned Labour Court for
obtaining copies of the award. Inspite of amending the mode of publication in
Karnataka, the study reveals that it takes on an average about three months for an
award to be published.
Causes for delay in the adjudication of Termination Disputes
The industrial adjudication bodies are conceived as specialised bodies for
efficient disposal of Industrial disputes. But in reality it has not been so. Persons
without any knowledge or experience in Labour laws are being appointed as
Presiding officers of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals. The 122nd Law
Commission Report has observed that the qualifications prescribed for the
Presiding officer of a labour court are such as would almost make it an impelling
necessity to select persons from civil judiciary, and therein lies the potentiality
for spill over of all the technicalities, dilatoriness and formal approach quite
evident in administration of Civil Justice.13 Obviously results are different from
what is expected and the consequences are disastrous.
In the State of Karnataka the senior District and Sessions Judges are appointed
as Presiding Officers of Labour Courts. There are no training facilities for them.
It is only after taking charge as Presiding Officer, that they start learning Labour
legislations. There are hardly any incentives for this. They become Presiding
officers of labour adjudication bodies not out of their interest but by compulsion
of circumstances. Some are appointed just before their retirement.
They are not equipped to regulate the proceedings properly. Frequent transfers
add to this malady. Further there will be considerable time lapse between the
transfer of a Presiding officer and appointing a successor to that post.
Regarding the contribution of advocates and parties to the delay, both parties
to the dispute seem to be contributing to the delay, though it may not be correct
to generalise.
The incentive for the Management is to keep the probable
troublesome workers away and to harass them. The incentive for workmen is the
back wages.
Very frequently the excuse given for the delay is that there are too many cases
before the labour courts and with so much of a backlog it is very difficult to
dispose the cases in time. This seems to be a lame excuse if one looks at the work
culture of Labour Courts. To know the work culture, the working of Labour
Courts was observed for a period of 15 days continuously and the data tabulated
as follows:

13

122, Law Commission Report p.2.

for
lack
of time
cases
heard
nil
nil
cases
adjourned
Average
64.34
67.1
68.67
64.67
0.33
83.75
Average
Average
cases
Average
cases
posted
adjourned
National
1.57
161.1
Average
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Additional Labour Court Presiding Officer - vacant during the period of
observation.
Court sitting hours

11 A.M. to 2 P.M.
3 P.M. to 5 P.M.

i.e. it is supposed to work for 300 minutes per day.
Rate of filing and disposal for the period July 91 to December
*-59
November
December
Cases!
in
MonthsDifference
21.8
82618
10
18
August
3*
September
1009
8123
3247950
3*
25
2310
15
130As
18
14
17.3
October
7.8
11.3
onsix
1st 28.2
Months
4*
26
21
3113
12
+78
2285
27
17
18
26
1847
769
22
53
12
20.3
+25
19
Balance
July
opening
F
Filing
iling
Filing

Q1:

as on 31st
December
91 months
Average

*No Presiding Officer and the indicated disposal is Compromise Settlements.

The data reveals that the average rate of filing of cases is less than 30 per
month. The sample of disposed cases selected for study revealed that 25.4% of
cases were compromise settlements; 22.54% of the cases were decided ex-parte
and the contested cases were only 52%. The Labour Court procedures are
supposed to be summary procedures. The reason for the delay could be the work
culture and the non-regulation of the Labour Court procedures by the Presiding
officers.
In the hands of the ill equipped Presiding Officers, Section 11 (1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests vast discretionary powers with regard to the
procedures to be followed. This serves no purpose.
The interpretation given to section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act in
Workmen
14

of Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Ltd.

(1973) 1 LLJ 278 (SC).

v

The Management,14
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has made the conducting of domestic enquiry before dismissal redundant. The
decisions of the Supreme Court in Maheswari v Delhi Administration and Verma
v Mahesh Chandra15 further reiterate tbe redundancy of the domestic enquiry. As
a result, the disputes where domestk enquiry is conducted take more time for
disposal than the cases where no domestic enquiry has been conducted. This is
because invariably domestic enquiry will be challenged as a preliminary
issue
and labour court will have to give findings on it.
Section 36 (4) of the Industrial Disputes Act has not been effectively used.
Advocates have been appearing before Labour Courts in almost all cases. Another
factor which has been contributing to the delay is the restoration of proceedings
by setting aside ex-parte awards. This not only causes delay but duplication of
work. The Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v The Central Government
Industrial Tribunal, 16 has held that where a party is prevented from appearing at
the hearing due to 'sufficient cause' and is faced with an ex-parte award, such an
award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances the Tribunal has not only the
power but also the duty to set aside the ex-parte award and direct the matter to be
heard afresh.
What is this sufficient cause? The study reveals that series of adjournments
are sought by the parties and while granting adjournments
no reasons are
recorded. The Presiding officers are reluctant to proceed ex-parte.
Publication of awards by the appropriate government has been contributing
to the delay. There appears to be no logic behind publication
of awards in
termination
disputes, especially when a termination dispute can go before the
Labour Court directly.

Suggestions for overcoming the problem of delay
The suggestion~ are two-fold. Suggestions which do not require any amendments
to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and suggestions which require amendments.
Suggestions

which do not require any amendments

are-

1.

The Presiding Officer is the pivot around which the efficiency of Labour
Courts and Industrial Tribunals revolve. It is suggested that the presiding
officers of these bodies are selected from among the judicial officers who
are around the age group of 40 years and who have put in about seven years
of service as judicial officers. The presiding officers so appointed must be
given compulsory training {or a period of six months before they work as
presiding officers. While framing the curriculum for training the recommendations
of the 122nd Law Commission report, the constitutional
goals and the new
economic policy must be kept in mind.

15
16

(1983) Lab. I.c. 1629 SC and 1483 SC
(1981) Lab. I.C. 155 sc.
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2.

The presiding officers so appointed and trained must continue in the Labour
Judiciary for the rest of their service. There must be good promotional
avenues and other attractive facilities created in the Labour Judicial Service.

3.

To keep these presiding officers well informed about the developments
taking place, there must be refresher courses arranged periodically. Streamlining
the appointment and training of judicial officers goes a long way in solving
the problem of delay and improving efficiency.

4.

The validity of the domestic enquiry will have to be decided based on the
records made available and arguments only. The procedure of recording oral
evidence must end.

5.

In cases where domestic enquiry is set aside or where no domestic enquiry
is held interim relief must be awarded. This is subject to the condition that
parties will not delay the proceedings. If the workman is causing delay, tbe
interim relief awarded may be withdrawn and if management
is causing
delay the quantum of interim relief may be increased. In doing so the Labour
Court will be acting within the powers it has under the Industrial Disputes
Act.!?

6.

The presiding officers should properly regulate the proceedings and adjournments
should not be granted indiscriminately.
They can follow the minimum
principles of Natural Justice.

7.

The termination disputes should ordinarily be decided based on the pleadings,
documents and oral arguments. Only in complicated cases oral evidence
may be allowed. At present recording of oral evidence is done mechanically.

8.

In order to clear the backlog of cases Lok Adalats will have to be arranged
at frequent intervaJs. Once the backlog is cleared, if each presiding officer
can dispose off around 30 cases per month, then there will not be any delay
or piling up of cases.

9.

The Presiding officers should exercise the power under Section 36 (4) of the
1.D. Act. ~hile permitting advocates to represent parties, conditions will
have to be imposed to the effect that they will conduct the cases without
delay.

Suggestions
requiring Amendments:
'Few amendments
Disputes Act, 1947 are required to bring about uniformity
efficiency.
1.

17

to the Industrial
and improve the

The law requiring publication
of awards must be taken out of the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The State of West Bengal has already
brought about such an amendment.

Sec. 19 (4) and 11(1). The power to order interim relief has been recognised by the Supreme
Court in Hotel Imperial v Hotel Workers Union. AIR 1959 SC 1342.
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2.

The proviso to Sec. ll-A of the Industrial Disputes Act should be
clarified in the light of the Supreme Court decisions. The decision in
Workmen of Fire Stone case; 18 has negatived the effect of the proviso
and has made the conducting of domestic enquiry redundant.

3.

An Industrial Relations Commission must be set up at the State level at
least.19 The IRC at the state lev.el must have appellate jurisdiction
over
the awards of Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal. The existing writ
jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 should be taken out. The IRC in
its supervisory capacity must have power to review certain percentage
of decisions given by Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals. This is
very important in the light of wide discretionary
powers they have
under the Industrial Disputes Act.

12

18

Supra, n. 14.

19

The National Commission on Labour 1969, 'the Sanet .Mehta Committee Report 1982', the
122nd Law Commission Report have voiced their views in favour of an Industrial Relations
Commission at the State level as well as at the centre. The Trade Unions and Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Bill, 1988 contemplated creating an Industrial Relations Commission at the State
as well as Centre.
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FEDERALISM AND ALL-INDIA SERVICES - AN EVALVA TION
Narayana *
Provision for the All-India Services as an integral part of the Indian federal
system, ha.s prompted many critics, commentators
and publicists to assail the
scope and character of the Indian federal system,. They have looked at the AllIndia Services from a very narrow constitutional
and political angle. Besides,
they have not given due consideration
to the pertinent factors and forces that
necessitated the creation ofthe All-India Services, notwithstanding the establishment
of a federal set up.! Considerations of administrative unity and national integration
weighed very much with the founding fathers. Consequently they were disinclined
to attach undue importance to the constitutional
niceties of federalism while
creating the All-India Services with the object of sustaining and promoting
administrative
unity and national integration.
Federalism,
unlike the unitarianism,
necessitates
the mechanism
of dual
Government:
federal and State without which the existence of federalism,
let
alone its functioning,
is inconceivable.
The existence of dual Government
in a
federal set up is in consonance with the political theory underlying federal polity.
Both these governments are created by the Constitution. The degree of independence
enjoyed by these two Governmental systems and the degree of co-ordination
that
exists between these differs iwidely from federation to federation. Since both the
authorities are the creature~ of the Constitution neither the Centre can attempt
unconstitutionally
to liquid~te manner
the Statetoauthorities
nor Centre.
can the This
States is combine
and operate in an undesirabie
endanger the
for the
simple reason that the respective
areas in which both the authorities can operate
I
as distinct entities and legisliltive and administrative
subjects in respect of which
they can exercise their respective power and authority are defined and demarcated.
Keeping in line with this fundamental political and constitutional requirement
of federalism,
there exist two different systems of public services one coming
under the authority of, and functioning within the sphere of federal government
and the other functioning under the State authority. In faCt, the existence of two
different systems of public services, functioning separately under federal and
State authorities,
is a logical corollary of the mechanism of dual government
which constitutes the heart and soul of federalism.
However,
Services,

,.

in India there exist three different

types of public services:

Central

State Services and All-India Services. The existence of this triarchy in the

UGC Research ~roject Investigator, NLSIU
Shattered by the devastating consequences of partition and its aftermath the constitution
makers realised the vital necessity of India's administrative unity. In accomplishing this they
found an excellent mechanism in the contrivance of the All-India Services.
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realm of public .services places the Indian federal system in a special category. It
is a direct consequence of the pre-independence constitutional and administrative
evolution and practices and administrative frame work through the instrumentality
of the erstwhile Indian Civil Services (I.C.S.) and Indian Police Services (I.P.S.)
which maintained the administrative unity of the country. 2 The existence of
triarchy in the realm of public services speaks eloquently of the tremendous impact
of constitutional evolution and administrative legacy on the constitution-makers.3
An analysis of the functional utility and importance and personnel aspect of
the central services shows that the members of these services are responsible for
manning the numerous Ministries and Departments of the Union Government in
which constitutional authority and responsibility are vested'for the administration
and legislation of subjects coming within its purview.4 Likewise, the members of
the various state public services are responsible for managing the various departments
and agencies of State Government which is constitutionally empowered to
legislate and administer subjects constitutionally earmarked for the state.5
Unlike the Central and State Public Services, the All-India Services do not
belong exclusively either to the Centre or to the States. The members of these
services have planted firmly one foot at the Centre and another in the States.6 In
view of this it would be a grave error to infer or to say that their loyalty is confined
exclusively to the Centre or States. Their loyalty is, and should be, strictly
speaking to the Constitution as they are created by it. This point deserves special
emphasis in view of the attacks of the critics who have disputed the raison d' etre,
utility and relevance of these services in the Indian federal context.
2

3

See, Ashok Chanda, Indian Administration (1958) See also, Reports of the Union Constitution
Committee, Union Powers Committee, Advisory Committee on Minorities, Sub-Committee on
Fundamental Rights.
Ibid.

4

Apart from the members of the All-India Services who occupy the most important and strategic
positions, members of the Central Services are responsible for manning the various agencies'
of the Union Government.
An appraisal of the variety of central services and their role in
manning the numerous ministries/departments
and agencies of the Union Government highlight
the utility, value and role of the personnel of the central services in the conduct of union
administration.
This also emphasises the point that in the conduct of administration
at the I,lDion
level, apart from the part played by the personnel of the All-India Services, the members of the
central services embracing such ministries as defence, finance, posts and telegraphs, transport
survey etc. playa
very significant role.

5

In the conduct of state administration
too the personnel of the All-India Services occupy the
important positions. But their presence alone won't be able to ensure the smooth conduct of
state administration
playa still more important part in the conduct of administration.
There is
hardly a department
or branch or agency of state administration
which is not serviced by the
personnel
of the state administrative
services.
'

6

All-India Services constitute one of the eye-sores of the critics of Indian federal system. Going
by the tenor and language of the critics of the All-India Services and Indian federal system,
many of these critics have laboured hard to show that the AI1-lndia Services belong exclusively
to the Union Government.
This is a travesty of truth. They are constitutional1y
created. Though
in terms of legal provisions, rules and regulations the Union Government exercises a great deal
of control, regulation,direction
and supervision,
they do not belong exclusively
to the Union
Government.

166

National

Law School Journal

[1994

The Indian Constitution,
in deference to the administrative
continuity and
imperative needs and considerations of administration,
has empowered the Union
Parliament to create by law, one or more All-India Services common to the Union
and States.? The service conditions of the members of the All-India Services,
subject to other provisions of the Constitution,
are regulated by law made by
Parliament, and rules and regulations made by the Union Government thereunder.
To judge the constitutional propriety and administrative implications of the AllIndia Services, what is most important to consider is not the norms and requisites of
federalism, as expounded and emphasised by the respectable and competent authorities
in the field of federalism but the acute felt needs and requirements of Indian
administration
and the specific purposes or goals for which the Constitution has
created and further empowered Parliament to create the All-India Services.
At the dawn of independence, barring the British Indian provinces and few states
in princely India, there was no tradition of sound and efficient administration in the
rest of India.8 Apart from this stark administrative reality, India, unlike several other
federations that preceded, has had to address herself to the task of framing her
Constitution in an age marked by the demise of the philosophy of individualism, and
the growing momentum of the concept of social welfare state.9 The cracks and
interstices noticed in the theory of federalism as developed and expanded ever since
1787, the need for creating and restructuring federal polity on a more pragmatic basis
in the wake of the calamitous changes wrought by the world wide economic depression
of 1929-30 and world war II, and the supreme need for framing in the middle of the
twentieth century a constitution to meet the needs of not merely a law-and-order
oriented administration, but more importantly, to effectualise the goals of the concept
of welfare state - were factors which profoundly influenced the framing of India's
Constitution. The cumulative effects of these formidable forces could be seen in the
All-India Services 'as these services have sought to promote national integration,
administrative
unity and become positive and vital instruments for implementing
effectively and promptly the various socio-economic plans, policies and programmes
of Central and State governments to establish a new social order based on justice and
accomplish the goals of welfare state.lO
In view of the creation of a federal polity under the Constitution, the Constitu tionmakers realised the need for dualism in public services, ie. separate public services
at the central and state levels respectively. This resulted in incorporating Article 309
and Article 315 in Part XIV dealing with public services!! and Union and State
7

Article

8

V.P. Menon,

249.

9

The profound impact of this concePt of the Indian
concerning
the directive principles of state policy.

Constitution

could

10

See, S.P. Iyer, "Federalism
and All - India Services",
(B.L. Maheswaran
ed., 1974)

Centre-State

Relations

11

Articles 308-313 deal with such important aspeGts of public services as the recruitment and conditions
of service of persons serving under the Union and States, tenure of office of persons serving under
the union and states, dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of persons serving under the union and

The story of Inte&ration

of Indian States (1956)
be seen

in Part IV

in the Seventies

states, All-India Services, Parliament's power to vary or revoke conditions of service of certain
persons (serving under the Union or State governments)

and transitional

provisions.
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Public Service Commissionsl2 By providing for recruitment and conditions of
service of persons serving under the Union and States, Article 309 recognised the
paramount importance .of administrative autonomy at the state level, a core
principle of federalism.
But the importance and implications of Article 309 seem to be partially
eclipsed or paralysed by the provisions of Article 312 which deal with All-India
Services. To kn.ow the extent to which Article 312 has been able to jeopardise the
administrative autonomy of the States by creating the institution of the All-India
services it is very important to recognise two pertinent factors:
1)

the provision for All-India Services is created by the single comprehensive
constitutional framework consisting of the governmental systems of both
the centre and states, and,

2)

the two important All-India Services, viz. Indian Administrative Services
(I.A.S.) and I.P.S. preceded the framing and inauguration of the new
Constitution.

The decision to create these new All-India Services, I.A.S. and I.P.S. to
replace the old I.C.S. and I.P. led to emergency recruitment to the I.A.S. and
I.P.S. Thus these two All-India Services were created before the new Constitution
took its birth. The decision to create these two All-India Services was influenced
more by the supreme desire to promote and preserve the administrative unity
which was rudely shaken by the partition of the country and many complex and
complicated problems of administration cropped up in its wake.
For the survival of India as a single political entity, not only her newly won
political independence but also her administrative unity were absolutely essential.
It was with this supreme object in view the constitution makers realised the
importance of providing for these All-India Services. Thus the provision for these
services was not motivated or influenced by any intention or desire to deviate
from the accepted norms and requisites of federalism.
The questions arising are - these All-India Services consistent with the
political and constitutional theory of federalism? Cannot the Centre make use of
these services, over which it has supreme authority, to strangulate or cripple the
administrative autonomy of the States? Would they be able to affect the balance
one way of or the other?
The members of the All-India Services occupy the strategic posts and vital
points in administration in the States and at the Centre. But the states have no say
in the matter of their recruitment, training and allocation. Nor would the centre
inform the stares about the allocation of personnel to the states. Except for the
12

Arlicles 315· 323 cover such aspects as the Union and Slate Public Service commissions,
appointment
and term of office of members, removal and suspension
of members of public
service commission,
power to make regulations as to the conditions of service of members and
staff of the commission, prohibition as to the holding of pffice by members after ceasing to be
such members, functions of commission and power to enlarge the same.
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posting and transfer of the members of these services allocated to the States, the
States do not have any disciplinary authority over them. As the relevant constitutional
provisions show, the Union Public Service Commission is responsible under
Article 320 for recruiting by means of open competitive examinations, the
members of these services. The Government of India through the Home Ministry
is responsible for the training of the candidates recruited to these services, and
after ascertaining the wishes of the candidates, on their successful training,
allocate them to the Centre and States. So, in none of these important mattersrecruitment, training, allocation and disciplinary control, the States have any
effective voice. The Union Public Service Commission and Union Government
dominate in these matters. Their promotions are determined by rules and regulations
concerning service conditions laid down by the Union Government. If any
disciplinary action became necessary against any members of these services, the
State concerned initiates, on its own, action, as in this matter too, supreme
authority lies with the centre. Thus it can be seen that in the case of these AllIndia Services, the Centre has both power and responsibility whereas the States
are only saddled with responsibility. In States the members of the All-India
Services occupy the most important places in the administration of departments,
barring departments like Public Health, Medical Services, Education, Public
Works, Agricultural and a few others. Even in these departments, the top policy
making positions are occupied by the All-India Services officials.
But considering the kind of circumstances and forces that influenced the
framing of India's Constitution, and the type of problems and challenges India
had to face, it may be said, without being unfair to the cause of federalism, from
India's point of view that the provision for All-India Service is not inconsistent
with her brand of federalism. Pure theorists and champions of the Indian federal
system view it as a constitutionally crippled and politically hybrid federal system
in the comity of federations. Nevertheless, given the character of political culture
and administrative genius, the provision for All-India Services cannot be denounced
as anti-thetical to her federal system. The institution of All-India Services is not
designed to cripple the States' administrative autonomy or deliberately upset the
federal balance, as it has been endeavoured to be made out by certain critics.13
But the avowed constitutional purpose sought to be emphasised and served is the
promotion of administrative interdependence between the Centre and States. The
need for administrative interdependence between the Centre and States constitutes
one of the distinctive features of the Indian federalism.14 The administrative
interdependence between the Centre and States will not fail to act as an antidote
to relieve the dangers and evils inherent in India's highly centralised federal
system.
A study of the manner in which the members of the All-India Services work,
whether at the Centre or in States is indispensable for proper understanding of the
13
14

See, Government of Madras, Rajamannar Committee Report on Centre-State Relations (1971).
See, M. Venkataranjayya, Competitive and Co-operative Federalism, (1951).
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and validity of the All-India Services in the federal context of

On successful completion of their training, the members of the All-India
Services according to their option, are allocated to work at the Centre or in the
States. The members of these services borne on any particular State cadre will
have to work under the direction, supervision and control of the concerned State
except in disciplinary matters over which Centre supervises. The State government
is responsible for the posting and transfer of the personnel of these services. In
promoting the members of these services the State government will be guided by
the service rules and regulations laid down by the Home Ministry of the Government
of India.ls
The Centre cannot intervene except in cases of national emergencyt6 or when
a particular State comes under the spell of the President's ruleY .
The foregoing analysis of the problems and of the situation will show that the
states have no constitutional authority to participate in the recruitment, training
and allocation of the members of these services borne on the (states) cadres.
However, the Centre, despite its overall authority over them, and its disciplinary
control over them, will not attempt to influence the States in a manner prejudicial
to the administrative autonomy of the States. But there is one important and
interesting aspect incidental to this problem. The members of the All-India
Services borne an any State cadre at least once (or twice) during their service will
have to go to the Centre and work there for a period which is normally not less
than two years. Their going to the Centre to serve there for a short period will not
automatically transfer them to the Centre's cadre and they will continue to be
borne on the state cadre. Their period of absence from service in the State and
their tenure of service at the Centre will be deemed to be on foreign service.
It goes without saying that notwithstanding the fact they are borne on the
State cadre, so long as they work on deputation basis at the centre, they will have
to, ipso facto, submit themselves to the Centre's overall supervision and
administrative control.
There is one very significant point concerning the Constitution of All-India
Services which critics have not analysed. It is provided by statutory rules, that
one third of the total number of posts of the All India Services borne on the state
cadre should be filled by State authorities by promotion from among the members
of the State Administrative Services (and Police Service). This means that if there
are about 200 posts of the All-India Services borne on the State cadre, 66 or 67

15

Under the existing arrangement it is incumbent on the part of the State governments
to comply
with the rules and regulations, under the All-India Services Act, 1951 made by the Union Home
Ministry in promoting members of the All-India Services that are borne on the States cadre.

16

See, Articles 352 and 353
See, Article 357.
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of these 200 posts will be filled up not"by appointing candidates directly recruited
by the Union Public Services Commission (U.P.S.C.) but by promoting officials
belonging to the state services. In choosing officials from the S tate services to fill
up the promotion
quota in the All-India Services the State authorities
are
generally
guided by such factors as seniority, administrative
efficiency
and
competence and considerations
of social justice. Thus, in this sense and to this
extent the State authorities are allowed to participate in the constitution
of the
All-India Services. In respect of the officers of theAll-India
Services borne on
the State cadre, there is fundamental difference between the members directly
recruited by the UPSC and allocated by the Centre, and the officials promoted by
the state authorities to these cadres. In the former category the directly recruited
candidates,
officials by exercising their option help the authorities to allocate
them to the Centre or State where they would like or intend to service. But in the
latter category, the officials of the State Public Services promoted
t~ the All India Services have no option to exercise but to serve in the State tQ which they
belong.
There is a good deal of exaggeration in the fears and misgivings expressed by
critics about the power given to Council of States concerning the constitution of
the All-India Services. There is no need to be too apprehensive
about the
implicatibn
and effects of Article 312. A careful perusal and analysis of this
Article shows that the power it has conferred on the Council of States is
permissive
and not obligatory.
It says that if the Council of States passes a
resolution supported by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members
present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest to do
so, Parliament may by law provide for the creation of one or more All-India
Services common to the Union and States.
It is important to note that both the Centre and States have a very sacred
constitutional
obligation to utilise effectively the public services, including the
All-India Services, as the dynamic agents of change to accomplish the goals of
welfare state and to usher in a new social order based upon justice-social,
economic and political. The manner in which the All-India Services have functioned,
the cautious and sparing manner in which Parliament has legislated to create
other All-India Services, and the constitutional and administrative
experience in
the post-constitution
period show that the All-India Services have not conducted
themselves
in an unbecoming manner to incur the odium that they are antithetical to the federal system of government,
nor have they done anything
deliberately and wilfully to endanger the principle of administrative
autonomy of
the States.
It is gratifying to note that the Sarkaria Commission, 18 after having examined
all aspects of the All-India Services, in the background of the recommendations,
observations and suggestions of the Administrative Reforms Commission as well

18

Government of India, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations 220 (1988)
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as the views expressed by the various States and als~ the recommendations
of the
Estimates Committee,
has recognised and emphasised
the vital necessity
of
continuing,
strengthening
and expanding the All-India Services. In arriving at
this mature conclusion the Sarkaria Commission has been very much influenced
by the rapidly expanding development activities and their pervading impact on
administration.
While quoting with approval the considered views of late Sardar
Vallabhai Patel ' .. This institution is meant to be worked by a ring of service
which will keep the country intact' ,19 the Commission has reiterated the indispensability
of these services for maintaining the country's unity. Touching on the controversy
of generalist versus specialist, it
rightly pointed out the necessity of yielding
place to greater specialisation
in the concerned areas of public administration,
and gearing up the training and career development policies for effectualising
this objective. It has rightly opined that disciplinary control should nurture the
best service traditions, and weed out the undesirable elements from these services.

19

Ibid at 225.
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BOOK REVIEWS
'IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST'- Essays on Public Interest Litigation and
Participatory Justice, by Mario Gomez, Legal Aid Centre - University of
Colombo, Colombo, pp. 209.
Savitri Goonesekere*

This volume of essays introduces the Sri Lankan legal community and
students to an exciting development in the sub-continent - the jurisprudence on
social action litigation. It is the first publication of its kind, and a timely
contribution in a year that has seen many violations of human rights as well as
both rhetoric and action on the theme. Participatory justice and delivery of justice
within the community through the involvement of various actors as well as the
people, is specially relevant in a situation where South Asian countries have
grown cynical of law and the legal system. There is a general sense that post
independence governments in South Asia have often failed to keep their commitments
under Constitutions to realise the basic and fundamental rights of their people.
Mario Gomez presents, in an easy and relaxed writing style, the basic
principles, ideas, and concepts associated with the jurisprudence of social action
litigation. The book is informative and stimulating. It focuses on the Indian
experience and recent innovative developments by the Supreme Court of India in
the area of fundamental rights. It also introduces comparative material from the
United States raising issues in regard to the difference in approach between
public interest litigation as it has developed in America and the broader scope of
social action litigation in the South Asian context. Important Sri Lankan cases are
analysed from the perspective of the vision of justice and access to justice that is
inherent in the concept of social action litigation.
The range of new legal ideas that had to be developed to accommodate the
concept of distributive justice, in a radical departure from the 'received' AngloAmerican jurisprudential traditions has been examined. The author has also
discussed in some detail the supportive mechanisms that must be developed
within the legal profession as well as the community if the courts are to assume
an activist role}n the delivery of justice.
The concept of social action litigation as it has developed in India, is in some
ways part of a judicial tradition that originated in the British Lord Chancellors'
courts centuries ago. Critics at that time dismissed the development in equity as
a device to foster uncertainty in the law and expand judicial discretion. Equity,
*
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it was said, varied with the Lord Chancellor's foot. A similar criticism has been
directed at social action litigation when it seeks to interpret the power of judicial
review so widely as to fuse the administrative and judicial role and places the
courts in a political and executive arena within the country. The author addresses
these criticisms and argues that the courts must exercise a wide jurisdiction and
ensure only that "justice is done". His passionate conviction that this is the sole
rationale for vesting any authority in the courts, sometimes leads him to generalisations
that are not supported by a close scrutiny of the Sri Lankan cases and judgements
he discusses.
The book would have benefitted from a discussion of comparative developments
in Pakistan and Bangladesh since social action litigation has now become a
familiar concept to many lawyers and activists and students in the Asian region.
The prospect of forging the new equity that the author advocates in the context
of social constraints against activism, involvement and mobilisation on issues
could also have been examined with recent examples of these constraints. Such
discussions would have strengthened the comparative law components of the
book, as well as the discussion on social action litigation.
An extensive bibliography on the topic has been included in the book and this
will be very useful to students and researchers who do not find it easy to ac£ess
these materials in Sri Lanka. 'In the Public Interest' is a useful contribution to Sri
Lanka's sparse legal literature. It is non-legalistic in its style and should also
attract a readership of non-lawyers interested in issues of law and public policy,
The book has been published by the Legal Aid Centre of the University of
Colombo which Mr. Gomez helped to establish with dedication and commitment
in the crucial first years of the project. Centres of this nature help to integrate
research and legal activism into academic programmes in law and contribution
both to staff and student development. The publication is a reminder of the
importance of that integration for the well being of the legal profession as well
as legal education.

13

(1994) 6 NLSJ 174

TEXT BOOK ON CRIMINOLOGY, (1991)by KatherineS. Williams,
1991, Blackstone Press Limited, London. pp. XVII + 365, Price £ 16.95 in U.K.
S.V. JogaRao*

The book under review written by Katherine S. Williams undoubtedly deserves
appreciation as it would throw light on the subject of Criminology from different
dimensions. The author has made it very clear that the purpose of writing this
book is to introduce students to the broad study of Criminology. This book
contains 17 chapters. Broadly speaking, the focal theme of this book can be
divided into three parts, namely, (a) Criminology (b) Criminal Etiology and
(c) Theories of Criminology.
The first part, Chapter 1-5 concentrates on (a) Definitions, Terminology and
the Criminal Process (b) Public perceptions and misconceptions of crime (c) The
extent of crime: a comparison of official and unofficial calculations and (d)
Victims, Victimisations and Victimology. In the second part, Chapters 6-12, the
author has analysed (a) Influences of physical factors and Genetics on Criminality
(b) Influences of Biochemical factors and of the Central and Autonomic nervous
systems on Criminality (c) Psychological theories of Criminality (d) Mental
disorder and criminality (e) Intelligence and learning (f) The sociology of
criminality and (g) Anomie, strain and juvenile subculture. The third part
Chapters 13-17, focusses on (a) Control theories (b) Labelling, phenomenology
and Ethnomethodology
(c) Conflict theories and radical criminologies· (d)
Positivists explanations of female criminality and (e) Women's liberation and
feminist theories.
Throughout, the treatment of the subject is quite logical and recent research.
advancements have been incorporated at appropriate junctures. Particularly the
information pertaining to 'Influences of Bio-chemical factors on criminality and
women's liberation and feminist theories', is quite informa~ive.
As a whole, it would be a worthy addition to the existing literature on
criminology.

*
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Dr. AMBEDKAR AND EMPOWERMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL
VICISSITUDES, by K.I. Vibhute (Ed.), 1993, University of Poona,
Pune, pp. LXIII+ 304, Price Rs. 2001-.
Dr. A. Jayagovind*

The book under review is an anthology of essays on Dr. Ambedkar's contribution
to Indian social and political life. The book was brought out by the Department
of Law of Poona University and carries the articles by the leading academicians
from the various Indian Universities. Justice P.B. Sawant of the Supreme Court
of India has contributed a learned foreword highlighting the various aspects of
Ambedkar's philosophy. The other contributions are organised under three heads:
constitutionalism, social justice and federal equilibrium. Upendra Baxi, S.P.
Sathe, N.R. Madhava Menon, T.K. Tope, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, etc., are some
of the notable contributors. S.K. Agrawal has given a good introduction to the
book.
Prof. Upendra Baxi's article, which was the inaugural oration on Ambedkar's
centenary celebration at Madras University in 1991, requires a special mention
for, unlike most other articles, it covers the entire spectrum of Ambedkar's life
and mission rather than narrowly focusing upon his role as the architect of Indian
Constitution. His call to backward classes to derive inspiration from Ambedkar's
towering intellectual achievements rather than wallowing in mediocrity is extremely
relevant to the present context. His analysis of Gandhi - Ambedkar conflict on
the issue. of separate electorates for the Depressed Classes is incisive, but
somewhat incomplete from Gandhiji's point of view. Given the bitter experience
of Congress regarding the separate electorate for muslims, Gandhiji's opposition
to any such demand from other sections was understandable.
Ambedkar's
arguments for separate electorates for the Depressed Classes could well be
countered by his own deposition before Simon Commission wherein he had
opposed the idea of separate electorates as inimical to sectional as well as
national interests. In brief, Prof. Baxi gets carried away by his own logic without
considering the opposite point of view.
The same criticism could well be made against most other contributions to the
volume. In my view, to point out that quite a few of Ambedkar's ideas have
proved to be counter-productive over a period of time, does not in any way detract
from his monumental achievements. For example, his extreme emphasis upon
socialistic economy and centralisation of political process cannot stand the
scrutiny of time. The learned writers dutifully quote his statements rather than
subjecting them to critical review.
As for Ambedkar's ideas on socialjustice, there are several articles including
an exhaustive piece by S.P. Sathe on "Indra Sawney v Union of India". But it
..
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must be pointed out here that Ambedkar's idea of depressed class was confined
to "Ati Sudras" (or Scheduled Castes and Tribes); and though, as the Minister of
Law, he was responsible
for the introduction of the concept "other backward
classes", he did not develop that idea. One can derive little guidance from
Ambedkar's life and work regarding today's raging controversy, namely, MandaI
Commission
report. In fact, his categorical statement that the reservations
to
services should be confined to minority of available posts indicates that he
viewed reservation as an ameliorative and integrative process rather than empowering
and confrontational
process.
The stark reality that the concept of "backward
class" has become a pawn in vicious electoral politics has hardly been touched by
any of the learned contributors.
Some competent analysis of umpteen number of backward class commission
reports in the light of Ambedkar's
ideas would have broken the repetitive
monotony of the contributions which narrowly focus upon judicial interpretations.
Notwithstanding
the verdict of Supreme Court, the fact that many eminent
sociologists
had denounced the methodology
of MandaI Commission
report
should not be ignored. In brief, if only there had been more balanced and critical
appraisal of the ideas that go with Ambedkar at present, the effort would have
been more worthwhile. Ambedkar himself might have liked it, for Ambedkar, the
great iconoclast that he was, would not have liked himself to be treated as an icon.
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TOW ARDS GENDER JUSTICE

by S.P. Sathe, 1993, Research Centre
for Women's Studies, S.N.D.T. Women's University, Bombay, pp. 88, Price
Rs.40/-.
Asha Bajpai*

This is a small monograph which contains three lectures delivered by Dr. S.P.
Sathe in the memory of the late Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkhar at the University of
Bombay between 3-5 February 1993.
This is intended to be the first book in the Gender and Law Series. The book
has just three Chapters which are organised as follows:
Chapter I

-

Pursuit of Gender Justice:
Historical Perspectives.

Chapter II

Sexism, Constitution and Judicial Process.

Chapter III

Empowerment of Women: Legal Strategies.

The· Introductory Chapter traces the historical growth of legislation and
social interaction from the colonial rule till the famous Shah Bano Judgement of
1985. This Chapter unraveis the colonial policy of not interfering with religious
beliefs and traditions based on imperial self-interest. The colonial legislations
relating to rape, adultery and other provisions in the Indian Penal Code reflected
the patriarchal ideology and Victorian morality.
An interesting'insight is given in the Rakhmabais legislation in 1985-88 and
how in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a bold interaction
between law, social change and judicial activism. The author points out that the
attitude of the State even after independence showed reluctance to undertake
social reform through legislation by citing the success of Muslim orthodoxy in
getting the law altered by passing of the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights)
on Divorce Act, 1986. To quote the author, "In 1985 Rakhmabai fought against
male hegemony and in 1985 Shah Bano did the same. Rakhmabai ultimately
succeeded though the law did not favour her because the social modernism of the
higher castes among the Hindus could withstand the resistance of the Hindu status
quoists. Shah Bano was not so fortunate since though the law was on her side, the
Muslim Orthodoxy succeeded in getting the law altered to her disadvantage".
Chapter II undertakes an examination of the Constitution and the judicial decisions.
Several cases like the Air Hostess case, the case of Neera Mathur v LIe, Sowmitri
Vishnu v India, and the Pati Parameswar case have been cited as instances of judicial
bias and gender,discrimination in spite of constitutional guarantees of equality. Here the
jmthor observes that 'gender bias is deep rooted and is often reflected in the legislative
*
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and judicial behaviour' . He further adds that the instances are of bias among judges who
constitute the elite of High Courts and Supreme Court and wonders how much it would
be among the judges of the lower courts.
In the concluding chapter the book specifically suggests ways how law can
create empowerment of women through legal strategies by using three methods:
a)

It can cause empowerment directly by conferring rights on the person
whom it intends to empower or by imposing liabilities on other persons
towards the person to be empowered.

b)

It can cause empowerment by strengthening the institutional infrastructure
for enforcing such rights and liabilities; and

c)

It can cause empowerment by supporting, stimulating and monitoring
attitudinal and value change in society.

There is one strain common to the entire book under review and that is gender
justice.
Several of the above issues have already received a much more elaborate
treatment in law books and journals. For those who want a very broad overview
of the status of women and law in India, the book is recommended. It is written
in a simple style, so that it could be useful to non-law persons. An ably compiled
almanac of issues and events that influence the cause of gender justice.
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HUSBANDS, by Kusum, 1993, Regency Publications,
New Delhi, pp. 62, Price Rs. 100/-.
Prabha Kotiswaran

*

This is a short book on a topical subject, "harassed husbands" . It has as its
central thesis: provisions aimed at safeguarding the interests of women and
maintaining family peace have through enforcement and court procedure resulted
in an increased number of broken marriages. Atrocities against women ought not
to be tolerated. However, beneficial laws and procedures are not to be used to
harass men ..
For example, married women have (mis) used beneficial dowry provisions in
the case of non-dowry related problems. Similarly, false complaints have been
made under Sections 304-B and 488-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1862 leading to
permanent social stigma and loss of employment· of the husband. In addition, the
media and enforcement agencies ensure that the husband is pronounced 'guilty'
and treated as such even before being tried.
Briefly, Chapter 2 deals with cases of matrimonial cruelty against men.
Chapter 3 highlights how penal provisions could be used as double-edged
weapons and the role of women's cells in the police, media, parents and relatives
in doing so. Chapter 4 relates to provisions on maintenance and custody. Conclusions
and recommendations are contained in chapter 5. Appendices include case
studies of three harassed husbands and a proposed Bill namely 'The Protection of
Rights and Dignity of Married Men Bill, 1993.
Evidently; the book is based on two premises:
(1) That law is the central and authoritative means of dispute resolution;
(2) Over identification of law with ideals of justice and fairness without
considering the vagaries and irrationalities that inform the enforcement
of the law and court litigation.
As a liberal afterthought the author adds that 'many a guilty may go unpunished
but a single innocent ought not to be punished". That the author empathises with
the single innocent, the harassed husband, is acceptable but the above assumptions
render her on ·slippery ground throughout the book. The harassment of no
individual, be it a woman or a man, ought to be condoned but the unseen agenda
of the book moves way beyond preventing the harassment of husbands.
More specifically, harassment conceptually has not been elaborated on.
Indications as to the magnitude of the problem, if any, are not forthcoming.
Individual decided cases have been heavily relied on, constituting no pattern as
such to strengthen the author's thesis. The result is unwarranted generalisations
minus the support of sound, verifiable field information.
*
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More problematically, the law and the legal system have been viewed as
objective, neutral and capable of dispensing justice as and when the situation
demands, irrespective of the sex of the litigant. Howe-ver, the law does reflect
male experience and patriarchal norms. Even if it ensures formal equality, in
terms of enforcement, the most beneficial of laws have had a differential impact
on women and men. Such fundamental questions have not been agitated at all. For
example, the author endorses the view of the Delhi High Court that the birth of
an illegitimate child within six months of marriage is an instance of cruelty
against the husband. What is not addressed is that legitimacy is a site of sexual
politics around which the patriarchal family and institutions of private property
revolve and are reinforced.
Yet another instance is that courts grant the husband's plea for divorce on the
grounds partly of the wife's refusal to conform to gendered toles assigned to
women in our society. Thus such attempts of (say by refusing to do the household
work) by women in their day to day struggles are pitted against the 'rights' of the
husband, to the privileges they receive as men, husbands and bread winners.
The highlight of the book is the innocuous Bill in the appendix which has the
potential of bringing to a nought the str~gle of Indian women for equal rights.
While justice for women and men is a laudable goal, the serious repercussions and
retarding effect such law reform will bring about for women have to be considered.
It appears dangerous to even suggest substantive law reform in the light of the
preceeding arguments. More so, because the book draws from experiences of
urban, middle-class, upper middle-class educated women and the consequences
of their supposed ·liberation'.
The impact of the book is contained in the popular imagery it reflects of some
women as being irrational, hysterical, vengeful, difficult - to-live-with and
nagging individuals.
'
The book is a starting point for it draws to our attention the highly gendered
world we live in and how men also pay a price for the same. Only, women suffer
more and in more numerous ways. Indeed, the problems on the way towards ajust
llnd humane society would have to be managed. creatively.
In conclu~ion, one is tempted to react to the endeavour in Susan Falvdi's
words,
•..... the antifeminist backlash has been set off not by women's
achievement of full equality but by an increased possibility that they
might win it'. It is a pre-emptive strike that stops women long before
they reach the finish line'.
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CRIMINOLOGY VICTIMOLOGY AND CORRECTIONS, by
V.V. Devasia and Leelamma Devasia, 1992, Ashish Publishing House,
Delhi. pp. XIII + 208, Price Rs. 3001-.
s. v. Joga Rao*
The Book under review, is a collection of select articles in the area of
'Criminology, Victimology and Corrections'. Professor S ukumar Base has written
a detailed and instructive foreword, mainly focussing on
i)

Ancient

Indian views on Criminal

ii)

Western

views on Criminology

iii)

Criminology

Law and Criminology

and

in the current decades.

The book has heen divided into thirteen chapters. In the first chapter on "Man
and Murder", the authors have given a vivid account of various theoretical
paradigms of the phenomenon of criminal homicide. The analysis includes early
studies on classical theorists like Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham etc, Bio-psychological
studies of Lombroso, Sheldon, Lorenz and Adrey and Sociological
studies of
Reckless, McCord and McCord.
In conclusion, the authors opined that "The
various approaches to the theory and causation of criminal homicide complete
each other, each with its own intellectual history and often with powerful support
and substantial body of empirical study. However, the efforts to formulate an
adequate theory should continue as yet there is no uniform theory on the subject
acceptable to all".
In the second Chapter on :'Eysenck's Theory of crime and personality:
An
appraisal", the authors have given critical account of Dysenk's Theory of crime
and personality mainly focussing on (a) Dimensions of personality
(b) Heredity
and criminal behaviour
(c) Predictability
of criminal behaviour
(d) Limitation
of personality Testing (e) Conditioning of behaviour and (f) Environment
and
crime. In the third chapter entitled" A functional analysis of white collar crime",
the authors after discussing the nature of the problem felt that the etiology of
white collar crime has received very little consideration
in current sociological
theory in India.
In the fourth Chapter on "Study of Juvenile Delinquents as a System of Social
Disorganization",
the authors from a functionalist perspective have analysed the
problem from the view point of (a) Delinquency as Dysfunction
(b) Delinquency
as sub-culture
(c) Delinquency as conflict and (d) Delinquency as alienation.
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In the fifth Chapter on "Youth in Poverty Groups and Culture", the authors
have mainly dealt with the extent of youth crime and specific characteristics
thereof like (a) Criminal youth gangs and (b) Young rapists and murderers. The
sixth Chapter on "College students and collective violence" has looked into the
etiological information pertaining to this problem, though quite peripherally.
The seventh Chapter has dealt with "Role of Victim in Crime". In this the
authors have probed into (a) The concept of victimology (b) the major issues and
aims of victimology (c) the victim-offender relationship (d) the pertinent aspects
of victim precipitation and (e) victim compensation.
Chapters eight to thirteen focus on 'corrections'. In these chapters pertinent
issues in the areas of (a) Prison sub"culture and prisonization (b) Social work
with offenders in correctional settings (c) Probation (d) Parole (e) After care and
(f) Capital punishment.
Undoubtedly, the authors deserve appreciation from one and all who are
concerned with these areas of scholarship. However, quite clearly, the reader
may not find a continuous thread in all the articles falling under the ambit of three
distinct branches. The authors could have taken care to see that there are linkages
in the selected articles. But for this observation, the book would be an interesting
addition to any library. Every article is followed by a list of detailed references.
The get up is quite attractive, printing is good, but price is definitely not within
the reach of many. The title somewhat appears to be misleading.
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AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGISLA TIVE DRAFTING, by P. M. Bakshi,
1992, N. M. Tripathi Private Limited, Bombay, pp. 160, Price Rs. 90/-.
G. S. Sri Vidhya *

An attempt by Prof. Bakshi to theorise a practical subject, essentially dependent
on individual nomographic ability - has resulted in "An Introduction to Legislative
Drafting" .
The author prefaces his fourth edition by stating that legislative drafting in
India has gained a high degree of skill and expertise.
The subject, essentially an art is also a science in so far as it has a certain set
of rules which have to be observed by all draftsmen. By theorising these rules, the.
author guides the draftsmen towards qualitative improvement. Legislative drafting
is dei sub numine viget (flourishes under the will of God) and is hence the byproduct of a gift - a gift of an alert and creative mind.
Chapter 1 takes the reader to the origin of the subject found in the ancient
codes. A range of qualities like clarity, consciseness, certainty etc., which are the
cornerstones of a good draft are listed in Chapter 2. The message Lege Toutum Sc
Vos Scire (Read all if you would know all) is the essence of Chapter 3. It discusses
the plethora of materials and sources that a draftsman should know.
Chapters 4 to 8 classify the statutes into various types. It guides the reader to
draft, right from naming the statute to enacting the clauses. Other chapters in the
book deal with the theoretical aspect of drafting, best exemplified in Chapters 3A,
15A, 19A, B, C and 22A. These chapters focus on aspects of constitutional and
administrative laws.
Chapter 19A deals with the procedure relating to a Parliamentary Bill.
Chapter 19B relates to enforcement and publication of the same. The author tries
to impress upon the readers that the Bill should be carefully drafted as it would
be closely scrutinised. However, it is unlikely that a person who is eminent
enough to be a draftsman should be fed on basics like the fact that a Bill goes
through three stages of reading, it should be published in the official Gazette etc.
The aforesaid statement gains more credence considering that the author starts
with the presumption that the draftsmen are well trained.
Another drawback of the book is arrangement of the chapters. Chapters on the
same subject have been placed far apart. For example, the qualities of good
drafting are in Chapter 2. These are elaborated in Chapters 9 and 10.
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It should be mentioned that the author debunks the myth that a complicated
draft is a good draft. He opines that the language should be simple and the clauses,
short. The extra information can be filled by adding more sub-clauses. He
advocates that legislative jargons like 'notwithstanding', 'aforesaid' etc., should
be avoided - a point to be noted and followed in the future. He>also instructs the
draftsman to take care of the small things like perfection in punctuation, prudence
in policy outline, precision in provisions etc. The greatest asset of the book is the
apt examples attached to every chapter from various statutes. This and the cases
cited serve to help better understanding of the subject.
The author concludes that a perfect draft is an impossibilit~. He suggests the
Court to adopt a more sympathetic view by considering the difficulties in
drafting. Alternately, he points out that if draftsmen are careful in avoiding
inherent contradictions and obvious loop~oles, the problems of the Court will
reduce.
Prof. Bakshi gives a good idea of the intricacies of drafting. The model
clauses in Chapter 23 and exercises in Chapter 24 will definitely prove to be
helpful. The author's strength lies in his simplicity. For a beginner, "An Introduction
to Legislative Drafting" is the best book.
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THE INDIAN
P Chandra

CONSTITUTION

AND INTERNA TIONAL LA W by

Sekhara Rao, 1993, Taxmann Publications, New Delhi, pp 250
M.K. Ramesh*

'The Indian Constitution and International Law' is the effort of a scholar
whose understanding of international law ranges from practical experience in
international diplomacy, representing India in United Nations, pursuing and
advocating Indian policy perceptions iILthe Mill-istry of Extemal AffaifS to law
making in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs. It is claimed that
the book "explains with great thoroughness the basic concepts of International
Law and examines their relevance to the numerous provisions of the Constitution
of India, which have a bearing on issues of Public International Law". The author
explains that the purpose of the book "is to ascertain the place of International
Law in the Indian Constitution" and that it stresses on the judicial approach to the
subject. The reader is thus made to learn about the extent of reception of
International Law into our legal system and the respect accorded to it in the
constitutional governance of an important third world country.
The book is divided into three parts. While the first part deals with the basic
structure of International Law, the second part deals with the linkages between
International Law and Municipal Law and the third - which constitutes half the
book, quite rightly so - concentrates on International Law in the Indian Constitution.
The work is well documented with a host of cases decided by international
judicial bodies. The practice of States is well reflected in the decisions of British,
American and Indian courts. International instruments finding place in the work
provide useful reference material to a researcher in International Law.
While subjects, sources, basis and j uris dictional aspects ofInternational Law
appropriately find place in the part on its basic structure, the rationale of having
.Directive Principles of State Policy as the opening chapter of the work appears
incongruous True, Part IV of the Constitution under Article 51 lays down the
basis on which India's foreign policy is fashioned and its respect for international
obligation rooted. But, to have that as one of the aspects of the basic structure of
International Law, in the presence of the true bases found else where in the part,
appears out of place.
While referring to Art. 51 (d) of the Constitution, the author observes that the
clause did not display adequate understanding of the system of settlement of
international disputes as required under Art. 1 (1) of the Charter of United
Nations, Indian practice never shared any bias in favour of arbitration as a mode
for settlement of disputes. He considers the distinction drawn between "International
Law an treaty obligations" in Art 51(c) of the Constitution as "uncalled for and
somewhat misleading" .
.••

Assistant Professor (Sr) NLSIU.

186

National Law School Journal

[1994

The Chapter on 'Sources of International Law' appears to have an impersonal
ring to it, in the sense that it makes no reference to Indian law and practice. Such
a reference would have been in the fitness of things as the title to the book
indicates.
Dr. Rao make.s a pertinent observation that the 'Panchasheel' (the five
principles of peaceful co-existence) that inspired the Non-aligned movement
constituted the quintessence of International Law found in the purposes and
principles of charter of United Nations.
While dealing with State jurisdiction, adverting to the recognition and
application of foreign laws in a conflict of laws. The author refers to a few
decisions of the Supreme Court to explain the Indian position. (Like, Satya v. Teja
Singh, AIR 1975 SC 105 & Surinder I(aur v. Harbax Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1224).
It would have been more appropriate had he referred to the more recent decisions
of the Supreme Court in Y. Narasimha Rao v. Venkatalakshmi, as it clearly
elucidated the current Indian stance in this regard.
On the part of the relation between International Law and Municipal Law,
one finds details as to Anglo-American practice, the British Act of State, the
Foreign Act of State and Facts of State. All the expositions are invariably
elucidations of British and American practices. Nowhere in tbat part, could one
find any mention to Indian position. No doubt, the author has reserved nearly half
the book, (Part III) to explain the Indian position. But a clear compartmentalisation
of the positions of eacb" of these states as is done here does not help one to
compare and appreciate the relative positions and prejudices ..
All the same, Part III is the real fulcrum of the work. It gives vivid details of
constitutional bases, respect for treaty obligations, their incorporation into
municipal law and the manner in which they are interpreted to internalise the
principles into Indian milieu; the status of customary rules of International law
in the municipal legal sphere; the recognition accorded to decisions of international
conferences; Act of the State before and after the inauguration of the Constitution
and facts of state and their evidentiary value. Combining of Part II and Part III,
it is believed, would not only have given a better perspective to the reader as to
the areas of similarly and distinction between the practices of India and the other
countries, and at the same time enhanced the value of this research effort.
Considering the situation that very little has been written by Indian authors
on International Law, referring on the relation, the jurisprudential bases and
points difference and departure between International Law and the fundamental
law of our land as is attempted by the author, is a very welcome effort.
Verily, a very useful work, that should adorn the library of every instit\ltion
imparting legal knowledge.
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THE LA W RELA TING TO INJUNCTIONS

IN INDIA: by Woodroffe -

2nd Revised and enlarged edition by SaIl! K. Roy Choudhury and H.K .. Saharag,
1992, S.C. Sarkar, Calcutta,pp. 380, Price 250/L. Vishwanathan

*

This treatise on the Law ofInjunctions written by Sir John George Woodroffe,
was first published in the year 1890. It has seen five editions by the author and
a revised and enlarged edition by the present editors, the second edition of which
is under review.
The Editors in the preface to this edition, have taken credit for including
material on injunction against television serial exhibition, public interest litigation,
pollution and against disclosure of confidential information, knowhow, etc. They
have, however not foreseen the possibilities of violation of civil rights by satellite
invasion and its impact on the efficacy of injunction as a legal relief in an era of
globalisation.
In Chapter I the meaning, form and effect of injunctions are considered.
While looking at temporary injunctions, the Editors have critically examined the
practise of granting 'Status quo'. In certain places in this chapter and other
chapters, the Editors have mechanically referred to the illustrations in various
legislations. Analysis of the same would have rendered the book more helpful.
The Editors ought to have taken sufficient care to avoid repetition while
attempting to give a detailed consideration of the rules governing injunctions in
ChapterII. It is a welcome feature that the discussion of English principles and
case law is accompanied by a comparison and consideration of Indian law at
appropriate places.
Chapter III deals with the practice relating to injunction. Tbis could serve as
a guide for practitioners especially for law graduates who do not get the requisite
support in procedural aspects in a classroom. While dealing with Mareva
injunctions in Chaper V (a Mareva injunction restrains the defendant from
removing his assets outside the jurisdiction of the courts pending the hearing of
the action), the Editors have sought to trace a similar relief in the Indian Legal
System by reference to Order 39, Rules 2 and 5 and Order 40 Rule 1 and Section
151 of the Civil Procedure Code.
While dealing with Anton Piller Orders (an Anton Piller order is an extraordinary
form of exposive order permitting an application to ent~r premises for purposes
of inspection), the editors have made a bald statement that it could be covered by
the wide powers of the Civil Courts in the Civil Procedure Code and the Specific
Relief Act. Instead, they could have pointed out that an Anton Piller Order is the
same as a relief under Order 39 Rule 7 read with Rule 8 (3).
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In Chapter VI while dealing with contractual and trust obligations, an
appropriate combination of the substantive law (The Indian Contract Act) and the
Procedural Law (Specific Relief Act and the Civil Procedure Code) makes
reading worthwhile.
It is noteworthy that in Chapter IX the book does not blindly trace English
Law in relation to landlord and tenants. A classification between agricultural and
non-agricultural facets of the relationship has been made. The rules of English
Law may be referred to with advantage in the case of waste by non-agricultural
tenants, but in other cases, the decision will not be of assistance because of the
varying geographical factors.
It is unfortunate that the most important areas which the Editors should have
concentrated has not been given adequate treatment. Chapter XI on injunctions
against infringement of confidentiality fails to sustain the interest of the reader.
The legal regime relating to Industrial Designs has been completely left out.
Moreover, the Editors have deemed it fit to fill the chapter with mechanical
reproductions of various standard published texts (duly acknowledged of course)
on these areas. Considering the fact that injunctive relief remains the easiest,
simplest, comparatively inexpensive and a very effective form of relief and
considering the fact that these areas are poised to be the most litigative areas in
the future, the Editors ought to have given serious and original consideration to
this section.
For a person looking for a working knowledge of the traditional law of
injunction, this is a book to be read. But for the readers who are looking for
something more, in terms of a creative use of the traditional legal relief for
problems of a complex modern society, the 2nd revised and enlarged edition of
the book running to 380 pages (including model form of plaint and applications
- however suspect they may be with regard to the varying practice of courts
situated in different states) priced at Rs. 250 does not give an answer and remains
a relic of the past.
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LIVING ISLAM by Prof Akbar S. Ahmed, 1993, BBC books Ltd,
Wood Lands, London, pp. 255. Price £16.99
Justice V.R. Krishna lyer*
'I write and record and analyse the reality of Islam to-day. I cannot invent or
create something that does not exist', so begins a rare book, a religious travellogue,
a truth told by a Sunni Muslim, frankly and fearlessly. The author, Prof. Akbar
S. Ahmad, is my friend who hides nothing, humanizes everything and, be his
religion what it may, reveals a soul of gold, an impatience with myths and lies
fobbed off as Islam which, literally and spiritually, means submission to God.
Reading these pages is an inward pilgrimage, a higher discovery whose reward is
the sincerity of the quest itself, not a proselytization. I see more of the truth about
the Prophet of Islam, and more of my proximity, as a sort of Hindu, to the Muslim
faith after reading this work. The whole truth is God, Science, Universal Spirit.
Partial perceptions lead to bleeding conflicts and religious, ethnic ~utcheries
everywhere, proving A.N. Whitehead who said: 'There are no whole truths; all
truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil.'
Anyway, Akbar S. Ahamed, far from marketing half-truths as whole truths speaks
straight, concedes, asserts, but never scores a point by arrogant insistence or by
painting a lie with Ii fanatkbrush. Let us read, assent and dissent but always with
sensitive sincerity. No New World Human Order can survive unless such a·
spiritual - material travel is undertaken.
C.E.M. Iod, a great thinker of his time wrote a book "Liberty To-day' and the
opening page contains the following sceptical note:
"The struggle of reason against authority has ended in what appears
now to be a decisive and permanent victory for liberty. In the most
civilized and progressive countries, freedom of discussion is recognized
as a fundamental principle." The quotation is from Professor Bury's
A History of Freedom of Thought, published in 1913. In this book he
tells us how freedom of thought was established once and for all in
the nineteenth century, and expresses the view that the struggle for
liberty may now be regarded as closed. "Well, that is very nice,
indeed - if it is true", comments Lytton Strachey in his review of
Bury's book. "But, after all, can we be quite so sure that it is true?
Is it really credible that the human race should have got along so far
as that? That such deeply rooted instincts as the love of persecution
and the hatred of heterodoxies should have been dissipated into thin
air by the charms of philosophers and the common sense of that
remarkable period, the nineteenth century?"
Since that book was pu.blished, decades of change have overtaken the world
- the October revolution and Stalin, the Cold War and McCarthy, the collapse of
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the Soviet Union and its dismemberment and the emergence of a unipolar world
and the U.S. using the U.N. to gain its world supremacy under guise of a New
World Order. Meanwhile the Middle East countries with Islam and Oil opulence
have become a Power, at once rich and uni-religious. The Muslim presence is
everywhere and a grotesque image is projected about its alleged obdurate obscurantism.
Funds flow into other countries from Saudi Arabia and Iran with Kumeini raj and
a death sentence on Rushdie having spread a scare about the Muslim faith. This
perhaps is a cruel caricature of one of the finest faiths in the world which has
civilised regions which were once barbarous, divinised countries, once ugly with
inhuman rule of life and offered a sanctuary of beautiful brotherhood, egalitarian
sharing and caring and a godward disposition rooted in universal fraternity.
Unfortunately, the Gresham's Law of finer faiths pushing out the more savage
has mired Muslim culture, since its glorious truth has not been properly interpreted
and propagated among non-Muslims so as to make them realize the profound
justice and humanism and devotion to the higher values which Islam, in its
quintessence, embodies. 'Living Islam' undertakes this task of spreading Islamic
light. The magna carta of mankind consisting of Universal Declaration and the
two International Covenants and many subsidiary instruments are more a printed
wonder of culture, but, judging by ground realities, a departure from the worth of
the human personality to callous killings with lethal weapons motivated by brutal
ambitions of maximum material gains perverting science and technology towards
this end.
Cultural pluralism, inulti-religionism and macabre materialism et al are writ
large in our human planet which, with each passing day, shrinks into a gory global
village, what with the terrorism of hegemonistic politics, Super-Power pursuit of
world authority and role of planet-wide gendarmerie.
Competitive technological discoveries which, wisely used could well make
for abundance on our good earth, now does multiply the lethal potential to
condition and control mass minds into sadistic pleasures, callous fanaticisms,
hard hatreds and 'pious' genocide. Currently, we have so many Gods and faiths
that frictions, tensions and rival versions of worship ignite belligerence, with the
weapons market fuelling intoxicated killings. Above all, the hedonist - materialist
conquest of the finer human spirit and social justice is becoming a fatal phenomenon
on the international plane. The post-modernist materialism is qualitatively different
from the past, magnified, as it is, by the blood-shot eyes of thanatoid technology
and profit-friendly armoury. The great Prophets, Seers and Sages blessed mankind
with sublime visions of Creation and handed down revelations rooted in love,
compassion and brotherhood. But this composite cultural heritage is under
invasion by imperialist powers and multi-national corporations which have no
body to be burnt, no soul to be damned and only maximum money-making as the
operational objective. So much so, if mankind is to live together on our dear
planet earth, a new manifesto of global humanism and spiritual fraternity is a
categorical imperative. Together we must resist the structural adjustments and
armed intimidations forced on us by the power-drunk America Inc. plus their G
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-7 allies. Otherwise, our mental-moral values will be wiped out by ghastly
weapons stored by the Pentagon and other Western armouries. To interpret Islam
to the West and to Hindu and allied faiths is the desideratum if a comity of
denominations is to gain ground and instead of mutual butchery, join hands to
defend those sublime values which are the world's common cultural heritage.
, Living Islam' by that remarkable Muslim Prof. Akbar S. Ahmad is a book in
sparkling style seeking to tell the West and the rest the essence of the noble faith
Islam as the Quran and the Prophet's hadiths expounded. Swami Vivekananda,
that cyclonic sadhu, interpreted the Vedanta to the world and sowed the seed of
a new World Spiritual Order.
Any student of the dialectics of contemporary
history will realise the
supremacy of deadly technology and the capability of cultural subversion which
the West now possesses. The higher values, which all great religious and good
persons share, are in peril because of the arrogance of the only Super-Power
which shapes the U. N. and shakes the nations as the sole master of the World
Economic and Military Order.
If peace is to reign on earth, if world brotherhood is to be actualised as a
reality, if spiritual nexus through shared humanism, compassion and tolerance is
to preserve societies with divergent religions together, we must dive deeper into
the wisdom of defending the ethos, identity and adaptability of each religious
communi ty, in the context of the post-modernist technology and value debasement.
Equally importantly, intolerance, arrogance, fanaticism and insularity of religions
must be jettisoned and a new morally acceptable modus vivendi be fashioned so
as to sustain, without war or internal blood-feud those credal fundamentals which
each religious community considers too vital to be abandoned.
Religious Pluralism and Realism.
No single religion has demographic dominance in the world to-day nor,
indeed, is numerical strength decisive when sabre-rattling mood takes over
control of godist - fundamentalists. Universal brotherhood is the broad creed but
butchery fuelled by religiosity is a frequent reality. A billion muslims kneel daily
before Allah and follow the teachings of the great Prophet Muhammad. An equal
number may perhaps worship a miscellany of deities in the Hindu pantheon. The
Buddha ano Jesus also have a large but dispersed number of 'votaries'. But Islam,
as a living religion, spread out from Samarkand to Stornoway, stands out
strikingly, even provocatively, as a fighting faith with a global following.
Historically, there is considerable confusion about the blind bigotry, prosyletising
propensity with sword in hand, and obnoxious practices like four wives at the
same time, women damned by purdah from visibility and condemned to indignity,
and jihad as a death-dealing road to heaven, killing kafirs with holy savagery.
Likewise, other competing faiths practise violation of human rights and wage
raging battles against muslims. It is an illusion to hold that mankind can be
farmed out among major religions and proselytization by conquest will establish
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stable supremacy. Indeed, to-day while Gods battle against each other, the great
challenge to all religions is the militarist-materialist mentality of certain Powers
against the values of all religions. The craze for sensual pleasures and affluent
satisfactions (I call it the diseases of affluenza and yuppiedom) are the true enemy
of human progress; and a vibrant humanism, with mutual respect among religions
inteT se, is the categorical imperative of mankind's survival. This dialectical
analysis takes us to the need for inter-religious dialogue, amity and understanding,
giving up aggressive superiority and obscurantist fundamentalism. If religions
turn market-hungry and seek to capture customers by authoritarianism, victory
will ultimately belong to the only Super-Power leaving Popes and Ayatullahs,
Acharyas and Archbishops to succumb to chaos in the cosmos. My thesis, then,
is that we should sit back to a new mood and temper of humility towards each
religion. A global democracy among the faithfuls of diverse theologies, an
elimination of hostility between Muslims and Kaffirs, believers and heathens,
higher castes and out-castes and similar frictional camps must generate a demilitarised
zone determined to liv~ together with reverence for each other and abjuring
aggressive infallibility for each one's faith. The task of tolerance, reveren.ce and
cordial togetherness is the desideratum. No denomination is an island, and
religions must live in fellowship in the wider continents.
My submission is that Operation Illumination of Islamic Basics is the first
step to remove the misunderstanding gathering against that great religion and
pave the way for an entente cordial with other noble, global godisms, and even
non-believing yet the finest humanists. Here comes the necessary relevance of
Akbar S. Ahamad's lucid, lovely, luminous, literary piece titled Living Islam
which fulfils the fundamental objective of telling the world, especially the West,.
what Islam means, what the Prophet's vision was and why muslims everywhere
stand for higher values and a better life for all, rather than bloody wars,
conversion by sword and intolerance of all other god ward paths. Global monopoly
even in religion is an aggressive theological imperialism which is the opposite of
Islam. For, in terms, Islam means not conquest nor power grab nor conversion
sword in hand. In Arabic, Islam imports 'submission' to the Will of God (Allah).
If one has the patience to read the true values of Islam, most of the prejudices will
melt like snow in the sun. The core values Akbar S. Ahamad postulates, as
integral to Islam, are "the respect for knowledge, for justice, for compassion
towards the less privileged, for a healthy family life, the need to improve the here
and now. The last is significant. Islam, unlike some other religions, does not
reject the world. The Muslim ideal balances matters of the world (dunya) with
ideas of religion (din), a good Muslim must participate in both. This goes a long
way towards explaining the power and popularity of Islam in to-day's world".
The five pillars of Islam, as the Cambridge Encyclopedia puts it, do not contradict
the existence or obligations of other religions and confine themselves to what a
good muslim's religious duties are:
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(1) "The shahada (profession of faith) is the sincere recitation of the twofold creed: 'There is no god but God' and 'Mohammed is the Messenger
of God'.
(2) The salat (formal prayer) must be performed at fixed hours five times
a day while facing towards the holy city of Mecca.
(3) Alms-giving through the payment of zakat (purification)
primarily as an act of worship.

is regarded

(4) There is a duty to fast (saum) during the month of Ramadan.
(5) The Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca is to be performed if at all possible at
least once during one's lifetime. Sharia's is the sacred law of Islam, and
applies to all aspects of life, not just religious practices."
Prof. Akbar S Ahmad has done great service to Islam and the West and the
rest, by writing this admirable book. It's excellence of presentation, elegance of
diction and humanism and tolerance in chapter after chapter wins my profound
admiration and imparts to every reader a new sympathy and view of beauty which
can rarely be surpassed in persuasive power, especially when the subject is
sensitive and flammable.
Once we grasp the Islamic fundamentals as Ahamad expounds with charming
simplicity, much that is associated with it as bigoted, obnoxious or obdurately
feared, both in the West and Bharat is myth, not truth; distortion, not divine
essence. Oftentimes, the concept of Jihad projects in the non-muslim mind the
image of holy war waged with haughty fanaticism. But while Jihad means
struggle, the holy Prophet identified it in the sublimest sense. For him, the
greatest Jihad was "the struggle to master our passions and instincts", not mere
physical confrontation, involving slaughter. Just listen. Did not Krishna in the
Bhagavat Gita tell Arjuna, as he steered the chariot in the midst of battle, that
struggle to control one's passions by total submission to Him was the highest path
to follow? Physical struggle is a gross approach while the inner struggle of the
soul to master the evil forces and passions is the ultimate object. The Bible too
speaks of the inner struggle to overpower vicious tendencies.
, Superficially read, there are apparent reasons for misunderstanding concepts
current in Islam and apt to prejudice the Western mind or other Eastern religions.
To misunderstand is easy when one's fixations are formed by a rival faith. Let us
look at the matter with an open mind and discover, in Shavian words: 'There is
only one religion, though there are a hundred versions of it' . Tolerance and Truth
promote comity among great religions. The opium is not religion, it is communalism
that sprays poison and spews violence.
Akbar S. Ahmad, with intelligent perception and selectivity, deals with
notions like Ummah, Fatwa, Mullah, Shahada and so on, which suffer misapprehension
in the Western mind. The concept of the Ummah is brotherhood, simple and
inevitable in our pluralistic world where unity and identity of the community is
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its very strength. Hindutwa spells Hindu brotherhood. Christendom invokes the
collective body of Christians world-wide. Illustrations from religions like Zionism
and other coherent body of faiths can be copiously given, without any evil slant
implicit in the concept of cultural identity. I do not see anything vicious about the
Ummah more than as an expression of communal identity without ferocity.
Blood-thirsty Islamic aberrations here and there cannot balckbrush the whole
religion. The special circumstances of such outbursts also need study. The
exception does not prove the rule. Democracy, with minority settings, seeks
similar expression among tribes and groups with linguistic, cultural and ethnic
identities and beliefs by a coherence and autonomy, not out of hostile separatism,
nor to coil up like a serpent to sting but to cling happily together as a sign of
belonging to one another in fellowship. Not only muslims but many groups have
this healthy community sense with common ethos. What is mischievous is violent
hatred which the Prophet abhorred.
Take again the concept of fatwa which has become a hateful word after the
Ayatullah Khomeni pronounced death sentence on Salman Rushdie, the author of
the Satanic Verses. Personally, I detest this ayatullah authoritarianism. But this
extra-constitutional fiat is not the essence ofIslam. I even regard it as incompatible
with the cosmic compassion of the Prophet. Indeed, in many religions, such
savageries of sacerdotal supremos are known, though rarely. When scepter and
mitre get mixed up, authoritarian excesses are not uncommon. Even so great a
model King and avatar as Sri Rama commanded that innocent Sita be condemned
into exile. And yet Rama was a paradigm of royal virtue. Was not Jesus brutally
nailed to death biblically on the cross with the sanction of Jewish high priests?
We cannot damn a whole religion and its divine teachings because someone in the
hierarchy has acted with barbarity. Moreover, a fatwa is not law with State
sanction. Here again Ahamad explains that afatwa means no more than aformal
opinion on a point ofIslamic Law and does not enjoy the status of enforceable law
unless validly ratified in a Judicial Forum. Ayatullah Khomeni did not and could
not pass death sentence on Rushdie in law. He merely expressed an extremist
view mixing up his religious authority with the regal functions. Such extraconstitutional commands we find, though under exceptional situations, in the
Sikh community Buta Singh, a former Home Minister, voluntarily underwent a
humiliatingly 'lawless' sentence recently of washing others' feet as expiation.
We cannot, for that reason, criminalize Sikhism containing gems of godly
teachings and sublime mandates. Many are shocked by the Khomeni demand for
the head of Rushdie but Ahamad has done the apologetic explanation with
dexterity and convincing jurisprudence. Even so, this ayatollah demand for
Rushdie's blood has cast a stain on it gracious faith. Ahamad has taken pains to
compare Khomeni'sfatwa with Dante's Divine Comedy with an adroit narrative
power. When Islam, in splendorous civilization (philosophy, science, arts) stunned
medieval European culture and Christian religion, resistance rose. And long later
when Iran was appalled by Western vulgar culture, Islamic resistance erupted.
Ayatollah attacked this cultural debasement seen through Islamic lens.
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Ahamad goes on:
"Fearful of America's irresistible cultural and political advance in
their country, the ayatollahs decided that the best strategy lay in
total rejection of the foreign. Because the USA had set out to
Westernize Iran, it became the embodiment of evil: the USA was
given the title the Great Satan. It was the reverse side of the
Christian-Muslim of Dante's time, with a new locality and in a
different age. Imam Khomeini'sfatefulfatwa,
condemning Salman
Rushdie for his novel The Satanic Verses (1988), needs to be set in
this historical context .••
Another charge, usually made against Islam, is that it is an evangelical
religion encouraging conversion. Ahamad admits without equivocation that
Muslims do believe in conversion. Is this charge peculiar to Islam? Christian
priests too go round and convert, as Kerala and the North East of India and many
other parts of the world testify. In a sense, Hinduism technically permits
conversion and reconversion, although the evangelical emphasis of Muslims and
Christians operating to embellish their strength is not there. However, Ahamad
points out that Dawah (conversion) is carried out not by Government but by
private organisations working on low-key basis. Even so, it must be stated both
against Christianity and Islam that in India proselytisation is a sore point of
tension and has resulted in militant Hindu organisations resisting this trend.
Maybe, the best thing would be to drop organised conversion as a religious
activity but to leave to individuals, in exercise of their conscience, to change faith
of their own free will after some test of sincerity by a judicial authority.
We are often confounded by names like Mullah, Sheikh, Imam, Ayatullah and
the like as breeders of bigotry and instigators of fundamentalism. Ulema merely
means a religious scholar and the gradations are neatly explained by Ahamad
which dispels the notion that there is any tyrannical control for these religious
heads. An Imam is but a senior figure incharge of a mosque and an ayatullah, a
seniormost scholar in the country. Pir and Faquir are likewise words of religious
significance even as Wali is a Sufi Saint. Caliphs, Sultans and Shahs have regal
import, not religious authority. A careful study of these terms in the Islamic
lexicon removes prejudices and indeed, similar functionaries are found in every
major religion. Islam does not have priesthood and even the Prophet is no
founder of Islam but only a messenger of God. Even the expression 'fundamentalism',
semantically speaking, has an innocuous as well as noxious sense. Only extremists
who refuse to think or reason but ~ling tenaciously to formularies, rites and rituals
deserve to be called fundamentalists as a dangerous species. Alas, there are many
such in all religions, perhaps Muslims have an overdose and suffer a backlash.
Vivekananda, that cyclonic Sadhu, dared and fought Hindu fundamentalists. So
did Naryanan Guru. Ambedkar was a victim of Hindu bigorty and changed over
to Buddhism courageously. But never will perish the great truths of advaita and
the profound philqsophy which made Schopenhauer state:
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"In the whole world there is no study ... so beneficial and so elevating
as that of the Upanishads .... (They) are products of highest wisdom ...
It is destined sooner or later to become the faith of the people." And
again: "The study of the Upanishads has been the solace of my life,
it will be the solace of my death."
[Discovery of India - 4th Edn. Pages 92-93]
Some pseudo-Sankaracharyas and saffron-clad Swamis turn chauvinist, irrational
and asuric, spiritually speaking, even like some sheiks and ayatollahs run amok
chanting Arabic. The prophet has to be measured by his glorious resurrection of
humanity, even as Jesus and Krishna should be. Prophet Muham_mad is not
regarded as the sole fountain of Islam. "Muslims believethat there have been over
one hundred and twenty four thousand prophets who spread the message of God.
Such figures, .... include people like Plato and Buddha .... ". The universalism of
Islam, in the prophet's vision treats even a slave as a brother and opposes every
villain even of noble birth. Read for instance:
"When Muslims encounter conflict the Quran has also said: 'To you
your religion and to me mine' (Surah 109: Verse 6) and 'let their be
no compulsion in religion' (Surah 2: Verse 256)" - (Page 32 of the
Book).'
One Muslim imperative is that Muhammad was the last prophet of God, but
Ahmadiyyas assert that there can be prophets even later. This controversy is not
a relevant answer to the query that Islam is a glorious faith. The Hindus, on the
highest scriptural authority, state that Truth is one but wise men see it from
different perspectives. Likewise, says Ahamad:
"Muslims believe that there are many paths to God and although
theirs is the last and final path, there are others which may also be
valid. Indeed the Quran goes out of its way to emphasize that
Christians and Jews - the people of the Book - are to be treated with
special respect" - (Page 33 of the Book).
What a paradigm of noble tolerance.
It is sensible to observe that Christianity and Judaism are incorporated in their
pure form in Islam. Thus, indignantexclusivism
is not an attribute of Islam.
Advaita shares the faith of the Muslims - so too Arya Samaj - that the one central
feature of their religion is that there is only one God. So too universal brotherhood.
So much so, Swami Vivekananda did proclaim:
"I believe it is the religion of the future enlightened humanity. The
Hindus may get the credit of arriving at it earlier than other races,
they being an older race than either the Hebrew or the Arab; yet
practical Advaitism, which looks upon and behoves to all mankin.d
as one's own soul, was never developed among the Hindus universally.
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On the other hand, my experience is that if ever any religion
approach to this equality in an appreciable manner, it is Islam and
Islam alone. "
[Complete Works of Vivekananda - Vol. VI - pAI7]
Issues of contemporary relevance where Islam is apt to be opposed by the
West, why, even by the Hindus and other religions, need our compelling attention
since the problems of the present mar convivial relations and possess divisive
potential unless differences are dissipated by reasonable, not dogmatic, grounds.
For Indians especially, Hindu-Muslim cordiality, through enlightened appreciation
of each other's values, is significant. However, in many parts of the world
Muslims face encounters. Gulf wealth and consequent arrogance of immense
opulence and tainted trends cannot defeat such challenges. Masterpiece like
Living Islam, explaining moot points and die-hard prejudices, can be the only way
to conquer ignorance. Akbar Ahamad, with unreserved frankness, unfolds the
flag of rational explanation.
Muslims are suspects in the West as guilty of fundamentalism, ferocity and
infliction of brutal criminal punishment in the name of Justice and terrorist
training. Saudi Arabia decreed stoning to death a princess for marrying a
commoner. It is demoniac violation of human rights. But it must be remembered
that a British King had to give up his throne to marry a commner! In medieval
Hindu reign, the harshest punishment on Shudhras and the lightest on the
Brahmins for the same offense were prevalent, till the British imported their rule
of law. Sati, where a young wife must die on her husband's funeral pyre, was
abolished by law by the British, but persisted in practice in Rajasthan till the other
day. Other instance of Christian women being discriminated against and Hindu
women, through the Devadasi system, being religiously offered for quasi-prostitution,
hurt the conscience of humanists everywhere. The point I drive home is that
clerically sanctioned barbaric syndromes somewhere cannot be good ground for
damnation of a religion everywhere. Draconic Saudi severity in criminal sentencing
is a disgrace to humanity. Many other Islamic States are far less brutal. Judgment
must be based on overall general practice and the finer teachings. So viewed, the'
anti-Islamic allergy"of the West or Hindu India is not founded on universal
features. The Great Prophet, the Holy Quran and Islam as a religion are more
sinned against than sinning. With all that, contemporary laws and social sinistemess
in some Muslim countries and communities are far in excess of U.N. human rights
instruments. They have 'miles to go' and 'promises to keep'.' Even the U.S. and
Bharat bave shortfalls, less in extent though.
We cannot wish away from the world a billion Muslims nor an equal number
of Hindus and Christians, Buddhists and other religions especially when the soul
of such faiths is sublime. A universal re-appraisal of inter-religious relations and
promotion of detente and dialogue among communities is inescapable in our oneworld. From this desideratum must emerge an illuminating flood of 'comity
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literature', at once accurate and scientific, rooted in the fundamentals of Truth,
righteousness and mercy and promotive of that fraternity world-wide sans which
future shock awaits the inhabitants of the earth. I regard Prof. Akbar Ahamad's
excellent work "Living Islam" as a beautiful beginning of this cosmic movement
of humanist holism in our burgeoning world order.
Polemics and Panaceas
A few more controversial issues deserve to be touched upon. The marriages
of the Prophet, the four wives theory ofIslamic law and the triple talaq have come
in for severe criticism; so too the idea of the Ummah as confined to Muslims only.
The last may be'dealt with first. Indeed, all creation comes within the ken of Islam
- not only our planet, but the Universe or Universes. Says Ahamad:
"The universalism
of Islam is reflected in its attitude towards
matters of statehood.
THroughout history Muslim rulers have been
tolerant of other religions when their empires have been secure and
stable - Ottomans, Mughals, the Umayyads in Spain. "
"The relations between Muslims and Jews were reflected in the
treaty the Prophet made with them in Madinah. The first of its kind,
it allowed them free trade,free travel, and freedom of thought and
expression. "
[Page 34 of the Book]

The Middle East is a scene of bitter battles between Israelis and Arabs. But
that is irrelevant to the Prophet's glory. Just look: he signed a treaty between
Muslims and Jews allowing free trade and free travel and freedom of thought and
expression. "A good Muslim must balance the world (Dunya) with the principles
of religion (Din)" ..
This synthesis reminds us of the spiritual and the material in Hindu theology,
and its unitive understanding.
Space constrains me from dealing with the false impression that a Muslim can
marry four wives and can divorce the wife at the male's pleasure. In fact, Islam
virtually enjoins monogamy upon Muslims and departure therefrom only a
detestable exception. So it is that a number of Muslim countries have codified the
law wherein the practice of polygamy has been either totally prohibited or
severely restricted. (I have dealt with this question while on the Bench in Kerala).
Indeed, among the Hindus, polygamy prevailed for long - even Sri Rama's father,
King Dasaratha had three wives - and when monogamy was enforced on Hindus,
noises were made that religion was in danger. The Court overruled the objection.
Even regarding divorce, Islam regards it as the most hateful thing before Allah.
As for Hindus, divorce, even when the woman suffered most, was not her right until
the statute ameliorated the situation. Indian Christian women are discriminated
against even now in the matter of divorce and until recently these women, in parts

Vol. 6]

199

Living Islam

of Kerala, were denied equality. The fact is that the great Prophet found, in the
desert lands, a dissolute people with women deprived of rights and he rid Arab
society of these intolerable vices. He humanised Arab society, although the picture
projected by prejudiced minds is the opposite, 'the undone vast' vis-a-vis women
still survives. Compassion is the heart of Islam and the attributes of Allah are
mercy, peace and justice. The highest attributes are reflected in Bismillah arRahman ar-Rahim which bring out the beautiful attribute of the Beneficent and the
Merciful. The magnificent ideas writ large in the Quran are condensed by Ahamad
thus:
liThe spirit of compassion which is reflected in the two names is
crucial to Muslims, who are told: 'Beforemost in seeking forgiveness'
(Surah 57: verse 21); 'Be quick in the race for forgiveness from your
Lord' (Surah 3: verse 133); and, in the next verse, 'Restrain anger
and pardon men' (Surah 3: verse 134). 'When they are angry, even
then forgive', advises the Quran (Surah 42: verse 37)."
Human beings are God's finest reflection, the culmination of creation. The
title of vicegerent is an extraordinary vote of confidence and bestowed on the
species because of its capacity to think and reason. It is to fulfil this destiny that
ilm, knowledge, is so emphasized; ilm is the second most-used word in the Quran
after the name of God. Human beings are told to use their mind and think in at
least 300 places. Numerous sayings support this. The Prophet said, 'The first
thing created by God was the Intellect.' Ali is quoted as saying:
'God did not distribute to His servants anything more to be esteemed
than Intelligence.'
The universal nature of humanity is underlined in the Quran. God's purview
and compassion take in everyone, 'all creatures'. The world is not divided into a
a North and a South, an East and a West. On the contrary, these divisions are
obliterated: 'To Allah belong to the East and the West. Whether so ever ye turn,
there is Allah's countenance' (Surah 2: verse 115). Again and again, the Quean
points to the wonders of creation, the diversity of races and languages. God
cannot be parochial or xenophobic.
The Quean suggests an ideal of social behaviour (as in Surah 17, 'The
Children of Israel'). Be kind to parents, kin, the poor and the wayfarer, it exhorts.
Do not be a spendthrift, do not kill, commit adultery or cheat, it warns. Boasting
and false pride are condemned and honesty praised. But when humans err, and
if they are sincere, 'God forgives those who repent' (verse 25). Corruption is
discouraged: 'Seek not mischief in the land. For God loves not those who do
mischief,' (Surah 28: verse 77). Humility is encouraged: 'Nor walk in insolence
through the earth. For God loveth not any arrogant boaster' (Surah 31: verse 18)."
[Page 37 of the Book]

200

National Law School Journal

[1994

Muslims have no Monopoly
It is not my purpose to apotheosize Islam nor even to defend some of its
traumatic trends found in Saudi Arabia where the most holy and hallowed spot
and black stone (Kabah) remains as a celestial magnet, drawing Muslims from all
over the world. There are pernicious features in the practices of Muslims, but
there is sublime enlightenment in the Quran and the hadiths which, in moral
splendour, compare with the best in the Greek Nomos, the Hindu dharma, the
Buddhist Dhamma and Confusian Analects. For me, the noblest heights of the
human soul are found in the Upanishads. For my Muslim friends the finest values
shine in the Quran, and for many in all religions Jesus and the Bible are spiritually
lustrous. Today we must remove the veil of distortion and accept cultural
pluralism as at once good and necessary. The pity is that petro-dollars and
market-friendly capture of territotires are the new yankee religion.
The sensitive issues where Christians and Hindus look at Muslims as clerical
artists of injustice turn, inter alia, on women and priesthood. So far as the West
is concerned, early Muslim conquest colour their views and the Hindus do not
forgive the Moghul conquest and other invasions robbing temples and what not.
Europe's memory of Islamic victories, attended with bloodshed in the centuries
after Islam, has, perhaps, left indelible imprints. But Christians also had
conqured Muslim countries, the scars and wounds of which are still poignantly
bleeding. When we assess the values of Islam and other religions, we cannot mix
up conquerors and their religions. Many wars have been fought by Christians
against Christians; equally so, Muslims have fought Muslims although both the
kings were muslims. Christianity and Islam are not c~lpable. It is the ruthless
rulers who are guilty of waging war, not Jesus Christ and Prophet Muhammad.
Hindu Maharajas have waged wars against other Hindu maharajahs but the Vedas
are not guilty for that. Islam spread to many countries and continents not with the
sword in had but kneeling before Allah. There are European Muslims, Hindu and
Sikh Americans, Krishan-conscious foreigners. India has been the Hindu home
but has been the peaceful habitat of 200 years of Christianity and Islam of 1000
years. Ashoka, the rarest of the rare of emperors, abjured violence and preached
peace and freedom for all faiths. Many Hindus go to temples chanting universal
prayers but practise what is contrary in actual life. Sunday Christians are antiChrist on all other days and Muslims are not exception. Many who live in Muslim
society pay only lip service to the notions of piety and faith and often disguise
materialist greed with religious rhetoric. George Bernard Shaw, in one of his
plays is bitingly cynical: "I am a Millionaire, that is my religion". Thus there are
many who worship Mammon but pretend to be Christians, Hindus and Muslims.
J;:ven otherwise, there are fanatics who hate every other religion. However, let us
look at the truth of Islam's teachings free from noxious memories of history. This
very exercise, objectively performed, will help build bridges of understanding
and exorcise the ghosts of prejudices lingering within. It is unfortunate, again as
Ahamad points out, that the Gulf war of 1991 and America's global hegemony
(ultimately making a profit out of its victory by collecting contributions from
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various countries, including so far away a country like Japan), has made Islam
appear ~s a symbol of dictatorship. It was not a war between Muhammad and
Jesus but between President Saddam, a dictator, and President Bush, the worlds
imperial super-power. Everyone who hated imperialism supported Iraq (not
Saddam). Not merely Muslims but Hindus and Christian Buddhists, opposed the
U.S. mass killings, even though they were disgusted with Saddam's dictatorship.
People everywhere hated the imperial arrogance and destruction by the US war
machines. Islam was not involved in the war and America was grabbing oil under
the guise of defending Kuwait.
I wonder if the Muslim League of India sheds tears over Bosnian butchery.
Similarly the BCCI is often associated with Islamic fraud of fund. That scam had
nothing to do with Islam although the top echelons of the Bank were Muslims.
Khomeini's fatwa against Rushdie was an aberration on both sides and could not
be treated as the criminality of Muslim Imams.
If follows that we have to study the Islamic faith which is difficult for the
West or, for that matter, many Hindus because of Pakistani incitement to
terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir. Even here the people of both the countries have
friendly relations. It is power politics, not Islam versus Hinduism which creates
this costly, cannibalistic estrangement and investment in defence weaponry. This
proposition holds good whether the wrangling godists be Christians, Jews,
Hindus or Muslims.
How religious hostility can pollute the loveliest truths is seen from the dark
lens turned on Taj Mahal by bigoted obscurantists. Ahamad's words are poignant:
"If there is one romantic monument instantly recognized throughout
the world that speaks to all peoples irrespective of colour or nationality
or race it is the Taj Mahal".
"It was the symbol of love, of romance, of imperial luxury and
extravagance; a symbol that was both Muslim and human, that spoke
to her of her identity and, above all, that expressed human love, the
love of a husband for a wife. "
"Shah Jahan' s selection of white marble with which to build the Taj
was by no means an innovation. His genius rather is expressed in the
overall concept and design of the mausoleum, in its power and
execution. Bothformally and symbolically he brought together fresh
itjeas in the creation of the Taj. "
"Of the many historical mounments created by the Muslims probably
the mostfamous are the Taj Mahal in Agra and, in Delhi, the Qutab
Minar, the Red Fort and the Juma mosque. The Muslim inspiration
and source of their creation has never been in doubt. But extremist
groups are claiming that the first two, with a long list of other
Muslim mon-uments, are of Hindu origin. The Muslims, these Hindu
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groups say, forcefully appropriated them, adding Quranicversesand
calligraphy to give them an Islamic character; it is time to restore
them to their Hindu character (Ahmed 1993).
Although few serious Indian historians, whether Hindu or Muslim,
give credit to these arguments, they have some support (Oak 1965).
They are also beginning to gather a popular bazaar following."

(Pages 95, 191 and 192 of the Book)
Omega

I conclude with a caveat. We, of various faiths, must accept a condition of
State and Society that in all matters, which do not infringe on religion, secularism
is an inflexible rule oflife. "Render unto Caser what is due to him and to God what
belongs to him', is the biblical tenet, which, if imaginatively read, forms the
foundation of secularism. Our world is but one, our religions are many. Inevitably,
religion must keep within its bounds and the State must secularly respect all
religions equally and operate only where the fundamentals of religion have no
play. Secularism is not a 'vacuous word' or a 'phantom concept'. Civilised life,
with its richness of diversity, finds it finest hour only when our poly-religious
universe shows high mutual respect and leaves to 'Caesar', i.e. the State, all
aspects of human affairs which have functional impact on material facets of life.
We must never abandon, however, that the sublime values and universal truths
which Buddha, Krishna, Christ, Muhammad and Gandhi embody must guide the
governance of mankind in secular affairs. In that sense, Truth is indivisible and
binds all religi(.ms to create and sustain a world of peace and progress.
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